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The black box of combat deaths: why Israel must release its Gaza casualty data

The Guardian’s recent investigation, conducted with +972 Magazine and Local Call, reports the existence of a classified Israeli military database listing 8,900 named Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters as dead or “probably dead” as of May 2025. This newly revealed figure, just 17% of the 53,000 total deaths recorded by Gaza Ministry of Health (MOH) over a comparable time period, provoked immediate discussion, including pushback, of the very high implied ratio of civilian-to-combatant deaths in the war.

But the focus on percentages obscures a more fundamental problem: we have only a reported number from an unseen list, compiled according to an unknown methodology.

We cannot examine or analyse the underlying data. As such, our efforts to gain a deeper understanding to true human cost of the conflict are once again thwarted by Israeli Defence Force (IDF) opacity.

The Transparency Asymmetry
The contrast between Israeli and Palestinian data transparency could hardly be more pronounced. The Gaza MoH has released no fewer than twelve detailed lists of recorded fatalities since the war began, complete with names, ages, sex, and national identification numbers. These lists, whatever their limitations, can be, and have been, subjected to both rigorous analysis and not so rigorous.

Researchers, including myself, have examined these databases for patterns, inconsistencies, and potential gaps. We can identify duplicate entries, verify demographic distributions, and cross-reference with other sources. This scrutiny has led to productive debates about methodology and reliability and broad agreement that a dip in quality that began in late 2023 was followed by later clean up and substantial improvement going forward.

The Israeli military, by contrast, maintains its list in complete secrecy. While Israeli officials regularly dismiss Palestinian casualty figures as propaganda, they simultaneously refuse to provide their own data for examination.

This asymmetry is particularly problematic given that Israeli politicians have publicly claimed historically low civilian-to-combatant ratios and more than 20,000 militant deaths. These are numbers in considerable tension with the figure of 8,900 named deaths reported by the Guardian.

The implications IDF opacity extend beyond academic debate. Without access to the actual list, civil society organisations like AOAV, journalists and academics like myself cannot perform the most basic validation exercises, including checks for duplicates, assessment of the demographic profile of those classified as combatants, or identification of potential misclassifications. Israel seems to ask the international community to accept its casualty assessments on faith while denying the tools necessary for independent evaluation.

Cross-Reference Potential and Classification Standards
Access to the Israeli list would enable cross-referencing against the MoH records could substantially advance our understanding of the capacity of the MoH surveillance systems to capture the deaths of combatants. The MoH does not classify the deaths it records into civilians and combatants. This is, in fact, a methodologically sound decision because they would have little basis for making such distinctions. Yet the numbers of combatants present on MoH lists is an issue of great interest that matching deaths across the two lists would illuminate to a considerable extent.  

We cannot properly understand the 8,900 figure until we learn where the IDF sets the bar for designating someone as a combatant. The Guardian article cites sources suggesting that this bar may be set problematically low, potentially inflating the count with, e.g., civil police, government administrators, or others with tenuous connections to military activity. Some reports indicate that field units could designate casualties as militants without verification, with one intelligence source quoted as saying people are “promoted to the rank of terrorist after their death.”

Having access to the actual list would also allow researchers to examine patterns in classification.

Are certain age groups disproportionately classified as combatants? What proportion of those listed match known militant announcements versus being identified through other means?

These questions cannot be answered through aggregate numbers alone; they require access to the underlying data that Israel holds back.

Methodological Opacity and Data Collection Challenges
Israel should explain not just what its numbers are, but how it arrives at them. Do they systematically analyse social media announcements by militant groups? Do they cross-reference the Ministry of Health lists against their larger database of suspected militants? How do after-action reports contribute to the count?

While one might reasonably assume they employ all these methods, the Guardian’s investigation leaves these questions largely unanswered. Without understanding the methodology, we cannot assess whether the true number of combatant deaths is likely higher or lower than the reported number.

The challenge of naming the dead presents methodological complications that affect both Israeli and Palestinian casualty accounts, though in different ways. Generating specific names from combat situations is inherently difficult. While the Israeli military might target a known individual and confirm their death, that person could be surrounded by other militants whose identities remain unknown. If the database only includes named individuals, it will necessarily omit many actual combatant deaths.

The MoH faces similar challenges in meeting the high bar of naming victims, but generally operates from a position of advantage through its extensive ground presence, particularly its network of hospitals and morgues that process the dead. Still, it cannot capture every death and may miss many of them.

However, the MoH advantage for capturing deaths is not uniform across Gaza. In areas under evacuation orders, where medical infrastructure is absent or severely degraded, the Israeli military may be better positioned to monitor casualties than the MoH is. Drone surveillance, signals intelligence, and ground operations in these zones could theoretically provide the military with information about deaths that never reach Palestinian medical facilities. These varying advantages and disadvantages across different areas and times during the conflict complicate any simple assessment of which party’s count is a more complete account of what it is trying to measure.

Any serious analysis must acknowledge factors that likely push both counts toward under- and overcounting. For the Israeli military, undercounting factors include the naming requirement that excludes unidentified combatants, limited access to bodies in areas with weak IDF presence, and the possible exclusion of militants from smaller groups. Overcounting factors might include the reported practice of posthumous classification without verification, the potential inclusion of civil officials and police, and possible duplicate counting across different intelligence streams.

MoH undercounting would result from bodies remaining under rubble, deaths in areas without functional medical facilities, reluctance of families to go through the rigamarole of getting the MoH to recognize the death of someone who did not pass through the morgue system or the nonexistence of surviving family members to make such reports. Overestimation concerns, frequently raised by critics, include the possibility of inflated numbers for propaganda purposes, though the provision of detailed lists with identification numbers makes large-scale fabrication difficult to sustain.

The current situation, where one party provides detailed data for scrutiny while the other offers only undocumented summary figures, renders meaningful validation impossible. The Israeli military’s possession of a detailed casualty database represents a potentially valuable resource for understanding this conflict’s human toll.

That it remains hidden while Palestinian data is subjected to intense scrutiny creates an analytical double standard that undermines credible assessment.

The international community, humanitarian organisations, and researchers need access to both data sets. Only through transparent, verifiable information can we move beyond competing narratives and toward empirical understanding. The Israeli military should release its list of militant casualties, explain its classification criteria, and detail its methodology.

Similarly, continued transparency from Palestinian health authorities remains essential.

In a conflict where numbers have become weapons in the information war, transparency is not just an academic preference; it is a moral imperative for accountability and truth.