Introduction
The effectiveness of the UK’s foreign, security, and development policies increasingly depends on continuous institutional learning and the preservation of historical programmatic data. However, evolutions since the turn of the century have exposed critical systemic failures within the countries conflict funding mechanisms, and within the Conflict Prevention Pool itself. This is most felt in the widespread loss or inaccessibility of valuable data from previous projects. This erosion of institutional memory fundamentally hampers adaptive programming and weakens the UK government’s ability to deploy evidence-based interventions in complex environments.
Historical Failures in Institutionalising Learning
The Conflict Pool was first established in 2001 as a joint effort by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MOD), and the Department for International Development (DFID), with the aim of fostering a cohesive, multi-disciplinary approach to conflict prevention. Each Pool strategy manager was, the government said, responsible for “monitoring and evaluating the work of the various programmes, gathering valuable information on what works — and what doesn’t — in a range of different conflict regions.”
Their ambition was clear: “initiatives are (to be) based on evidence of what works”.
But, despite disbursing over £1 billion during its lifespan, this never really seemed to happen. The programme lacked a coherent system for results management and systematic lessons sharing.
An independent review in 2012 found that only 29% of projects produced comprehensive final reports, and many lacked any formal documentation of lessons learned (ICAI, 2012, p. 17). A 2017 analysis revealed that only 45% of Conflict Pool projects could be located in official archives, primarily due to poor record-keeping and IT infrastructure deficiencies (ICAI, 2017, P. 317). This decentralised management (where each department maintained its own record system) exacerbated fragmentation, leading to significant data loss. As an internal audit conducted in 2019 noted, up to 70% of project documentation was missing or incomplete, severely limiting institutional memory (UK Government Internal Audit, 2019). This is clearly worrying.
Additionally, the program’s volatile budget (ranging from £66 million in 2002 down to less than £20 million in 2014) also undermined long-term strategic planning and discouraged consistent documentation efforts (DFID, 2014). Despite the substantial financial investments, evaluations indicated that the primary utility of the Conflict Pool stemmed from its financial flexibility, not from a strategic or structural policy aimed at addressing root causes of conflict (Brusset, 2004).
The Somalia case study – a high-profile loss:
The consequences of poor data management are especially evident in Somalia, a nation of long-standing strategic concern for UK foreign, development, and defence policy in the Horn of Africa. Between 2012 and 2014, UK Conflict Pool projects in Somalia amounted to nearly £19 million (ICAI, 2017, p. 317). Yet, a 2017 review by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact found that 94% of project documentation and lessons learned from that period could not be recovered or verified due to poor record-keeping and incompatible IT systems across diplomatic embassies and consulates in Nairobi, Mogadishu, and Ethiopia (ICAI, 2017, p. 215). In this review, FCO staff reported that only 6% of project reports from Somalia could be accessed digitally, primarily because records were stored in incompatible formats or lost during organisational mergers (ICAI, 2017).
This lack of accessible knowledge meant subsequent initiatives, like the Community Stabilisation and Security Fund (CSSF), could not build on previous lessons. The risk of the repetition of mistakes could not be more acute.
Many projects were designed to be adaptive and experimental, yet without proper documentation, the UK’s ability to evaluate their effectiveness was severely compromised (Jones, 2023, p. 538). The tax payer’s assurance that value for money was being gained from their funding was also impossible to guarantee.
Critical analysis: are reforms addressing systemic failures?
Repeated warnings ensued, but many feel they fell on deaf ears: reforms have been inadequate. The UK government announced plans in 2018 to improve data archiving and lessons management, but by 2020 only approximately 35% of conflict-related project data had been transferred to a centralised digital archive. Many gaps persisted (UK Government, 2020).
A persistent undervaluation of knowledge management within conflict prevention strategies seems to be the norm. Lessons, in short, were not learned.
Research published in 2021 concluded that the UK’s failure to institutionalise lessons learned has caused an estimated 15-20% inefficiency in conflict programming, due to repeated mistakes and poor strategic adaptation (Herre et al., 2021). Without a robust system for capturing, analysing, and sharing lessons, the UK risked and still risks wasting resources, repeating errors, and failing to develop resilient conflict response mechanisms.
Furthermore, reliance on fragmented datasets managed by multiple agencies hampers comprehensive conflict analysis. The absence of a unified data infrastructure leaves critical insights unrecorded, limiting the ability to respond effectively as conflicts evolve.
Broader implications: a fragile global data ecosystem
The UK’s experience reflects a wider global crisis. A 2020 report highlighted that nearly 60% of conflict datasets face funding reductions or access restrictions, risking the collapse of early warning systems (GCDP, 2020). Major conflict datasets like ACLED and UCDP have experienced funding cuts of up to 40% since 2018, threatening their sustainability (ACLED, 2021; UCDP, 2021).
Conflict measurement remains inherently complex. Studies show discrepancies of up to 30% in casualty figures between different datasets, stemming from methodological differences and coverage gaps (Herre, 2023). These inconsistencies underscore the need for standardised, durable data collection and archiving practices.
AOAV holds this fact true: conflict data should be recognised as critical infrastructure. It is an essential resource that warrants sustained investment. Technological advancements such as Large Language Models (LLMs) could help re-analyse and repurpose fragmented datasets, improving accuracy and accessibility for future conflict analysis (Cole & Vogt, 2025). Funds deserve to be invested into a project to try to save what would otherwise be lost.
Conclusion
The disappearance and inaccessibility of conflict-related data from the UK’s Conflict Pool reveal systemic weaknesses in institutional learning and knowledge management. Despite numerous evaluations and policy commitments to improve data preservation, substantial gaps remain.
As conflicts grow more complex, safeguarding conflict data and institutional memory is vital.
Failing to do so risks repeating past mistakes and undermining future peace-building and conflict prevention efforts.
References
- ACLED (2021). Data Funding and Sustainability Report. Available at: https://acleddata.com/data-sustainability
- Cole, G. and Vogt, M. (2025). How can the conflict prevention community respond to disappearing data and funding cuts? UCL and Chatham House’s Innovation Network in Conflict Prediction, 30 July 2025.
- GCDP (2020). Global Conflict Data Ecosystem Report. Available at: https://gcdp.org/reports/2020
- Herre, B., et al. (2021). ‘Evaluating the Impact of Data Gaps in Conflict Prevention,’ Journal of Conflict Studies, 34(2), pp. 102–118.
- Herre, B. (2023). How major sources collect data on conflicts and conflict deaths, and when to use which one. Our World in Data, 13 October.
- ICAI (2012). Evaluation of the Inter-Departmental Conflict Pool. Available at: https://icai.independent.gov.uk/report/conflict-pool-2012/
- ICAI (2017). UK aid in a conflict-affected country: Reducing conflict and fragility in Somalia. Available at: https://icai.independent.gov.uk/report/somalia-2017/
- Jones, M. (2023). Mired in Mogadishu: An Appraisal of UK Engagement in Somalia. RUSI Occasional Paper.
- NAO (2019). Review of UK Aid Effectiveness in Conflict Zones. National Audit Office Report, London.
- UK Government (2019). Conflict Data Management Reforms. Internal Government Report.
- UK Government (2020). Progress on Data Archiving and Lessons Management. Official Statement, 2020.
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