Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo
The South West region is home to two of Nigeria’s three largest cities: Lagos and Ibadan. As a national and continental economic hub, Lagos sees a high level of political demonstrating, some of which has turned violent. The city saw high rates of rioting in January 2012, when violent demonstrations broke out against the federal government’s proposed cuts to a fuel subsidy, prompting some analysts to discuss the possibility of a ‘Nigerian Spring’.344 As elsewhere in the country, security forces have been accused of responding with excessive force against demonstrators.345
Osun, in the South West, was the only state in southern Nigeria that was not won by the current President Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP in the most recent 2011 general elections; having been won by the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) candidate, Nuhu Ribadu.346
Across a range of poverty measures, the South West region performs relatively well. The region has an infant mortality rate of 59, the lowest of all national regions.347 The South West also has one of the lowest rate of respondents reporting no educational attainment whatsoever.348 In spite of Lagos’ status as a national and regional economic hub, many city residents struggle with poor living conditions. Nearly two-fifths of the population lives in overcrowded housing, and a quarter have no access to adequate sanitation.349 In 2006, Lagos was recorded as having a Gini coefficient of 0.64, making it among the most unequal cities in Sub-Saharan Africa.350
Demographics and geography
The population of the South West region is estimated at 32.5 million people.351 The region’s population is predominantly Christian,352 and members of the Yoruba ethnic group, who make up approximately 21% of the national population, are concentrated in this area.353 The population of Lagos is an estimated 10.7m354 with an annual population growth rate of around 3.2%. Many of the drivers of armed violence in urban areas are amplified in a city the size of Lagos: the city is densely populated with pockets of overcrowding and extreme poverty reflecting the inequality that prevails there.
Armed violence in the South West region is concentrated in Lagos, where over 55% of the recorded conflict events in the region are located.355 Lagos is the second most conflict-affected state in Nigeria, although levels of political violence were highest in the 1990s and early 2000s, in the early years of the transition to civilian rule.356 This figure does not reflect explicitly criminal armed violence, which is extremely high: Nigeria Watch data identifies Lagos as having the highest relative number of deaths due to crime in the country.357
Civil society in the South West: Lagos, Ogun and Osun
In Lagos, 26 organisations, including 18 civil society organisations, were surveyed.
Civil society in Lagos is second in terms of capacities, after Abuja: The survey has shown that, across Nigeria, the Lagos civil society organisations have the strongest financial capacity after Abuja, with median annual budgets of more than 10 million naira, and a higher geographical coverage than most other zones – 81% of the organisations work at the national level.
Civil Society in Lagos also cooperates with the security sector more than in other zones: Lagos is home to a number of influential civil society organisations with important links to the security sector. Several of the big Lagos-based non-profit organisations state that they work with the police, the military and the National Human Rights Commission. Roles include, for instance, training the police and the army on violence-reduction in law enforcement.358
Ogun and Osun
The following 55 organisations were identified and interviewed in Osun and Ogun:
Civil society organisations in Ogun and Osun have slightly higher financial capacities, but less staff than the national median. They work with a median budget of about five million annually – slightly more than the national median of 3.8 million naira. With a median of five full-time employees and about 10 volunteers, they seem to engage less staff than the national median of seven and 12, respectively.
Civil Society in Ogun and Osun is also characterised by prominent vigilante groups and community-based organisations. In comparison to other zones, more community-based organisations and vigilante groups were identified – potentially a reflection of their perceived importance in the fight against armed violence. Many of them operate with a rather limited median budget of between one and two million Naira, and no full-time staff. Instead, they often engage with significant numbers of volunteers – sometimes more than 500. This means that, even if their financial capacity can’t compare to some of the NGOs and faith-based organisations, their staff numbers and the resulting importance of their work can.
Lagos is the historical and commercial capital of Nigeria, located in the southwest of the country.359 It is the country’s largest urban area, and one of the largest cities on the African continent, with some analysts predicting that Lagos will become the world’s third largest city by 2015, behind Tokyo and Mumbai.360
Lagos is the second most conflict-affected state in Nigeria, according to the ACLED dataset, although levels of political violence were highest in the 1990s and early 2000s, in the early years of the transition to civilian rule.361 Nigeria Watch data identifies Lagos as having the highest relative number of deaths due to crime in the country.362
Decentralised militias are the most common violent actor in the state. These groups operate on the border of criminal-political violence and engage in opportunistic rather than strategic violence for the most part.363 Many of the drivers of armed violence in urban areas are amplified in a city the size of Lagos: the city is densely populated with pockets of overcrowding and extreme poverty. In 2006, Lagos had a Gini coefficient of 0.64, amongst the highest in Sub-Saharan African cities. 364
City residents struggle with poor living conditions – nearly two-fifths of the population lives in overcrowded housing, and a quarter have no access to adequate sanitation – and limited opportunities: 40% of males and 12% of females were unemployed according to 2006 data.365
Our researcher’s mapping of responses to armed violence identified 26 organisations, including 18 civil society groups, working to reduce and address armed violence in the city. Those surveyed had the second highest financial resources at their disposal (following those based in Abuja), with median annual budgets of 10 million naira, and 4 out of 5 these organisations operate on the national, as opposed to local or state level.366
The indigenous peoples of Lagos State are the Yoruba subgroups of the Aworis in Ikeja, the Eguns in the Badagry area and the ljebus in Ikorodu and Epe, while Lagos Island consists of a mixture of Benin and Eko Aworis as well as repatriated Yorubas and other immigrants.
Overview of armed violence in the state
Armed robbery, organised crime, disproportionate use of force by state authorities and domestic violence are perceived to be high in Lagos. It is also notorious for its ethnic militia and vigilante groups. According to the 2012 CLEEN victimisation survey, 23% of Lagos’s inhabitants were victims of crime in 2010.367 Among these, 13% have experienced robbery.368
A 2005 assessment by Wale Adebanwi put the number of armed violence outbreaks recorded in Nigeria between 1999 and 2003 at over 50, with Lagos accounting for at least 15. Ginifer (2005) identifies at least 8 forms of armed violence in Nigeria, including Lagos. These include inter and intra-communal violence, ethnic militia and vigilante violence, political and electoral violence, armed criminality and ‘gang- sterism,’ state armed violence, state-sponsored violence, arms racing and ethno-religious violence.
Few cases of domestic violence have also been reported in Lagos compared with states in other zones. According to the CLEEN Foundation, a non- governmental organisation headquartered in Lagos, 33 per cent of respondents in the South South said they had suffered or are suffering from it while the North East came in second with 26 per cent. Fewer cases were recorded in the South West region (including Lagos).
Perpetrators of armed violence
The main actors involved in armed violence in Lagos include ethnic militias, so-called Area Boys, youths, criminal gangs and the state security apparatus itself. Ethnic militias in Lagos and across the South West region, the dominant ethnic militia-cum-vigilante group is the OPC (Oodua People’s Congress).
‘Area boys’ are the unemployed young people – mostly men – who take part in opportunistic violence in Lagos.They are easily mobilized for armed violence and although no precise data exists, there are probably several thousand across Lagos. Area Boys have traditionally had some positive connotations as community service providers. But they started to turn into a negative phenomenon in the late 1980s as a result, in part, of government economic adjustment programmes that exacerbated unemployment and resulted in cut-backs on social service provision, and of the increase in narcotic trading and consumption in Lagos.
Not all youths are Area Boys. The UN estimates that there are 25 million economically, socially and politically deprived youths in Nigeria. The inequalities and difficulties faced by these youths contribute heavily to the incidence of armed violence in Lagos. Criminal gangs are involved in various types of violence including armed robberies and gang conflicts.
Finally, the state security agencies themselves – the police, paramilitaries, special security elements, and the armed forces – are involved in armed violence. Many of these are involved in illicit activities backed up by the threat of, or actual use, of armed violence.
Victims of armed violence in the state
Victims of armed violence in Lagos are mainly ordinary citizens, including vulnerable groups such as women and children, the old and the physically challenged.
However, members of the Nigerian armed forces and the Nigerian Police have also remained both perpetrators and victims of armed violence.
Since the return to civil rule in 1999, civil society organisations, international development agencies and state authorities have undertaken various efforts at reducing armed violence in Lagos. Police authorities and successive state governments have set up special joint task forces in response to increasing armed robbery and other violent crimes.
Civil society groups in Lagos generally have a broader focus – 81% of the organisations work at the national level. Lagos is home to a number of influential civil society organisations with important links to the security sector. Several of the big Lagos-based non-profit organisations work with the police, the military and the National Human Rights Commission on tasks such as training the police and the army on violence-reduction in law enforcement.369
The Lagos State House of Assembly enacted a Domestic Violence Prohibition Law in 2007. However, the government’s failure to undertake genuine and radical security sector reform also predisposes the police and other security forces to violence and corruption.
Civil society groups have been collaborating with the police and the National Human Rights Commission to organise human rights training for the police officers.
CLEEN also runs a youth program aimed at reorienting youth against drug abuse and other crimes.
The British Department for International Development and Justice for All (J4A), in collaboration with CLEEN Foundation has developed an intervention plan to support the development of voluntary policing sector (VPS) groups (otherwise known as Vigilantes) in Lagos State. The aim of the project is to improve the responsiveness and effectiveness of the service delivery, increase accountability of vigilante groups in Lagos community and help them to work more closely with the Nigeria Police at the divisional command level and other relevant counterparts.
J4A said that the pivotal role that vigilante groups play in addressing the safety and security needs of poor communities is well documented. For many Nigerians, especially the poor, VPS groups are the first, and in some cases, the only groups they feel able to go to for their safety and security needs.
The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding Nigeria (WANEP-Nigeria), a civil society network headquartered in Lagos, was established to provide an organised platform for collaborative peace-building for conflict transformation and development in Nigeria by indigenous Non Governmental Organizations.
Progress has undeniably been made in Lagos in recent years. As columnist Kayode Komolafe wrote in 2011: “The physical efforts to battle crimes should be coupled with a socio-economic war on poverty. The strategy must ultimately encompass social security. For in the long run, it is social security that could enhance physical security. The product of such a strategy would be a more enduring security model.”
Lagos state: view from the ground
While political violence in Lagos continues, its attendant fatalities have decreased in recent years. Rather, AOAV found that armed violence in Lagos is often related to trade, specifically the control of land, motor parks and market places. Non-indigenes, especially those from South-East Nigeria, who are primarily traders, often come under attack during disputes with indigenes. These intimidation attacks are typically carried out by armed youths under the influence of alcohol.
Attacks on merchants and customer over-extortion along with demands for protection money and ongoing territorial disputes all plague Lagos’ huge and bustling markets. At Lagos’ Alaba International Market – with more than 5,000 traders, one of the largest in Africa – the market’s legal counsel, Festus Keyamo, recently wrote a petition to the Lagos State government: “These touts and hoodlums armed with all manner of weapons are stationed along the Ojo-Igbede Alaba road and its environs, collecting illegal tolls from drivers and owners of containers lawfully and dutifully cleared and paid for by traders. The most annoying in this show of shame is the brutality visited upon our clients and their customers in the course of extorting money from them.”
In Lagos, we saw that many markets in the city have established their own armed forces to defend themselves. Traders at Alaba International, Iddo, Idumota, Ladipo, Oshodi, Mile 12 and Owode Onirin markets have stockpiled arms and engage attackers in defensive and reprisal attacks.
Another source of armed violence in Lagos are the so-called “cults” – gangs organised as university-campus confraternities, and more recently as non-university street gangs, that use armed violence and intimidation as part of a slew of criminal activities.
Violence between smugglers and customs officials has been a part of Lagos life for some time, with a rise in reported killings on each side in recent years. Sometimes customs officials manage to intercept arms and ammunition, but the borders remain porous. A July 2013, interception announced by Lagos police commissioner Umar Manko illustrates the real dangers posed by smugglers’ wares: “[A] vehicle was brought to the station and a search was conducted. Twenty-six cartons of live cartridges concealed in T-shirts … were recovered. A Navy Warrant Officer’s uniform … ID card, beret and shoes were also recovered inside the vehicle.”
Lagos has the most vibrant media presence in Nigeria, with the highest concentration of print, online and electronic media in the nation. However, Nigeria’s media lacks both a full understanding of the country’s armed-violence problem and the skills and resources to do appropriate investigative journalism to cover the extent of this widespread issue. Most stories are covered as breaking news and not followed up.
Ogun state – also known as the Gateway State – was created from the former Western State in 1976 by the administration of General Murtala Muhammed.370 The new state was composed of the former Abeokuta and Ijebu provinces of Western State. Ogun borders Lagos State to the south, Oyo and Osun states to the north, Ondo state to the east and the republic of Benin to the west. Abeokuta is the capital and largest city in the state. Other cities and towns in the Ogun State are Ijebu Ode, Sagamu, Ijebu Igbo, Ilaro Ayetoro and Ota.
Ogun has 20 Local Government Areas (LGAs) each headed by a Chairman. It is divided into four geo-political Zones, three Senatorial Districts, nine Federal and 26 State Constituencies.
Ogun is a largely agricultural area, and as such its population relies heavily on farming for their income. Of the state’s population centres, only Abeokuta has adequate water from the source. Other major settlements have between 25% and 70% of their present demand met. Rural areas are generally poorly supplied, with only about 50% having access to potable water.
Geography and demography
Ogun is located in the southwestern corner of Nigeria, bordering Oyo, Osun and Ondo states and the Republic of Benin. The residents of Ogun State mostly belong to the Yoruba ethnic group, comprising mainly the Egba, the Yewa, the Awori, the Egun, the Ijebu and the Remo. As with Nigeria as a whole, Ogun is largely divided between Muslims and Christians, along with a small number of believers in traditional religions.
Overview of armed violence in the state
According to a survey by the CLEEN Foundation, Ogun state is the safest in Nigeria, with only 5% of respondents reporting having been the victim of crime.371However, the same survey found that Ogun state’s residents had the highest fear of crime, at 94% of respondents claiming they feared the impact of crime in their lives.
The disparity between the actual experience of crime and the extent to which Ogun residents fear it demonstrates that the impact of armed violence is vast and far-reaching, and that the negative effects of armed violence extend well beyond human and economic cost. It is an opinion held that this further damages Nigeria’s much taunted image internationally at a time when foreign investors are being attracted to the country.
The increase in armed violence in Ogun State and other parts of Nigeria was the result of an imbalance in the administration of justice and unfair distribution of resources. The frustrations caused by the lack of justice and widening economic gap between the privileged and the disadvantaged is a major impetus to armed violence incidence.
Main underlying causes
In Ogun state, many drivers and factors contributed to the increase of armed violence incidence, which was recorded mostly in the state capital and other major towns. These factors include: spontaneous reactions / expression, socio–economic factors, desire for retaliation for prior incidents, unemployment, poverty, policy disagreements, implementation of existing laws, corruption and religious disputes.
There are a number of more specific flashpoints, grievances and motivations for armed violence – some of which are specific to the state itself, but most are issues that are felt across Nigeria. These include armed robbery and burglary; land grabbing and land speculators (for instance in Omo Onile / Ajagungbale); cultism; local power struggles – such as the issue of chieftaincy e.g Oluke Orile (Ewekoro Local Government); religious tension e.g Ososa (Odogbolu Local Government); political violence (mostly during election campaign and voting); commercial transport union violence; violence that impacts traditional or cultural festivals (e.g Egungun festival); and boundary disputes (e.g Bakatari).
Criminals in Ogun use a variety of weapons, including long guns, pistols, cutlasses, knives, machetes, acid, arrows, empty bottles and stones. In larger incidents, such as a clash between different factions of motorcycle riders in Abeokuta, most of these types of weapons are used simultaneously.372
Victims of armed violence
The victims of these criminal acts are both male and female while perpetrators are mostly men. According to the CLEEN Foundation, Ogun was on the low end of incidence of robbery, with 8% of residents reporting that they were the victims of the crime, the third-lowest rate in the country. However, the number of victims of physical assault is much higher, with 38% of Ogun residents reporting being victims – the fifth-highest rate in the country.373
By and large, the Ogun state government’s reaction to armed violence has centred around seven policies. These are the introduction of a new Police / Army Joint Task Force; the purchase of armoured tanks and other security equipment; the introduction of a Quick Response Squad (QRS); the cancellation of Police check- points on highways; the establishment of a vigilante service of Ogun State; the provision of employment opportunity to youths; and an ongoing sensitisation / awareness campaign.
Which institutions are most effective at addressing armed violence
There are a wide range of institutions working to reduce armed violence in Ogun. These include the Nigeria Police Force; Nigeria Prison Service; Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps; State Security Services; Vigilante service of Ogun state; Central Department of Statistics, Ministry of Finance, Oke-Mosan; Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs); Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and Faith Based organizations (FBOs).
In Nigeria as a whole, only 18% of crimes are reported to police. But Ogun residents report 33% of crimes – the third-highest rate in the country.374 This indicates the Ogun population’s level of trust in the authorities in their state is higher than the national average. However, during the course of the research for this report, it also became clear that many governmental organisations and agencies use deeply bureaucratic approaches and adopt often hard-to-rationalise information sharing policies that act as a brake to prompt response and transparency. More in this area needs to be done.
Efforts to address armed violence
Few stakeholders working directly in armed violence reduction are government owned or their affiliated agencies. Those that work indirectly are generally non-Governmental organisations. This reinforces the belief among many local organisations that, for violence to be properly addressed in this state, states must come together and work in partnership with local, regional and international civil society organisations. Only by doing so will they be able to successfully address the challenges posed by armed violence.
International cooperation and assistance are also critical to reducing the level of violence in Ogun state, in order to better enforce existing law. Fundamentally, all levels of government must integrate strategies to cope with armed violence in their development plans.
Osun state was created from Oyo state under the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida in 1991.375Located in the western part of Nigeria, it borders Kwara, Oyo, Ogun, Ondo and Ekiti states. The majority of Osun people are Yoruba. The state has a heavily agricultural economy. Osun’s current governor is Ogbeni Rauf Aregbesola, who was installed by a court order in 2010 after challenging the results of the 2007 elections. Osun has seen periodic disputes over the results of its elections.
Overview of armed violence in the state
Osun State has seen extensive violence around elections, particularly during the voters’ registration period and during and after Election Day. This violence, whose effects ranged from property damage to deaths and injuries, occurred in Ede, Iwo, Ejigbo, Ilesha, Ifon, Ife, Ikirun, Osogbo and Ikire in 2007 and to a lesser degree in 2011. Political opponents threatened and intimidated the electorate, destroying lives and property. In addition to the disruption of the electoral processes, this period saw significant amounts of cultural and religious violence in places such as Ifon, Okinni, Ife and Modakeke. Efforts by informal social networks and formal community institutions to address the conflict have not produced lasting peace.
Despite this background of violence, the CLEEN Foundation’s survey of responses to crime and armed violence found that Osun State recorded the lowest level of fear of crime, with a low level of 40% of respondents indicating that they feared being victims of crime. (For comparison, in Taraba state, 99% of the population answered affirmatively.)
In 2006, a post-census boundary adjustment led to an eruption of cultural violence amongst the people of Ifon and Ilobu in Orolu and Irepodun Local Government Areas. About 120 people lost their lives, and there was considerable injury and property damage in both areas.
In 2008-2009, cultural violence also was recorded among the people of Igbaye in Odo-Otin Local Government Area. Igbaye indigenes reacted aggressively to the person pronounced as Oba-elect (King-elect) by the state government, which escalated into violence.
The same period saw cultural violence in the Okinni lands of the Egbedore Local Government Area, where two kings both claimed the same throne. Both royal families and their supporters became hostile to each other, leading to serious violence which was suppressed with the deployment of Nigerian Mobile Police units, but which only completely ended when the courts made a final ruling to settle the disputed case.
Some violence in Osun crosses both cultural and political issues. For example, in 2010, violence erupted in Iperindo after Rauf Aregbesola was declared Governor of Osun State by the courts. Members of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) party attacked the palace of the King of Iperindo believing he supported Aregbesola.
Perpetrators of armed violence
Much of the electoral violence has been perpetrated by unemployed youth. Unemployment is a critical issue here: many politicians, traditional leaders and wealthy individuals have taken advantage of rampant poverty and unemployment in order to recruit young men and women. These people are then used to intimidate and even kill their opponents or opponents’ supporters.
Motivations for violence in Osun state vary. Political/ electoral violence and terrorism are motivated by poverty, lack of education and absence of opportunities.
Ethnic and religious violence is caused by a lack of understanding and tolerance. Sexual and criminal violence are generally opportunistic.
The weapons used in violence in Osun state tend to be knives, swords, handguns and long guns. Many of these weapons are paid for or provided by politicians for electoral violence. During the 2007 election, some prominent politicians were seen carrying guns around in broad daylight in order to intimidate the electorate. There is also a considerable unlicensed local arms production industry.
Victims of armed violence
In Orolu, the groups mostly affected by armed violence are youth. In 2006, during the boundary adjustment dispute, 120 people were killed and 320 were injured, with reports mainly being on younger people impacted. In Iwo, youths were also primarily involved when PDP and ACN supporters attacked their perceived political rivals.
In Modakeke, the people affected by armed violence were youths, children, women and men with an age range between 5 and 56. Modakeke has a long history of bloody clashes, including lengthy periods of violence in 1835-1849, 1882-1909, 1946-1949, 1981, 1983, 1997-1998, and 2000, making the violence there the oldest intra-ethnic conflict in Nigeria. The causes of armed violence include disputes over cultural identity, economic factors and politics.
While there is little to no armed violence in the Ife and Modakeke communities today, the psychological underpinnings of violence remain in place. In a survey of 360 individuals drawn equally from the two communities, 34.4% of the respondents agreed the conflict is not resolved while 22.1% said that they still expect a resumption of the crisis between the two communities.
The most effective institutions addressing armed violence in Osun are the Army, the Nigeria Police Mobile Force, the Red Cross Society and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps.
These institutions could be more effective if they operated in collaboration with non-governmental organisations. However, there seems to be a negative view towards work of this type. The result is that government agencies give incomplete information and do not fully cooperate with NGOs, making more accurate assessments of the state of armed violence in Osun impossible.
The issue of security cooperation is significant, as is the question of re-training and reforming the Nigerian police force. The government should re-orient the police towards a community policing model rather than emphasising more aggressive tactics. Finally, the government needs to emphasise the issue of economic inequality and ensure equitable opportunities for all Nigerians to limit the motivation for violence in Osun and elsewhere.
Overviews of armed violence per geopolitical region:
- The Violent Road: an overview of armed violence in Nigeria
- Federal Capital Territory (Abuja)
- North Central (Benue, Kogi, Plateau)
- North East (Bauchi, Borno, Taraba)
- North West (Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto)
- South South (Edo, Rivers, Delta)
- South East (Anambra, Ebonyi, Imo)
- South West (Lagos, Ogun, Osun)
344 John Campbell, ‘Nigeria’s Battle for Stability,’ The National Interest, Vol, 118, Mar-Apr 2012, p. 33.
345 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2013: Nigeria.
346 Nigeria Elections Coalition, Nigeria Presidential Elections – 2011, http://nigeriaelections.org/presidential.php.
347 National Population Commission, Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2008, November 2009, p. 121.
348 National Population Commission, Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2008, November 2009, pp. 15, 16.
349 UNHABITAT, State of the World’s Cities 2012/2013, 2013, p. 80.
350 UNHABITAT, State of the World’s Cities 2010/2011, 2011, p. 80.
351 National Bureau of Statistics, Social Statistics in Nigeria Part III: Health, Employment, Public Safety, Population and Vital Registration, 2012, p. 71.
353 Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa, April 2010, p. ii.
354 National Bureau of Statistics, Social Statistics in Nigeria Part III: Health, Employment, Public Safety, Population and Vital Registration, 2012, p. 71.
355 Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED), www.acleddata.com, violent conflict events (excluding non-violent activity) from January 1999 – June 2013.
356 Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED), www.acleddata.com.
357 Nigeria Watch, Third Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006-2011), June 2011, p. 5.
358 Okechukwu Nwanguma, “Background Paper on Lagos”, October 2012, unpublished background paper.
359 The information in this section is taken from the following sources:
359 Ginifer, J and Ismail, O. 2005. Armed violence and poverty in Nigeria: Mini case study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative. Centre for International Cooperation and Security, Department of Peace Studies.
359 Muggah, R. 2007. Armed Violence in Africa: Reflections on the Cost of Crime and Conflict. UNDP, Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Kenya. [Online]. [Accessed 2012]. Available from: http://www.genevadeclaration.org/filead- min/docs/regional-publications/Costs-of-Crime-and- Conflict-in-Africa.pdf
359 Online Nigeria. People, Population and Settlement. [Online]. [Accessed 2012]. Available from: www.onlinenigeria.com/links/LinksReadPrint.asp?blurb=322
359 Oyo, R. 2002. Ethnic Militias Guard Tribal Divides. Gemini News Service.
359 Oyo, R. 2002. Only Dialogue Can Tame This Crisis. This Day
360 United States Institute of Peace, Climate Change Adaptation and Conflict in Nigeria, 2011.
361 Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED), www.acleddata.com.
362 Nigeria Watch, Third Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006-2011), June 2011, p. 5.
363 Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED),www.acleddata.com
364 UNHABITAT, State of the World’s Cities 2010/2011, 2011, p. 80.
365 UNHABITAT, State of the World’s Cities 2012/2013, 2013, p. 80.
366 National Working Group on Armed Violence and Action on Armed Violence, Mapping Efforts against Armed Violence in Nigeria: Interim Report, 2013, p. 12.
368 CLEEN (2012a). Presentation of Summary of Findings, http://cleenfoundation.blogspot.co.uk/2012/07/summary-of-findings-of-2012-national.html, accessed.
369 Okechukwu Nwanguma, “Background Paper on Lagos”, October 2012, unpublished background paper.
370 The information in this section is taken from:
370 Central Department of Statistics, Ministry of Finance. [Online]. [Accessed 2012]. Available from: http://www.ogunstate.gov.ng/http://www.ogunstate.gov.ng/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=106: ministry-of-finance&catid=59:ministries&Itemid=412
370 Ogun State. 2012. [Online]. [Accessed 2012]. Available from: http://ogunstate.gov.ng/
370 Population Figures. 2012. [Online]. [Accessed 2012]. Available from: http://ogunstate.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&vie w=article&id=229&Itemid=208 CLEEN Foundation, “Public Presentation of Findings of the
371 National Crime Victimization and Safety Survey,” 2013, accessed from http://gallery.mailchimp.com/dfa149110658bf 12270745fe1/files/Text_Report_of_2013_NCVS_Findings.pdf on 14 November 2013.
372 Olatunji, Segun, “Ogun okada riders clash in court, 25 arrested,” Punch, 1 November 2013, accessed from http://www.punchng.com/metro/ogun-okada-riders-clash- in-court-25-arrested-2/ on 14 November 2013.
373 CLEEN Foundation, 2013.
375 The information in this section is taken from:
375 CLEEN Foundation. 2012. Communiqué issued at the end of 6th policing executive form on intelligence –led policing in Nigeria. [Online]. [Accessed October 2012]. Available at: http://cleenfoundation.blogspot.co.uk/2012/ 07/communique-issued-at-end-of-6th.html
375 Joachim, A. 2012. Curbing Armed Violence in Nigeria. [Online]. [Accessed 22 October 2012]. Available at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/09/curbing-armed- violence-in-nigeria/
375 Nigeria Galleria. 2012. Osun State. [Online]. [Accessed 15 October 2012]. Available at: http://www.nigeriagalleria.com/ Nigeria/States_Nigeria/Osun_State.html
This report is a draft and may be subject to change.