Introduction
When Hamas fighters breached Israel’s defences on 7 October 2023 – killing some 1,200 Israelis and taking hundreds hostage – one of the staunchest responses came from London.
Within days, Britain dispatched military assets to the eastern Mediterranean in a show of support for Israel’s counter-offensive in Gaza (Reuters, 2023). Royal Navy vessels (the auxiliary ships RFA Lyme Bay and RFA Argus) with a company of Royal Marines were deployed off Israel’s coast, while Royal Air Force surveillance aircraft began patrolling the skies (Sabbagh, 2023). Downing Street framed the move as a deterrent to further escalation. That they were monitoring arms flows to Hezbollah in Lebanon and providing practical support to Israel’s security.
Meanwhile at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, Britain’s forward base in the region, UK fighter jets and drones were placed on high alert as Israel prepared a major ground assault on Hamas in the Gaza Strip (Sabbagh, 2023).
This military response in October 2023 became the starting gun for an intense, multifaceted, multi-year British engagement in Israel’s war on Gaza, even in the face of growing concerns of genocide and human rights atrocities by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF).
Over the next year and a half, the United Kingdom’s armed forces – and the wider military-industrial complex – became deeply entwined with the conflict. From arms exports that kept Israeli weaponry supplied, to joint intelligence efforts that fed Israel real-time battlefield information, to high-level visits and naval deployments that signalled unwavering backing for Israel’s campaign. British officials insisted these actions were aimed at stabilising the situation and aiding in tasks like hostage recovery (Sky News, 2023). Concerns were raised again and again that Britain was effectively enabling an indiscriminate assault that pummelled a densely populated enclave, blurring the line between aid and harm.
By mid-2025, after Gaza’s death toll had climbed above 50,000 (OCHA, 2024), calls emerged for war crimes investigations and even a UK public inquiry into Britain’s role.
In examining the period from 7 October 2023 to mid-2025, AOAV finds one thing clear: that Britain’s support significantly bolstered Israel’s military operations in Gaza and that this support came with profound legal and ethical dilemmas.
The following sections detail the key facets of such compromised support: the arms and matériel supplied, the intelligence and surveillance shared, the defence diplomacy conducted, and the consequences of this blind alliance.
Arming a Dangerous Ally: Britain’s Weapons Exports
One pillar of the UK’s support has been weaponry. Despite the carnage unfolding in Gaza – which by mid-2025 has killed tens of thousands of Palestinians – Britain’s supply of arms to Israel continued to flow. In September 2024, amid growing outrage, the new Labour government in London announced it was suspending about 30 of the roughly 350 export licences for Israel, citing a “clear risk” that British-made military equipment could be used in serious breaches of international humanitarian law (UK Government, 2024).
However, there was no blanket embargo. The vast majority of licences remained valid, and crucially the government exempted Britain’s contributions to the US-led F-35 fighter jet programme from suspension (UK Government, 2024). The UK’s BAE Systems produced F-35 planes – a company that dominates the UK’s arms exports – have played a critical role in the Israeli bombing campaign, including one bombing raid in March this year in which over 400 Palestinians were killed (Wintour, 2025b).
Such deaths hold no sway. Officials argued that halting UK-made F-35 components would jeopardise the jet’s global supply chain and harm “international security” (UK Government, 2024).
In practice, Britain’s arms trade with Israel continued unabated. Investigations have shown that since October 2023, the UK had approved or conducted at least 14 shipments of military goods to Israel, including over 8,000 munitions (such as bombs, rockets and missiles) and a stockpile of armoured vehicle parts (Wintour, 2025a). In the halls of Westminster it was even stated that the UK had sent “8,500 munitions, bombs, grenades, missiles, and 146 armoured vehicle parts. In October 2023 alone, the UK exported 150,000 bullets.” (UK Parliament, 2025a).
Some arms transfers appear to have continued even after the purported “partial” suspension in 2024. Britain is not Israel’s main arms supplier – UK exports amount to under 1% of Israel’s total weapons acquisitions (UK Parliament, 2025b) – but the persistence of arms sales for many have morally implicated the UK in the ongoing destruction of Gaza.
The British government insisted that all exports were vetted against stringent criteria, and that remaining licences covered only items for Israel’s legitimate self-defence or non-lethal uses. Yet it has refused to detail exactly what was sent.
AOAV contends that the UK has essentially no way to ensure its weapons are not being used in Gaza. Given the weapon categories involved, it is “completely conceivable that those weapons have been used to kill and maim children in Gaza,” Warinder Juss MP (Labour) argued in Parliament, urging a total arms ban (UK Parliament, 2025a).
Human rights groups and anti-arms trade campaigners that form part of AOAV’s wider circle have all condemned Britain’s permissive stance. They point out that components for Israel’s F-35 jets – which spearheaded aerial bombardments of Gaza – kept flowing with official blessing, a loophole in the September suspension (Holden and James, 2024).
In our view, Britain’s continued arms exports during the Gaza war made it an enabler of the onslaught. Ministers in London maintained that Israel faced legitimate threats from Hamas and that the UK was respecting its alliance commitments. But the ethical dissonance was hard to ignore: as Israeli strikes pulverised apartment blocks and refugee camps, UK-made parts were likely somewhere inside the warplanes and tanks carrying out those attacks and – meanwhile – the UK military were assisting the IDF in ways we still do not fully know.
Eyes in the Sky: British Intelligence and Surveillance
Modern warfare runs on intelligence, and here too Britain became Israel’s covert partner. Starting in December 2023, the Royal Air Force began flying near-daily surveillance sorties over Gaza and southern Israel from Britain’s airbase at Akrotiri in Cyprus (Overton, 2025). The primary platform is the Shadow R1, a small reconnaissance aircraft loaded with high-powered cameras and eavesdropping gear.
Operated by the RAF’s No. 14 Squadron, the Shadow R1 is known as an intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance aircraft (ISTAR) aircraft. It can track vehicle convoys, monitor buildings and gather battlefield intelligence (Overton, 2025). Britain also deployed other assets, such as an RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic spy plane, to ‘soak up’ signals intelligence and keep watch for threats (Allison, 2023).
In total, Britain has sent over 570 ISTAR flights over Gaza’s airspace since December 2023, more than 200 of which have taken place under the Labour government (Overton, 2025 and latest analysis).
Officially, London insists these flights are “solely” to help locate hostages held by Hamas, and that any intelligence gathered is shared only to assist rescue efforts (Sky News, 2023). The surveillance planes are unarmed and do not themselves conduct strikes. However, the information they collect – mapping buildings, tracking vehicles, intercepting militants’ communications – undoubtedly also benefits Israel’s military operations. If such British intelligence was handed to Israeli or American partners, the UK has limited control over how it is used. In effect, British spy aircraft may have given Israel additional eyes and ears over Gaza’s battlefields. Israeli warplanes and artillery would, if this is the case, could have struck targets identified in part through this coalition surveillance web. The problem is those who know if any safeguards are in place preventing such abuse will not make this public. The RAF remain tight-lipped.
What is known is that Britain’s participation in the Five Eyes intelligence alliance amplifies this role. The UK has long been responsible for monitoring the Middle East within that Anglophone network (PrivacyHQ, 2023). Signals intercepted by British agencies – from tapped communications to radar tracking – are routinely shared with the United States, and through Washington it is well established that some of that intelligence reaches Israel.
In the Gaza conflict, Britain’s contribution to the intelligence picture was probably second only to America’s. This raises troubling questions. If Israeli forces committed unlawful attacks in Gaza with the aid of British-supplied information, does the UK bear some responsibility? The lack of transparency around the RAF’s Gaza surveillance has fuelled suspicions that Britain may have become complicit in Israel’s attacks on Gaza, not only through arms sales, but by surveillance too.
What price ethics? High-Level Defence Diplomacy
Britain’s support for Israel’s war was not only material but through diplomatic and military missions. Senior UK military figures engaged in a flurry of behind-the-scenes conversations with their Israeli counterparts. In late January 2024, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin – Britain’s Chief of the Defence Staff – made a secret trip to Tel Aviv to confer with Israel’s Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Herzi Halevi (Middle East Monitor, 2025). Their agenda, according to later disclosures, was to discuss “future operations in the region”. Radakin was not alone. Records show that over the ensuing months at least four other top UK defence officials quietly visited Israel, including the head of UK Strategic Command and the Chief of the Air Staff (Middle East Monitor, 2025).
These unpublicised meetings were not announced to Parliament or the public at the time.
When questioned, Britain’s Ministry of Defence described such visits as routine military-to-military engagement, stressing that UK officials pressed Israel privately on reducing harm to civilians. Indeed, London maintained a public line of urging Israel to obey international humanitarian law, even as it affirmed Israel’s right to respond to Hamas. The very existence of these covert consultations, however, illustrated how closely Britain was involved in the conduct of the war.
By trading notes at the highest level, the UK effectively gave Israel’s generals implicit support for their operations – reinforcing that British defence leaders were eager to assist and advise, not merely observe from afar. The secrecy of the visits drew criticism once revealed, with MPs and analysts asking why the government had kept quiet if everything was above board. The answer likely lies in optics: open acknowledgement of such intimate coordination might have undercut Britain’s claims of neutrality and humanitarian concern.
Similarly, organisations like ELNET – the European Leadership Network – have facilitated British veteran delegations to Israel and Gaza that may serve more as public relations exercises than impartial fact-finding missions. These delegations, involving retired military figures such as Colonel Richard Kemp, Captain Johnny Mercer, and Major Andrew Fox, amongst others, granted participants curated access to Israeli officials and military sites, while excluding independent humanitarian voices. The veterans’ subsequent public endorsements of Israeli military conduct have been widely circulated in UK media, adding credibility to IDF narratives and dulling the national press’ critical scrutiny of alleged war crimes and humanitarian violations.
These trips, funded through opaque channels and often framed as neutral diplomacy, promote a one-sided view of the conflict that risks distorting public and political discourse in Britain. Veterans like Kemp and Mercer have portrayed the IDF’s actions as disciplined and morally justified, while frequently dismissing evidence of civilian harm. Such former senior British military involvement raises questions about the ethics of military figures participating in lobbying-like activities, especially when their prestige may influence UK policy on arms sales and diplomatic responses to Israel’s conduct.
A similar ambiguity marked Britain’s wider diplomacy. In May 2025, for instance, the UK’s trade envoy to Israel, Lord Ian Austin, went ahead with a visit to promote business ties – barely a week after Britain had suspended negotiations on a new free trade agreement in protest at the Gaza offensive (Wintour, 2025c). The trip was welcomed in Israeli media as a sign of “business as usual”, sending mixed signals from London. Britain had ostensibly put high-level trade talks on ice due to Israel’s military conduct, yet it simultaneously dispatched an envoy to drum up commerce.
Such gestures suggested that even as Britain publicly calibrated its criticism, it was unwilling to fundamentally sour relations with Israel. Economic and defence links remained robust beneath the diplomatic surface.
Controversy and Complicity
The UK’s deep entanglement in the Gaza war has provoked serious legal and ethical questions. International humanitarian law (IHL) forbids the deliberate targeting of civilians, yet Israeli bombardment of Gaza caused massive civilian loss of life and drew accusations of war crimes from UN experts and human rights organisations. Israel’s top leaders even faced potential international criminal charges: by 2025 the International Criminal Court was examining allegations of genocide and crimes against humanity in Gaza, with some calling for indictments of Israeli officials (Overton, 2025). By continuing to arm and assist Israel amidst these alleged violations, has Britain become complicit?
The UK is a signatory to the Arms Trade Treaty and the Geneva Conventions, which oblige it to ensure weapons or intelligence it provides are not used for atrocities. This obligation prompted the belated September 2024 licence review. But that review came only after the UK had already enabled a year of indiscriminate Israeli strikes.
Some insiders found the dissonance too much to bear. In mid-2024, a senior British diplomat who oversaw arms-control policy resigned in protest, accusing the government of being able to “manipulate legal frameworks to shield ‘friendly’ nations from accountability”, and crossing the threshold into complicity in war crimes (Smith, 2025). He noted that ministers and officials kept arms flowing to Israel even as evidence mounted of illegal attacks in Gaza. His account bolstered what activists were saying publicly: Britain’s arms export system, they argued, was effectively rubber-stamping support for Israel’s campaign regardless of humanitarian law.
Politically, the issue has been divisive in Britain. Large protests in London and other cities saw demonstrators chanting “Stop arming Israel” and “Not in my name”. More than 300 public figures, including prominent British artists and writers, signed an open letter urging the government to end its “complicity” in what they termed war crimes in Gaza (Culbertson, 2025).
In Parliament, opposition MPs demanded transparency: Were UK bases in Cyprus being used to ship American arms to Israel? What exactly were British pilots spying on above Gaza? The government’s answers were often opaque, citing national security and alliance confidentiality.
By mid-2025, calls had grown for an independent reckoning. Jeremy Corbyn – a former Labour leader turned independent MP – introduced a bill in June 2025 seeking a full public inquiry into the UK’s role in Israel’s military operations in Gaza (Hansard, 2025). He likened it to the Chilcot inquiry that investigated the Iraq War, arguing that Britain must examine whether its decisions enabled or aided atrocities.
The proposed inquiry would demand access to government records on arms deals, intelligence-sharing, and war-related decision-making spanning both the Conservative and Labour governments since October 2023. Notably, when Prime Minister Starmer visited RAF Akrotiri in December 2024, he told British personnel that “the whole world is relying on you” and that some of what they were doing could not be revealed publicly (Hansard, 2025). The remark hinted at the secret surveillance and planning underway, even as officials maintained public silence on details.
Whether such an inquiry will materialise is unclear – sitting governments rarely welcome self-scrutiny. But even some of Britain’s staunchest Israel supporters have grown uneasy at the scale of destruction in Gaza and the UK’s entanglement in it.
It is worth noting Britain also pursued a humanitarian track with a cognitive dissonance that some may find startling. The UK sharply increased humanitarian aid to Palestinian civilians, committing tens of millions of pounds for relief. RAF cargo planes joined international air-drops of food and medicine along Gaza’s coastline in early 2024, in coordination with Jordan and other countries (Reuters, 2024). And Britain publicly urged Israel to allow in aid and observe ceasefire pauses.
Yet such gestures were half-measures undermined by the military support provided. In practice, Britain’s military-industrial choices consistently prioritised bolstering Israel’s offensive over restraining it.
Conclusion
Britain’s militarised engagement with Israel’s Gaza war exemplifies the difficult trade-offs between strategic alliances and ethical responsibilities. From October 2023 onward, the UK government chose to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Israel, providing arms, intelligence and diplomatic cover at critical moments. In doing so, Britain undoubtedly reinforced Israel’s military capabilities – helping a close ally wage a ferocious campaign against Hamas.
But it also tied Britain’s reputation to a war that inflicted immense human suffering and drew international censure. The United Kingdom found itself both lauded by Israel’s supporters for its steadfastness and condemned by others for abetting what they saw as egregious violations of humanitarian law.
Britain has now long faced a moment of reckoning. Its leaders must account for how far the country has gone and continues to go in backing Israel’s offensive both in Gaza and Lebanon and now in Iran, and whether that support was consistent with British values and legal obligations. The calls for inquiries and the soul-searching in Parliament suggest that the Gaza war is already having a lasting imprint on UK foreign policy debates.
In the end, London’s decisions laid bare a familiar tension in British statecraft: the pull of loyalty to allies (and allies of the United States) and the demands of the international rule of law. The decision to choose the former may come to define Britain’s role in one of the deadliest campaigns of the 21st century. History will judge and it may well not judge kindly.
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