The revolving door between Whitehall and the defence industry is spinning at an alarming rate. It’s a carousel where 86% of former defence ministers and senior defence officials go on to secure lucrative private sector defence roles, often mirroring their old government jobs. Not only does this opaque system of personnel exchange pose an ethical dilemma – it’s a clear concern to both our democracy and the finances linked to our national security.
While the revolving door is undoubtedly a phenomenon affecting every government department, it seems to have a disproportionate impact on defence. Whilst, on average, only 29% of new jobs taken by senior government ministers and officials had a subject overlap with their previous brief, the defence sector shows a much higher rate of crossover. This glaring disparity isn’t a mere coincidence, it is part of a significant systemic issue that raises profound questions.
It would, of course, be naive to claim that this military-industrial revolving door garners no benefits. The exchange of expertise can obviosly lead to mutual efficiency gains for both public and private sectors. A former civil servant might bring valuable policy insights to an arms contractor, while an ex-industry executive could help convey complex procurement processes in Whitehall. However, it’s incorrect to assume that these benefits outweigh the corresponding risks.
A poll by the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies found that over 73% of respondents believed revolving door appointments should be banned: a clear public consensus that this practise has no place in our government. Despite this, the private sector is actively recruiting top-tier British public officials to join their ranks, including the Chief of Naval Staff, the Director General of MI5, and the head of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).
This close relationship between government and industry creates a conflict of interests. Former defence officials often anticipate transitioning into high-paying private sector roles, potentially fostering contractual incentives that could discourage efficiency improvements, favour potential future bosses and erode accountability.
Consider Philip Jones, former Chief of Naval Staff. In 2021, a mere two years after leaving this public post, he joined BAE Systems – the UK’s largest defence contractor. BAE Systems has been the primary defence supplier to the MOD for decades, and its influence continues to grow. In the 2022-23 financial year, BAE Systems received nearly £4.6 billion from the MOD, an increase of £569 million from the previous year. The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA), a committee tasked with overseeing the revolving door between the government and private sector, noted that BAE Systems could gain a ‘commercial advantage’ from employing Mr Jones that would otherwise not be possible.
While it’s impossible to establish a direct causal relationship (particularly given the lack of comprehensive data) it’s worth questioning why BAE Systems consistently secures such lucrative contracts. BAE Systems’ handling of their £3.7 billion MOD contract to manufacture the Navy’s new Type 26 frigates has been far from exemplary. The Initial Operating Capability (IOC) has been pushed back, parts have been delayed, and an additional £233 million of taxpayers’ money has been used to fund these inadequacies.
Despite this, the same year as these significant setbacks came to light, BAE Systems was awarded a further £4.2 billion from the MOD to manufacture the remaining ships in the programme. The government’s continued unwavering support for BAE Systems seems sometimes to defy logic, as does the government’s rule that prevents taking a company’s long-term past performance into account when awarding new contracts. The movement of individuals, such as Mr Jones, with intimate knowledge of the British defence sector to private companies is concerning, especially given statements from the former CEO of BAE Systems that the company explicitly sets out to profit from MOD programmes.
Moreover, the revolving door swings both ways.
The same committee that condemned BAE System’s handling of the Type 26 programme also objected to the Defence Equipment and Support’s (DE&S) ‘poor oversight’ of the programme, noting its ‘highly unenviable track-record of managing ship refits’. This ‘poor oversight’ is hardly surprising given some might say that the integrity of the DE&S is also undermined by the revolving door.
Despite calls from the House of Commons Defence Committee for more scrutiny when appointing the current DE&S Chief Executive, the MOD refused to allow a pre-appointment hearing. AOAV has since found that their chosen candidate Andy Start – the current CEO of the DE&S – previously held roles in six defence companies: BAE Systems, Capita, EADS Astrium (now an Airbus subsidiary), Inmarsat, FS Defence, and L3Harris.
Four of these companies now receive over £100 million from the MOD, of which DE&S is a part, with two receiving over £500 million.
Even as recently as February 2023, the UK government appointed another private sector prodigy to its ranks. Julia Sutcliffe took up the role of Chief Scientific Advisor at the UK Department for Business and Trade, the very department that is responsible for arms exports to Israel. Julia Sutcliffe was also the Chief Technologist at BAE Systems, working in some capacity with the company for almost 15 years. A company who saw its shares up by 29% in the first 6 months of 2024, no doubt due in a large part to the purchase of lethal aid by the Israeli Defence Force.
The consequences of Whitehall’s revolving door are far-reaching. It creates conflicts of interest and potential regulatory capture, where defence policy may be influenced more by corporate interests than public good. And it potentially compromises the integrity of key institutions, as seen in the appointment of individuals with extensive industry backgrounds to crucial government positions. And whilst AOAV in no way accuses any of those named here of wrong-doing, the system that appointed them to their posts might – in itself – be wrongly framed.
To address these issues, there is an urgent need for stricter regulations, greater transparency, and more robust oversight mechanisms. The government must prioritize public interest over industry connections and implement policies that prevent the exploitation of insider knowledge for corporate gain.
Only through such measures can we hope to restore integrity to our defence sector and ensure that national security decisions are made solely in the interest of the British public.
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