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Case studies: Myanmar military – Assessing the effectiveness of the Arms Trade Treaty, Part 7

The violence in Myanmar has drastically increased since February 2021 when the military seized control after Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy won the election. The country had been a quasi-democracy since 2011, with the military remaining the dominant force within the political system. Following her win in 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi had come under scrutiny due to the treatment of the Rohingya in Myanmar and allegations that the Myanmar military was carrying out genocide on the Rohingya people. Since the coup in February 2021, the situation worsened further, inspiring protest and civil disobedience, followed by violent responses from the military.

The minorities around Myanmar have frequently been the target of military violence and the military leader has received international condemnation for the attacks on minorities.[i] The violence against the Rohingya people from 2017 and the widespread violence since 2021 has seen thousands killed, raped, abused and displaced. While many forms of violence have contributed to this harm, the below sections will focus on the use of explosive weapons by Myanmar’s military junta, particularly their use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

It is worth iterating the difficulties in assessing this harm due to the attacks on journalism and journalists in the country, especially since the coup; including arrest and torture, forcing many into hiding.[ii]

Read the full report here

Civilian deaths and injuries from Myanmar explosive weapon use

The above table indicates the harm recorded each year, though underreported, from the use of manufactured explosive weapons by Myanmar’s military forces, demonstrating the escalation seen in the last few years. Many more instances of this type of violence were recorded without the source identifying Myanmar’s military as responsible, though it is likely they were responsible for many of these events. Of the 498 civilian casualties, 245 were killed and 253 were injured. This total includes at least 33 female casualties, though gender is rarely mentioned in casualty reports – mentioned in just 18 of the 86 incidents. Children accounted for 58 of the civilian casualties, having been reported in 31 of the 86 incidents.

This harm looks set to worsen, with 236 civilian casualties recorded in just the first six months of 2022, as a result of the use of manufactured explosive weapons by Myanmar military forces.

The above graph indicates the explosive weapon types reported to have been used in the incidents recorded between 2012-2021. Artillery shells have been the most used weapon type, while airstrikes have caused the most civilian casualties. The location most targeted by this violence has been villages, with 61 incidents causing 309 civilian casualties. Four incidents targeting places of worship have resulted in 29 civilian casualties in this period. While two incidents, targeting public gatherings, caused 103 civilian casualties.

In one incident in April 2021, grenades, mortars and machine guns were used to target protesters in Bago. More than 80 were reported killed – a number for those injured was not reported in English-language sources.[iii] The use of excessive force targeted at peaceful protestors is a serious violation of international human rights law which is covered under Article 7 of the ATT.[iv]

While indirect casualties are a lot harder to measure, the below sections should give some indication of the further fatal consequences of this violence.

Impact on infrastructure and communities

Damage and destruction

Of the 86 incidents of manufactured explosive weapons use by Myanmar’s military forces, recorded by AOAV, almost a third (29%) reported infrastructure damage or destruction. This has typically been general destruction in the neighbourhood or village targeted, or specific mention of homes. Nevertheless, destruction to infrastructure is rarely included in reporting.

ACLED data sheds further light on the level of damage from some of the explosive violence seen. ACLED records incidents even when no casualties are reported so can give a better idea of the levels of damage caused. Between 2020 and 2021, ACLED recorded 655 incidents of explosive weapon use by Myanmar military forces; 189 occurred in 2020 and 465 in 2021.[v] The vast majority of these incidents were airstrikes (127) or shelling (481).

While ACLED does not include a mechanism in their data where damage to buildings is recorded, 84 of the incident descriptions included this information. Of these, 32 mentioned damage to buildings without providing a figure on the number of properties damaged. Most mentioned damage to homes, two mentioned damage to “almost the entire village”, two more mentioned damage to churches and homes and one included damage to a Dharma Hall and homes. The other 52 incidents gave a figure for the number of buildings damaged or destroyed, which totalled 525 buildings; mostly homes but also churches, schools, an office, monasteries, and shops.

In some of the worst incidents, more than 100 homes and other buildings were destroyed in artillery shelling, giving an idea of the scale of the damage possible in such incidents.

Displacement

As of May 2022, over a year since the coup, more than 605,700 people are estimated by the UNHCR to have been newly displaced.[vi] Frequently displacement has been triggered by the use of airstrikes and artillery shelling on civilian infrastructure.

Fortify Rights in their Nowhere is Safe report, highlighted that an incident in Bago, mentioned earlier, prompted tens of thousands to flee; residents are said to have reported over 100,000 fleeing.[vii] A further 59,000 are estimated to have sought refuge in neighbouring countries since the coup.

It should also be borne in mind that UN figures are likely to be an underestimate, with local reports putting the numbers of displaced far higher. In Kayah State, civil society estimates the number of displaced at 170,000; almost double the UN estimate.[viii]The continued threat of attack, the destruction of homes, disruption to services, blocked roads and the presence of landmines, also prevent returns and restricts access to certain locations, including farmland, homes and schools.[ix]

Impact on health and well-being

Healthcare personnel have played a key role in the protests, and health facilities and personnel have been frequent targets of the Myanmar military junta. According to data from the WHO, there have been 293 attacks on health personnel, between 2020 and 2021.[x] The data shows that 56 of the attacks occurred with the use of ‘heavy weapons’[xi] or ‘individual weapons’,[xii] in some cases alongside other forms of violence. Of these attacks, 25 resulted in casualties, with 26 deaths and 53 injuries recorded in these attacks.

Of the 56 attacks which occurred using heavy or individual weapons, 17 impacted healthcare facilities. It is unclear whether this indicates damage or destruction to these facilities. 13 also impacted healthcare transport, 51 impacted healthcare personnel, four impacted supplies, one impacted a warehouse, and 10 impacted patients. All but one of these attacks occurred in 2021.

While data by Insecurity Insight shows 444 reported incidents of conflict violence that affected health care in 2021, of which nine are confirmed to have used explosive weapons, not including IEDs.[xiii]

The above table includes some of the incidents recorded by Insecurity Insight on their Global Map where explosive weapons were used in 2021.[xiv] Some of the buildings with damage or destruction mentioned in these incidents include a prosthetic clinic, a sub-rural health clinic, a drug rehabilitation centre and a hospital.

The damage to facilities and the loss of health personnel are likely to have a significant impact on the provision of services for a population at a time of increased need; firstly, due to the conflict and the civilian impact, and secondly, due to the COVID-19 pandemic occurring alongside this violence.A BMJ article, from October 2021, highlighted this dual struggle facing healthcare and the civilian population.[xv] It also noted the destruction of COVID-19 treatment centres in June 2021.

Impact on healthcare

Even before the coup, Myanmar had just 0.67 doctors per 10,000 people – the average is about 15.6.[xvi] The loss of healthcare personnel and facilities are likely to have a profound impact, not just immediately but for many years to come.

Much of the population remains unvaccinated and the survival rate from COVID-19 decreased after the coup, with difficulties in receiving supplies, including medicine, vaccines and oxygen due to displacement and military interference.

For many, there will also be a lasting psychological toll. A humanitarian worker, who works with IDPs in Kayah estimated that of the approximately 56,000 displaced children, about half need professional psychiatric services;[xvii] with many children running for cover whenever they hear a plane. Many predict there will be long-term limited access to healthcare, contributing to lasting physical and psychosocial trauma.[xviii]

Nevertheless, parents and humanitarian workers are not in a position to even consider mental health, with the focus on providing necessities like food and clean water. The World Food Programme predicted that the number of children going hungry would double in 2021 to 6.2 million,[xix] while the UNDP estimated that by early 2022, 46% of the population in Myanmar would live below the poverty line.[xx] This reflects a two-fold increase in the poverty headcount, first due to the COVID-19 pandemic, followed by the military violence since the coup.[xxi]

While it is difficult to prove a direct link between explosive violence and the health consequences, it is clear that the reverberating impacts of explosive weapon use, particularly displacement, damage to health infrastructure and loss of personnel, have contributed to, or intensified, the impact on civilian well-being.

Impact on education

Children in Myanmar already lost a year of education due to the COVID-19 pandemic prior to the coup.[xxii] The impact of the violence that followed as part of the coup has exacerbated this situation, with many students and teachers fearing returning to school, as well as damage to education facilities.

Education facilities damaged and destroyed

In May 2021 alone Save the Children reported that 103 schools and other education facilities were attacked and frequently damaged by explosives, including IEDs, shelling and grenades.[xxiii]

Data from Insecurity Insight for 2021 (table above) saw the military in Myanmar carry out at least nine attacks on education facilities, using explosive weapons or a combination of weapons.[xxiv] These attacks destroyed four facilities and damaged a further three.

In 2020, Insecurity Insight recorded two incidents where state use of explosive weapons resulted in damage to schools in Rakhine. Students were also injured in these attacks.[xxv] ACLED also recorded the destruction of a school in Pyain Tein village, Paletwa Township, Chin state, on March 15th 2020.

Additional incidents have been recorded by the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) in the last few years (table).[xxvi]

While this data is incomplete, it does indicate that schools have not been safe from attack in Myanmar, and even seem to have been the target of violence on occasion.

Disruption caused

Many students have been fearful of going to school. In Rakhine, this has been the situation since 2017 and this has extended to the rest of the country since the coup. In June 2021, Reuters reported that of 12 million children, no more than a quarter enrolled for the new school year across the country.[xxxi] By December, UNICEF estimated this stood at 40-50%.[xxxii] When children have returned, the quality of education is said to have decreased, with many teachers still absent or boycotting – 125,000 teachers had been suspended by June 2021.[xxxiii]

While there are many reasons for the decisions not to send children to school, children and parents have expressed concerns over security and violence, including bombings.[xxxiv] The use of explosive weapons by the state military is just one of the many challenges to education.

Findings related to the ATT

The continuous targeting of populated areas, the significant infrastructure damage, particularly to homes and healthcare facilities, as well as civilian harm directly, violate international humanitarian law and human rights law. It seems likely that many arms transfers to Myanmar would violate States Parties’ commitments under the ATT.

While the arms embargo announced by the UN in June 2021 is nonbinding, this should be indicative of the approach which should be taken to supplying arms to Myanmar.[xxxv] The actions perpetrated against the Rohingya, which has included the use of explosive weapons, has resulted in genocide allegations for several years, with the US declaring the actions of the Myanmar military as genocide in March 2022.[xxxvi]

As far back as 2018, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar made a recommendation to prevent arms transfers to Myanmar, “considering the overriding risk that they would be used to undermine peace and security and in the commission of serious crimes of international law.”[xxxvii] The violations of international law highlighted in this report included attacks on civilians and indiscriminate attacks using explosive weaponry, as well as the failure to take requisite precaution in attacks and the destruction of civilian property. The report also found evidence of unlawful killings in the context of hostilities, including civilians targeted by shelling as they fled.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Myanmar called on the Member States of the UN Security Council to put forward a resolution to stop arms sales to the military junta in Myanmar, which would be binding on Member States.[xxxviii] In any event, the UN Special Rapporteur stated that:

“Arms transfers to the Myanmar military after 2018 were done with the full knowledge that they would likely be used in attacks against civilians. As such, Member States had an obligation under international humanitarian law, customary international law, and the Arms Trade Treaty, if they are Party to it, to prevent arms transfers from their respective jurisdictions to Myanmar.”[xxxix]

Human Rights Council, ‘Enabling Atrocities: UN Member States’ Arms Transfers to the Myanmar Military, Conference room paper of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar’

With this in mind, it is essential to better understand where Myanmar’s arms have come from and the ATT status of the suppliers.

Arms exports to Myanmar

Many states have continued to supply weapons to Myanmar since accusations of genocide and the report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar. When the report by the Human Rights Council on ‘The economic interests of the Myanmar military from the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar’, was released in 2019 no state party to the ATT was found to be transferring arms to Myanmar.[xl] However, some signatories, who have an obligation to “refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose” of the ATT,[xli] had transferred arms to the Myanmar army; these included Ukraine, the Philippines and Israel.[xlii]

Even since the coup, there have been a few states which have continued to supply arms to Myanmar’s military forces, and one of these states has now acceded to the ATT and another has been party to the ATT since 2014.[xliii]

China, which acceded to the ATT in October 2020, has been identified by the UN as having supplied arms since the coup.[xliv] The weaponry provided has included four Hongdu K-8W Karakorums, a trainer or light attack aircraft, and four Harbin Y-12 transport planes. Serbia, which has been a party to the ATT since December 2014, reported the export of 2,524 items under the category ‘Portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems’ and eight combat aircrafts, with the last delivery in February 2021, according to UNROCA data.[xlv] These arms transfers would appear to violate both Serbia and China’s ATT commitments.

The only other states to have supplied arms to Myanmar since the coup began are Russia and India; with Russia promising further arms.

Prior to the coup Belarus, Israel, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea and Ukraine, had all been involved in providing weapons to Myanmar’s military. Of these, only Korea has imposed an embargo on arms transfers since the coup, though Israel has indicated that they now maintain a policy of not transferring arms to Myanmar.[xlvi]

Protest against military coup in front of Kayin State Hluttaw and State Government Office, 9 February 2021, Source: Ninjastrikers.

Appendix 1 further details known arms transfers, utilising both SIPRI data and data from two OHCHR reports. Appendix 2 also shows the UNROCA data.

It is worth noting that many ATT states have imposed arms embargoes against the Myanmar military. Of the 44 states that have arms embargoes imposed against the Myanmar military, (listed in Appendix 3), 41 are party to the ATT, two are signatories and one has not signed or ratified. Despite embargoes across Europe, however, European-manufactured aircrafts still entered the ranks of Myanmar’s Air Force fleet in December 2021.[xlvii] Though both transport helicopters, this transfer exemplifies how states party to the ATT must be vigilant to third-party sales. In another incident, Swedish-made artillery shells were found to have been used in an attack in Kayin State in April 2022 – they had also been used in previous attacks. It is thought that these weapons were originally sold to India.[xlviii]

A few further countries have expressed informal positions of not transferring arms to Myanmar (Appendix 4).

Almost all other States Parties to the ATT who had supplied arms-related transfers since 2012, had not transferred ammunition or other weaponry. One potential exception to this occurred when a company from Austria, an EU member committed to an arms embargo, and party to the ATT, transferred five Camcopter S-100s to Myanmar in 2019. They argued that this was not contrary to their commitments as they were not sold for military use, despite being mentioned in Myanmar’s Defence Ministry budget.[xlix] The drones are reported to not be weaponised but are used by the military for surveillance use – though there are reports that the drones could be fitted with missiles, which the company disputes.[l]

While not explosive weapons-related, the transfer of a landing platform dock from South Korea’s Dae Sun Shipbuilding in 2019, is also questionable as it could be used to facilitate attacks, with attacks on coastal communities a frequent occurrence by Myanmar’s military.[li]

It is worth reiterating that most arms transfers to Myanmar have come from states not party to the ATT, or China pre-acceding to the ATT. Russia particularly has provided an extensive range of explosive weapons and their launch systems. Such weapons have caused immeasurable harm to civilians and were transferred with the knowledge they would be used in this way.

Displaced Rohingya from Myanmar, 13 October 2017. Source: Tasnim News Agency, Seyyed Mahmoud Hosseini.

Navigate the report:

Assessing the effectiveness of the Arms Trade Treaty – Executive Summary

Part 1: Nation-by-nation review analysis

Part 2: Who is causing the most harm?

Part 3: Who is providing arms?

Part 4: Thematic examination

Part 5: Conclusion

Part 6: Recommendations 

Part 7: Case studies – Myanmar’s military

Part 8: Case studies – Saudi Arabia in Yemen

Part 9: Case studies – Non-state armed groups in the Philippines

Part 10: Case studies – the Taliban

Part 11: Case studies – China before and after ATT accession

Part 12: Case studies – the United Kingdom, from key ATT architect to key violator?


[i] Lewis, S. ‘Factbox: Sanctions imposed against Myanmar’s generals since they seized power’, Reuters, 22 March 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-sanctions-factbox-idUSKBN2BE2PY (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[ii] Fortify Rights, ““Nowhere Safe”: The Myanmar Junta’s Crimes Against Humanity Following the Coup d’État”, March 2022, https://www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/Nowhere%20is%20Safe%20-%20Fortify%20Rights%20Report.pdf (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[iii] ITV News, ‘Myanmar: At least 82 people killed as security forces fire ‘mortars and grenades’ on pro-democracy protesters’, 10 April 2021, https://www.itv.com/news/2021-04-10/myanmar-at-least-82-people-killed-as-security-forces-fire-mortars-and-grenades-on-pro-democracy-protesters (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[iv] ATT Monitor, 2015. ‘ATT Monitor Report 2015’,  https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ATT-Monitor-2015_Online.pdf (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[v] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); www.acleddata.com. (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[vi] UNHCR, ‘Myanmar UNHCR displacement overview’, 09 May 2022, https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/92635 (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[vii] Fortify Rights, ““Nowhere Safe”: The Myanmar Junta’s Crimes Against Humanity Following the Coup d’État”, March 2022, https://www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/Nowhere%20is%20Safe%20-%20Fortify%20Rights%20Report.pdf (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[viii] Frontier Myanmar, “‘An entire generation at risk’: Myanmar’s children traumatised after a year of violence”, 07 April 2022, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/an-entire-generation-at-risk-myanmars-children-traumatised-after-a-year-of-violence/ (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[ix] UNHCR, ‘Myanmar Emergency Update’, 04 May 2022.

[x] Data collected from WHO, ‘SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM FOR ATTACKS ON HEALTH CARE (SSA)’,  https://extranet.who.int/ssa/Index.aspx.  (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xi] Which includes attacks where more than one person uses firearms, tanks, missiles, bombs, or mortars.

[xii] Which includes knives, bricks, clubs, guns, grenades and IEDs.

[xiii] Data collected from Insecurity Insight ‘Health Map’, https://map.insecurityinsight.org/health (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xiv] Data collected from Insecurity Insight ‘Health Map’, https://map.insecurityinsight.org/health (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xv] Krishna, G. and S. Howard, 2021. ‘Myanmar doctors are under fire from the military and covid-19’, BMJhttps://www.bmj.com/content/375/bmj.n2409 (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xvi] Krishna, G. and S. Howard, 2021. ‘Myanmar doctors are under fire from the military and covid-19’, BMJ.  https://www.bmj.com/content/375/bmj.n2409 (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xvii] Frontier Myanmar, “‘An entire generation at risk’: Myanmar’s children traumatised after a year of violence”, 07 April 2022, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/an-entire-generation-at-risk-myanmars-children-traumatised-after-a-year-of-violence/ (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xviii] ACAPS, 2021. ‘MYANMAR Impact of 1 February coup’,  https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210429_acaps_briefing_note_myanmar_impact_of_1_february_coup.pdf (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xix] Irrawaddy, ‘Global Charity Warns Thousands of Displaced Myanmar Children Facing Starvation’, 04 Oct 2021, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/global-charity-warns-thousands-of-displaced-myanmar-children-facing-starvation.html (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xx] UNDP, Impact of the twin crises on human welfare in Myanmar, November 2021.

[xxi] UNDP, Impact of the twin crises on human welfare in Myanmar, November 2021.

[xxii] Save the Children, ‘Myanmar: More than 100 attacks on schools in May, says Save the Children’, 11 Jun 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-more-100-attacks-schools-may-says-save-children (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xxiii] Save the Children, ‘Myanmar: More than 100 attacks on schools in May, says Save the Children’, 11 Jun 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-more-100-attacks-schools-may-says-save-children (accessed 07 Jan 2023)  

[xxiv] Data available from Insecurity Insight’s HDX profile https://data.humdata.org/dataset/sind-education-in-danger-monthly-news-briefs-dataset (accessed 07 Jan 2023) 

[xxv] Insecurity Insight, ‘Education in Danger: Monthly News Brief’, February 2020, https://www.insecurityinsight.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/February-2020-Education-in-Danger-Monthly-News-Brief.pdf (accessed 07 Jan 2023)   and Insecurity Insight, ‘Education in Danger: Monthly News Brief’, January 2020, https://www.insecurityinsight.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/January-2020-Education-in-Danger-Monthly-News-Brief.pdf (accessed 07 Jan 2023) 

[xxvi] Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, 2022, ‘EDUCATION UNDER ATTACK 2022’ https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/eua_2022.pdf (accessed 07 Jan 2023) 

[xxvii] Huang, K. and Reuters, ‘Chinese teacher killed in Myanmar conflict after shelling hits school

Refugees surge into China as fighting across border escalates’, 13 March 2017, SCMP, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2078409/chinese-teacher-killed-conflict-myanmar (accessed 07 Jan 2023) 

[xxviii]  CSW, ‘Burma army targets Kachin Christian Mission School’, 15 May 2018, https://www.csw.org.uk/2018/05/15/news/3972/article.htm (accessed 07 Jan 2023) 

[xxix] Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, 2020, ‘EDUCATION UNDER ATTACK 2020’, https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/eua_2020_full.pdf  (accessed 07 Jan 2023) 

[xxx] Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, 2020, ‘EDUCATION UNDER ATTACK 2020’, https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/eua_2020_full.pdf  (accessed 07 Jan 2023) 

[xxxi] Reuters, ‘Boycott and bombings mar Myanmar’s new school year’, 02 Jun 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/boycott-bombings-mar-myanmars-new-school-year-2021-06-02/  (accessed 07 Jan 2023) 

[xxxii] Bo, M. ‘In turmoil, Myanmar families split over school’, DW, 03 Apr 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/myanmar-families-divided-over-childrens-education-amid-political-turmoil/a-61004985 (accessed 07 Jan 2023) 

[xxxiii] Reuters, ‘Boycott and bombings mar Myanmar’s new school year’, 02 Jun 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/boycott-bombings-mar-myanmars-new-school-year-2021-06-02/  (accessed 07 Jan 2023) 

[xxxiv] Reuters, ‘Boycott and bombings mar Myanmar’s new school year’, 02 Jun 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/boycott-bombings-mar-myanmars-new-school-year-2021-06-02/  (accessed 07 Jan 2023) 

[xxxv] Arms Control Association, ‘UN Adopts Nonbinding Arms Embargo On Myanmar’, July/August 2021, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-07/news-briefs/un-adopts-nonbinding-arms-embargo-myanmar (accessed 07 Jan 2023) 

[xxxvi] BBC, ‘Myanmar Rohingya violence is genocide, US says’, 21 March 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-60820215 (accessed 07 Jan 2023) 

[xxxvii] Human Rights Council, (Thirty-ninth session, 10–28 September 2018, Agenda item 4, Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention) ‘Report of the detailed findings of the Independent

International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar’, 17 September 2018, A/HRC/39/CRP.2 https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/A_HRC_39_CRP.2.pdf (accessed 07 Jan 2023) 

[xxxviii] OHCHR, ‘Myanmar: UN expert urges Security Council resolution to stop weapons fueling spike in military attacks on civilians’, 22 Feb 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/02/myanmar-un-expert-urges-security-council-resolution-stop-weapons-fueling?LangID=E&NewsID=28142 (accessed 07 Jan 2023) 

[xxxix] Human Rights Council, ‘Enabling Atrocities: UN Member States’ Arms Transfers to the Myanmar Military, Conference room paper of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar’, (Forty-ninth session, 28 February-1 April 2022) 22 February 2022, A/HRC/49/CRP.1  https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ohchr.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2F2022-02%2FCRP-31012022.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xl] Human Rights Council, ‘The economic interests of the Myanmar military:  Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar’, (Forty-second session, 9–27 September 2019, Agenda item 4, Human Rights situations that require the Council’s attention) 5 August 2019, A/HRC/42/CRP.3 https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/EconomicInterestsMyanmarMilitary/A_HRC_42_CRP_3.pdf (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xli] Unless the state has made it clear that it will not become party to the treaty.

[xlii] There are few details on the arms from Philippines so these arms are not included in the Appendix. Reports indicate the Philippine-based company, Armscor International, sold competition handguns to the Tatmadaw Shooting Team. Human Rights Council, ‘The economic interests of the Myanmar military:  Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar’, (Forty-second session, 9–27 September 2019, Agenda item 4, Human Rights situations that require the Council’s attention) 5 August 2019, A/HRC/42/CRP.3 https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/EconomicInterestsMyanmarMilitary/A_HRC_42_CRP_3.pdf (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xliii] Human Rights Council, ‘Enabling Atrocities: UN Member States’ Arms Transfers to the Myanmar Military, Conference room paper of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar’, (Forty-ninth session, 28 February-1 April 2022) 22 February 2022, A/HRC/49/CRP.1  https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ohchr.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2F2022-02%2FCRP-31012022.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xliv] Human Rights Council, ‘Enabling Atrocities: UN Member States’ Arms Transfers to the Myanmar Military, Conference room paper of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar’, (Forty-ninth session, 28 February-1 April 2022) 22 February 2022, A/HRC/49/CRP.1  https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ohchr.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2F2022-02%2FCRP-31012022.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xlv] Data collected from the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, available at: https://www.unroca.org/ (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xlvi] Human Rights Council, ‘Enabling Atrocities: UN Member States’ Arms Transfers to the Myanmar Military, Conference room paper of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar’, (Forty-ninth session, 28 February-1 April 2022) 22 February 2022, A/HRC/49/CRP.1  https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ohchr.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2F2022-02%2FCRP-31012022.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xlvii] Human Rights Council, ‘Enabling Atrocities: UN Member States’ Arms Transfers to the Myanmar Military, Conference room paper of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar’, (Forty-ninth session, 28 February-1 April 2022) 22 February 2022, A/HRC/49/CRP.1  https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ohchr.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2F2022-02%2FCRP-31012022.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xlviii] BNI, ‘Burma Army Used Swedish-Made Shells When Attacking Karen Joint Forces’, 22 April 2022, https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/burma-army-used-swedish-made-shells-when-attacking-karen-joint-forces (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

[xlix] Myanmar Now, ‘UN Expert Calls for EU Investigation Into Austrian Firm That Sold Drones to Myanmar’, 10 August 2019, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/un-expert-calls-for-eu-investigation-into-austrian-firm-that-sold-drones-to-myanmar (accessed 07 Jan 2023)

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