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Peace support or power projection? Britain’s military role in Africa examined

Britain presents its military training missions in Africa as instruments of stability. Framed as capacity-building ventures, they are said to professionalise local armies, strengthen governance and reduce the risks of insurgency. Yet such efforts exist against a wider backdrop: the continent’s colonial inheritance, fragile institutions and the dilemmas of modern counterterrorism.

The official language from Westminster is always reassuring. “By continuing support for developing countries in Africa by supporting their people and helping them improve their security and overcome the threats,” the MOD’s website states, “our Armed Forces help make the world a more stable place and they help keep our country safe and secure.”

In this way, Britain claims to be exporting discipline, oversight and respect for rights. Troops are deployed under the banners of partnership and peace support. Training packages are wrapped in the offering of democracy promotion.

But beneath this narrative lie more complex realities. The same missions that promise stability are often conducted in places where security forces are accused of mass killings, torture and corruption.

This report examines the disjuncture between stated goals and observed outcomes. It asks whether British training has been able to strengthen democratic institutions and improve civilian protection in Africa, or whether, it authoritarian practices and abusive partners have not been curtailed.

The analysis focuses on five states where British military activity has been most extensive: Nigeria, Kenya, Mali, Somalia and Sudan. In each, the British presence has been shaped by a particular blend of counterterrorism imperatives, strategic interests and post-colonial ties. Taken together, though, these cases show the UK’s tendency to prioritise national access over accountability, to equate stability with security, and to fall back on process-heavy safeguards that rarely seem to extend to meaningful oversight.

The research draws on NGO reports, parliamentary reviews and Ministry of Defence records. The findings suggest that, far from being peripheral, military training missions lie at the heart of the contradictions in Britain’s African policy: a desire to project influence and uphold values, tempered by a reluctance to confront allies when those values fall short.


Human rights safeguards and guidance in the British Military

In the context of its overseas activities, the British Army integrates human rights accountability into training through structured policies. Central to this is the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance, which sets out a framework for assessing the risks of capacity-building exercises and military assistance abroad.[1] The policy mandates a four-step screening process for recipient units before missions begin, assessing whether assistance may contribute to abuses.

On paper, this guidance appears robust. It was introduced in part to address growing scrutiny over Britain’s role in training foreign forces accused of misconduct and to demonstrate that human rights were not being sidelined in the pursuit of counterterrorism or strategic partnerships. In practice, however, its safeguards seem to be markedly narrow in scope.

Crucially, the OSJA guidance does not seem to extend to monitoring, reporting or reviewing potential abuses once missions are underway. This omission means that while units may be vetted before training, there seems little accountability for what follows once British troops have left the field.

Civil society organisations have been scathing in their assessment of this framework. A coalition of human rights NGOs warned that the OSJA risks “rubber stamping” the last (Conservative) government’s deeply flawed human rights policy and argued that the process too often functions as a box-ticking exercise rather than a meaningful safeguard.[2] Their criticism points to a structural flaw: by focusing almost exclusively on initial assessments, the OSJA allows Britain to claim due diligence while leaving a vacuum of responsibility for ongoing abuses committed by the very forces it has trained.

The practical consequences cannot be ignored. Allegations of mass killings, sexual violence, and torture by partner forces in Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan have surfaced during or after the period of British engagement, with little evidence that these concerns triggered meaningful suspension or review of UK support. In some cases, such as Nigeria, even when reports of grave violations were widely documented by international organisations, British training and arms deals continued. This suggests that the OSJA’s emphasis on pre-mission checks, without mechanisms for in-mission accountability, is insufficient to prevent complicity in abuses.

By presenting itself as a safeguard while failing to prevent or respond to violations, the OSJA risks becoming not a tool of accountability but a shield of plausible deniability. Its existence allows policymakers to argue that risks have been “assessed” and “mitigated,” even when subsequent events reveal otherwise. Without stronger requirements for transparency, independent oversight, and post-mission evaluation, Britain’s military partnerships will continue to carry the risk of enabling repression under the guise of training for stability. In the next sections we will add detail to these concerns.


Nigeria

The British and Nigerian armed forces have long maintained a close partnership.[3] In 2014, the British military offered support during Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram, and since then the relationship has centred on counterterrorism and national security. This alignment has positioned Nigeria as an indispensable ally to Britain in West Africa, yet it has also entangled the UK in the country’s repressive practices.

At the heart of Nigeria’s crackdown lies the notorious Giwa Barracks, a detention facility synonymous with human rights violations. Reports have accused the Nigerian security forces of carrying out forced abortions, burying victims in mass graves, and subjecting detainees to prolonged solitary confinement.[4]

These abuses are not isolated. Nigeria’s security apparatus has repeatedly drawn criticism for accidental airstrikes killing civilians, extrajudicial executions, and torture.[5] It is little surprise that international NGOs continue to express deep concern about the human cost of Nigeria’s security operations, which weigh most heavily on civilians in the north-east.[6]

The critical question is the degree to which Britain’s military partnership has facilitated such abuses. A government review of UK programmes in Nigeria concluded that training had failed to improve security actors’ capacity to process members of armed groups in line with International Humanitarian Law.[7] [8]More damning still, investigations by Declassified UK found that officials in Westminster were fully aware of atrocities and systemic corruption, yet continued to prioritise the bilateral relationship.[8] Indeed, even in the face of such evidence, Britain offered Nigeria a £1.5 billion loan to purchase British weaponry, a decision justified partly on the grounds that Nigeria remains one of the UK’s largest oil suppliers.[8] This suggests that strategic and economic interests, rather than human rights concerns, drive the relationship.

The entanglement goes beyond security cooperation. The right to a healthy environment—one of the most fundamental of human rights—has been systematically undermined by the same nexus of oil and arms. Shell, whose activities in the Niger Delta have long caused devastating environmental harm, successfully lobbied for increased British military aid to Nigeria to secure its oil infrastructure.[9] The result is a toxic convergence in which British military support shores up both a security force accused of grave abuses and an industry implicated in ecological catastrophe.

Taken together, these dynamics reveal something that can’t be ingored: British safeguards, while codified in documents like the OSJA, seem to have done little to mitigate Nigeria’s repressive tendencies. Instead, the evidence suggests that Britain’s military partnership has consistently prioritised economic gain and strategic leverage over human rights and environmental protection.

The relationship, AOAV believes, risks the perils of a counterterrorism policy that conflates stability with security and allows expediency to trump accountability.


Kenya

The British Army Training Unit Kenya (BATUK) is the largest contingent of British soldiers in Africa, based out of Laikipia Air Base.1 Activities include joint training with the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF), community engagement and medical support through pop-up clinics in remote regions.[10] A core objective is to support the local population through the British Peace Support Team (BPST) which aims to advance peace and security and counter illegal wildlife trade. Despite the human rights movement that followed Kenya’s independence from Britain, today, Freedom House rates Kenya as only partially free, due to ongoing corruption and brutality from security forces.[11] Other NGOs, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have raised concerns over government efforts to counter dissent and dampen freedom of expression.[12][13]

BATUK soldiers have a controversial track record of their own, which includes accusations of murder, rape, sexual exploitation, environmental damage and other criminal activity. In 2012, Agnes Wanjiru, a 21-year-old Kenyan woman was murdered, after last being seen with a British Serviceman. The subsequent media attention and inquiries into her death have revealed a ‘toxic culture of misogyny, racism, and impunity that appears to be embedded within parts of the British Military’.[14] A public inquiry has also revealed further allegations of human rights violations by British soldiers in Kenya, including testimony from a woman allegedly victim to a hit and run which left her disabled.[15] The most recent addition to this troubling picture is an internal inquiry which has exposed that British soldiers stationed in Kenya are paying for the use of sex workers despite a ban on transactional sex within the military.[16]

In a nation that already has a pervasive presence of femicide and violence against women, the actions of certain British soldiers stationed in Kenya are incompatible with the base’s original aims of community protection and support.[17] There is no evidence to suggest that the OSJA’s guidance has been heeded by BATUK soldiers. The troops working with the KDF should be assisting against human rights abuses in Kenya, particularly against women, and certainly should not be contributing to them. This highlights a stark failure of accountability and justice within the British Military.

Perhaps this is reflective of the OSJA’s focus on screening recipient units, rather than implementing safeguards which acknowledge the possibility that there may be those capable of such abuses within the British Army itself.


Mali

Much like in Nigeria, British military involvement in Mali has focused on supporting counterterrorism and regional security efforts.[18] The UK has played a secondary role, mainly assisting French-led counterinsurgency operations, EU training missions for Malian Armed Forces and UN peacekeeping efforts.[19] From 2013, British troops provided surveillance and logistical support to French forces, but no combat units were deployed.[20] In 2020, UK forces joined a UN peacekeeping mission intended to last three years, but they withdrew early in 2022, citing worsening political instability in Mali.[21]

Mali’s human rights situation can only be described as dire. Civilians continue to bear the brunt of ongoing violence by Islamist insurgents, but also from foreign and Malian security forces.[22] The UK’s withdrawal was driven, not only by successive military coups in Bamako,[23] but also by the increasingly complex security landscape shaped by Russia’s Wagner Group.[24] Both have faced accusations from human rights watchdogs of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and indiscriminate strikes.[25] In June this year, Wagner announced its withdrawal from Mali, yet Russian influence endures under the so-called Africa Corps, another Moscow-linked mercenary force.[26] For Malians, the future of human rights appears bleak.

While there is little evidence to suggest that British training missions contributed or enabled these atrocities, they represent a relative failure of the UK’s international security objectives. As western forces, including Britain, adopt a more distant approach, other actors will inevitably fill the void. While the UK’s military presence in Mali did not provide the stability or civilian protection hoped for, this cannot be attributed solely to British shortcomings.

Nonetheless, it represents a setback for Britain’s credibility as a security partner in West Africa and calls for a more meaningful long-term strategy. Regional drivers of instability and human rights atrocities will require further attention and investigation as the situation continues to unfold in Mali.


Somalia

On the other side of the continent, the British Military has supported Somali forces through training missions under Operation Tangham. This was conducted in Baidoa between 2019 and 2021.[27] These missions were designed to improve the operational capacity of the Somali National Army in its fight against the al-Qaeda linked militant group al-Shabaab.[28] The UK’s involvement in Somalia is said to be part of its broader counterterrorism commitments in the Horn of Africa.

Against the backdrop of the ongoing Somali Civil War and the attacks carried out by al-Shabaab, the human rights situation in Somalia remains very worrying, with civilians experiencing violence from all sides. Amnesty International claim that ‘all parties’ continue to commit human rights violations, including the British-trained Somali National Army.[29] Reports by other humanitarian organisations, including War Child, document that the abuses are particularly concerning for children.[30] This includes sexual violence against children and attacks on schools by al-Shabaab but also state forces, who have used the death penalty on child offenders, which the UN condemns.[31]

Because of this, the UK’s training of Somali forces raises significant concerns. A review conducted in 2023 of British military activities in Somalia post Operation Tangham categorised the programme as ‘high risk’, indicating under the OSJA’s definition that ‘there is a serious risk that the assistance might directly or significantly contribute to a violation of human rights, and it is assessed that the mitigation measures will not effectively mitigate this risk’.

By their own admission, then, the safeguards and oversight of these missions in relation to human rights was inadequate, which further undermines the British Military’s credibility in Africa.

Surely the UK government must put in place more protections for civilians within its military training missions to prevent them from becoming implicated in grave human rights violations? Without such safeguards and transparency, external military support in Somalia has a very high potential of perpetuating cycles of abuse rather than ending them.


Sudan

In Sudan, British military training missions have been conducted with the objectives of strengthening the capacity of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and improving governance and respect for human rights. The so-called ‘Defence Engagement Programmes’ in Sudan are meant to allow the British Military to ‘gain access, insight and influence to’ the SAF.[32] One particular programme, running from 2017 to 2020, provided £400,000 to the SAF for activities including English language training and courses in International Humanitarian Law.

In the 2 years since its official start, Sudan’s Civil War between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has generated widespread atrocities, including mass killings, sexual violence, indiscriminate attacks on civilians and large-scale displacement.[33] As both sides refuse to halt their violence, human rights groups report on the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation and wide-spread hunger crisis.[34]

A government review of the Defence Engagement Programmes in Sudan reported that the missions had no impact on the UK’s ability to influence the humanitarian situation in the region, blaming a lack of robust monitoring and oversight of the programmes.32 Without clear programme management and safeguards, the British military risks linking itself with armed forces who show no signs of respecting the rule of law or human rights. Even prior to the Civil War, the UK came under scrutiny over its partnerships with the SAF. In 2015, a Sudanese lawyer and refugee brought a legal challenge to the UK High Court, arguing that the government-funded training was complicit in human rights abuses in the nation.[35] The case was made that the UK ‘failed to carry out proper assessments in relation to assistance and training’.

It should be noted that this occurred prior to the updated publication of the OSJA’s Human Rights Guidance.  

Organisations such as the Stop the War coalition, have pointed out the hypocrisy of the current UK government’s position in regard to the human rights violations in Sudan.[36] In April 2025, Starmer announced a new aid package to the nation, to help end the violence and respond to the humanitarian emergency unfolding.

However, if the Defence Engagement Programmes have assisted or emboldened the SAF in their indiscriminate attacks on civilians then the impact of this aid is futile. The programme review labels these activities as ‘medium-high’ risk which the OSJA defines as incurring ‘serious risk that the assistance might directly or significantly contribute to a violation of human rights, but this can be mitigated effectively’.

In combination with Britain’s colonial legacy in the region, these findings are deeply troubling. It is essential that there is greater monitoring and transparency to determine whether this risk is being effectively mitigated. If the training missions, as reported, are having no positive impact on the humanitarian influence of the British Military, then working with those accused of such atrocities, while providing aid to the nation, risks eroding any claim Britain clings on to of being a legitimate moral presence in Africa.


Conclusion

Britain’s military training missions in Africa reveal the tensions between principle and practice in foreign policy. They are promoted as efforts to bolster stability, enhance professionalism and spread respect for human rights.

Yet the evidence from Nigeria, Kenya, Mali, Somalia and Sudan suggests that such initiatives often unfold in contexts where those very aims are most elusive. Fragile governance, entrenched abuses and competing geopolitical interests mean that the British presence, however well-intentioned, seems to frequently struggle to achieve the results advertised.

At the heart of the problem appears to lie the gap between stated safeguards and their application. The OSJA framework was introduced to reassure critics that Britain would not lend its weight to abusive regimes. On paper, its processes appear thorough, with risk assessments and screening intended to prevent complicity. In practice, the checks are front-loaded, with little scrutiny once missions begin.

This asymmetry – one could argue – allows Britain to demonstrate diligence before deployment while avoiding awkward responsibilities after troops have departed.

The consequences are visible. Nigerian forces implicated in grave abuses continued to receive British training even as reports mounted. In Kenya, British soldiers themselves have faced accusations ranging from murder to exploitation, undermining claims of community protection. In Mali, Britain’s presence proved fleeting, its withdrawal leaving space for other actors with fewer qualms about rights. In Somalia and Sudan, training efforts were labelled high risk by Britain’s own criteria, yet proceeded with limited oversight. The pattern is not of flagrant disregard, but of a system that seems – at least to AOAV – to prefer to manage reputational risk rather than to enforce true accountability and commitment.

This might be a harsh criticism but this disconnect is not unique to Africa with regard to MOD engagements. Iraq and Afghanistan come to mind and quickly. But in Africa it resonates strongly there given Britain’s colonial past.

The echoes of pith-helmets and Dr Livingston are hard to ignore: missions justified by the language of order and stability, entanglement with regimes of doubtful legitimacy, and a willingness to privilege access and influence over the protection of civilians. None of this implies that Britain’s involvement is wholly malign, nor that withdrawing would improve matters. The dangers posed by insurgency, terrorism and state collapse are real. But the record still suggest that Whitehall has too long prioritised strategic expediency, optics of assistance and economic ties above the values it claims to defend.

If Britain wishes to sustain its credibility as a security partner, doesn’t a recalibration seem required? What this looks like is hard to say, but it would mean strengthening monitoring mechanisms, committing to independent evaluations, and accepting that partnerships with abusive forces should be curtailed even when they serve wider strategic aims.

Without such changes, the gap between rhetoric and reality will endure.

Training missions may continue, but their contribution to rights and stability will remain contested, leaving Britain open to the charge that its influence in Africa looks more like a colonial echo than a contemporary safeguard.


[1] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overseas-security-and-justice-assistance-osja-guidance

[2] https://reprieve.org/uk/2024/12/04/reprieve-warns-osja-review-rubber-stamps-flawed-human-rights-policy/

[3] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-second-uk-nigeria-security-and-defence-partnership-dialogue-communique/communique-of-the-second-edition-of-the-united-kingdom-nigeria-security-and-defence-partnership#defence-cooperation

[4] https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/nigeria-military-international/

[5] https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/562027-were-investigating-accidental-airstrikes-on-civilians-nigerian-air-force-chief.html?tztc=1

[6] https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-world/2025

[7]https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/60f16bbd8fa8f50c78eb5f5e/North_East_Nigeria_Security_and_Conflict_and_Stabilisation_annual_review_summary_2019_to_2020.odt

[8] https://www.declassifieduk.org/ghost-soldiers-britains-shadow-war-in-west-africa/

[9] https://caat.org.uk/publications/armed-extraction-the-uk-military-in-nigeria/

[10] https://www.army.mod.uk/learn-and-explore/global-operations/africa/batuk/

[11] https://freedomhouse.org/country/kenya/freedom-world/2025

[12] https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/east-africa-the-horn-and-great-lakes/kenya/report-kenya/

[13] https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/kenya#:~:text=Keynote,-Tirana%20Hassan&text=Kenya’s%20human%20rights%20trajectory%20deteriorated,the%20high%20cost%20of%20living.

[14] https://aoav.org.uk/2024/the-agnes-wanjiru-case-a-damning-reflection-of-misogyny-and-racism-in-the-british-military/

[15] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cedd92vn5lko

[16] https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/british-army-soldiers-paying-for-sex-kenya-agnes-wanjiru-killed-inquiry/

[17] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/05/kenyan-women-arent-safe-and-will-no-longer-be-quiet

[18] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-troops-support-mali-training-mission

[19] https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles/life-with-the-raf-chinook-detachment-in-mali/

[20] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21955839

[21] https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9634/

[22] https://www.hrw.org/africa/mali

[23] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/27/west-africas-coup-belt-did-malis-2020-army-takeover-change-the-region

[24] https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/mixed-picture-how-mali-views-wagner-group

[25] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/28/mali-army-wagner-group-atrocities-against-civilians

[26] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ce3ve0e7ndzo

[27] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-army-trains-500th-somali-soldier-in-infantry-skills

[28] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-military-train-somali-army-in-baidoa

[29] https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/east-africa-the-horn-and-great-lakes/somalia/report-somalia/

[30] https://www.warchild.org.uk/news/new-report-war-child-finds-uk-government-providing-military-support-states-committing-grave

[31] https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/somalia#:~:text=The%20UN%20documented%20hundreds%20of,allegations%20of%20Al%2DShabab%20affiliation.

[32]https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c91136d40f0b633fa716108/Sudan_Improving_International_Standards_Defence_2017-2018.docx

[33] https://socialistworker.co.uk/international/britain-is-no-peace-maker-in-sudans-civil-war/

[34] https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan

[35] https://dpglaw.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Final-Judgment-Nour-v-Sec-State.pdf

[36] https://www.stopwar.org.uk/article/britains-bloody-hands-sudans-ongoing-nightmare/