The events in Lebanon since last week, known as Operation Northern Arrow, mark the beginning of what appears to be a meticulously planned Israeli offensive. While media attention has shifted to the ongoing aerial bombardment, questions remain about how Israel executed last Tuesday and Wednesday’s devastating attacks. The blasts, which targeted communication devices, including pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah, have claimed at least 32 lives, including two children, and injured thousands. Among those devices was a batch of walkie-talkies, which appeared to be manufactured by the Japanese firm Icom. However, production of that model ceased ten years ago, and the Lebanese Communications Ministry stated that the particular model was not supplied by a recognised agent or officially licensed.
The explosions, which killed 12 people on Tuesday and 20 more on Wednesday, unfolded amidst confusion and chaos in hospitals as emergency rooms were overwhelmed. The blasts even struck a funeral procession, intensifying the panic. Now, a Norwegian-Indian man, Rinson Jose, believed to be linked to the production of these deadly devices, has vanished, leaving behind many unanswered questions about his role in the broader scheme.
The events of the past week appear to have begun prematurely, with coordinated attacks on Hezbollah members via their pagers on September 17th, followed by radio system attacks on September 18th. These attacks resulted in the deaths of 12 and 20 people, respectively, with thousands more injured, according to the Lebanese Health Ministry. Al-Monitor, a well-regarded regional news outlet, reports that the original plan was to follow these attacks with an immediate ground invasion, exploiting the ensuing confusion and communication breakdown. However, Israeli commanders reportedly initiated the attacks early due to concerns that Hezbollah had discovered the tampered devices. This operation was coordinated at the highest levels of the Israeli military and Mossad and had been in development for at least six months, potentially as early as 2022.
The exact logistics of the attacks remain unclear. Since 2022, there has been a noticeable increase in the import of pagers, with a Lebanese security official telling Reuters that around 5,000 were brought into the country just five months ago. Hezbollah significantly ramped up its use of pagers over the past year, driven by concerns that Israeli signals intelligence could intercept even encrypted phone communications. Some speculate that this heightened paranoia may have been part of an Israeli strategy to push Hezbollah towards greater reliance on pagers, thereby creating more vulnerable targets.
The initial attacks on the pager system were carried out by arming the devices through an alphanumeric text message, which appeared to come from a Hezbollah commander. Once armed, the next person to use the device triggered the explosion. A Western intelligence source suggests that Unit 8200, the highly secretive cyber intelligence and warfare unit within the IDF, was likely involved in the technical planning of the operation. The explosives used in both sets of attacks were likely military-grade plastic explosives, such as PETN. Successfully placing the explosive charges while maintaining the functionality of the devices is a highly complex task. Trevor Lawrence, head of Cranfield University’s Ordnance Test and Evaluation Centre, estimated initially that the pagers probably contained around 5g of plastic explosives, while the walkie-talkies held more, resulting in a higher fatality count despite fewer attacks. However, an unnamed former British Army munitions expert told the BBC that the pagers likely contained between 10g-20g of explosives. Considering the device’s overall weight, this additional weight seems excessive and not based on evidence.
Until this Friday, the type of explosives used and the required amount were unclear. In an article released by CNN today, sourcing high-ranking Lebanese security officials have established that some of the tampered pagers have been recovered. This is because they were turned off during the attack and did not receive the arming message. After careful examination and a series of controlled explosions using the tampered pagers, it has been determined that the explosives were placed within the pager’s lithium-ion batteries in a way so advanced it was virtually undetectable. Nothing like this has ever been seen previously by senior Hezbollah commanders, who themselves are known for being experts in improvised explosives.
CNN also spoke to Sean Moorhouse, another former British Army officer and bomb disposal specialist; he told them that whoever built these bombs could have modified the battery, implanting an electronic detonator and small explosive charge inside of its metal casing, which would have made it impossible to detect, even with imaging, for example, X-rays.
The Kyodo news agency interviewed Yoshiki Enomoyo, Director of Icom, the Japanese company that manufactured the suspected walkie-talkie model, IC-V82, used in Wednesday’s attack. Based on photos of the recovered devices, Enomoyo noted that the damage to the battery compartment suggested this was where the explosives were detonated. It is possible that the explosive charge was concealed in the radio’s replaceable battery, similar to the pager attack. Icom stopped producing the IC-V82 model and its batteries in 2014, but these radios were exported to the Middle East between 2004 and 2014, with counterfeit versions widely circulating in the region.
Some of the pagers recovered had identifying marks that initially pointed to the Taiwanese company, Gold Apollo. Early media reports suggested that this model of pager, AR924, had been shipped from Taiwan. A Hezbollah source claimed they believed the pagers were ordered directly from Gold Apollo. However, on Friday, Taiwan’s Minister of Economic Affairs stated “with certainty” that the components were not manufactured in Taiwan. Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry also clarified that none of the alleged pagers were directly exported to Lebanon. Of the 260,000 pagers Gold Apollo exported between 2022 and August 2024, the majority were sent to European countries and the United States.
Gold Apollo’s president, Hsu Ching-Kuang, revealed that BAC Consulting, a Budapest-based company, manufactured the pagers under a licensing agreement, which gave them sole responsibility for the AR-924. This marks the start of a complex web of deception. On Thursday, September 26th, Taiwan authorities disclosed that they had interviewed at least four persons of interest, including Teresa Wu, the sole employee of a similarly named company, Apollo Systems Ltd.
While Ms Wu’s involvement was not made clear at the time by Taiwanese officials, CNN reported that Ms Wu, in part, organised the licensing deal between Gold Apollo and BAC consulting. Someone knowledgeable about Gold Apollo told CNN that Ms Wu left Gold Apollo a few years ago and began working with BAC Consulting. According to records, Apollo Systems Ltd was set up in 2024, potentially operating for BAC Consulting in Taipei. Despite this, YouTube videos uploaded to Apollo Systems HK in December 2022 and February 2023 specify the AR-924 with a “high-capacity lithium rechargeable battery”. This is quintessential as Taiwan officials said there was no record of Gold Apollo manufacturing any AR-924 pagers in Taiwan and that Gold Apollo only manufactured pagers with AA batteries in Taiwan, not lithium batteries as found in the devices used in the attack and examined by Lebanese officials.
Multiple irregularities have existed with Apollo Systems beyond their operating well before they were registered as a company this year. Their website, www.apollosystemshk.com, which has since been taken down after the attack, showed offices in both Taipei City and Hong Kong. However, when CNN visited the Hong Kong address, they found no sign of the company.
Similar was found when CNN visited the registered address for BAC Consulting in Budapest, with a building receptionist saying there had never been anyone from BAC Consulting ever occupying the space rented in the building. Mr. Ching-Kuang of Gold Apollo noted irregularities and delays in money transfers from BAC to Gold Apollo, with the funds being held up for originating from the Middle East. Initially unreachable by major press outlets, BAC Consulting’s CEO, Cristiana Bársony-Arcidiacono, later told NBC News that they were merely an intermediary. According to customs records in Taiwan, Gold Apollo exported about 200 pagers to Hungary in 2022, but none in 2023 or 2024. However, Hungarian officials said the pagers were not manufactured in Hungary, nor were they ever “present on Hungarian soil”. There is an apparent disconnect between custom records and whatever evidence Hungarian intelligence has seen.
When BAC Consulting refers to being an intermediary, it relates to Norta Global, based in Bulgaria. BAC Consulting CEO, Ms Bársony-Arcidiacono, told the Hungarian Constitution Protection Office that Norta Global Ltd. placed the orders for the pagers and that the devices were delivered directly from Hong Kong to the customer, the final location not being made public. The Bulgarian Prime Minister Dimitar Glavchev told reporters last Friday that Norta Global was under investigation and was operating as a “cash flow, mailbox-type of firm” and that its director “acted by proxy.” That director is the missing man, Rinson Jose, who founded Norta Global in 2022 and was last heard from in Boston, USA, on September 18th, where he declined to comment on his company’s involvement in the events before disappearing. Although Norta Global is registered in Bulgaria, Jose does not reside there; he holds Norwegian and Indian citizenship and has worked in sales for DN Media Group in Norway since February 2020. One news agency reported that Jose’s social media lists another company he runs, NortaLink, an IT services company set up in 2016 which is also based in Norway.
Dezső András, reporting for Hungarian news outlet Telex, said that Notra Global transferred more than 1 million euros to BAC Consulting in several instalments between March 2023 and June 2024. BAC then sent this money to Gold Apollo, Apollo Systems Ltd, and an unnamed Hong Kong firm. According to customs data from October 2022, Apollo Systems Ltd had sent one shipment to Hungary, containing a package containing just one-pager.
Bulgaria’s security service, DANS, is probing Norta Global, which may have been involved in the shipment of the pagers in collaboration with Hungarian-based BAC Consulting. According to The New York Times, both BAC Consulting and Norta Global are believed to be fronts for Mossad, Israel’s Intelligence Agency, but little evidence was shown to corroborate this. However, DANS has yet to uncover evidence of the devices being exported from Bulgaria but continues its investigation. What does seem clear is that a complex chain of companies has enabled Israel to obscure any direct link to these devices. How long this can remain hidden amid investigations currently underway in Taiwan, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania is only a matter of time.
As the conflict intensifies, it becomes evident that these initial attacks were always part of a larger strategic plan. Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant has already stated regarding Operation Northern Arrow, “We are opening a new phase in the war.” These attacks, which amount to blatant criminal acts on foreign soil with no apparent effort to limit civilian casualties, must not be overshadowed by the ongoing devastation. UN human rights chief Volker Türk told the Security Council last Friday that these attacks are violations of international human rights law. While the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has been long-standing, this marks the most significant escalation since Israel’s 2006 ground invasion of Lebanon. That invasion, widely condemned both internationally and within Israel, eventually led to the replacement of then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert by Benjamin Netanyahu. These current events in Lebanon may once again catalyse significant political change.
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