The UK has supplied more than $6.7 billion worth of components for the production of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, according to research by Project Ploughshares. The findings, published in a January 2025 report by the Canadian peace research institute, reveal Britain’s deep involvement in the global supply chain of the aircraft, including those delivered to Israel, and raise fresh concerns over whether the UK is meeting its international arms control obligations.
The report, Global Production of the Israeli F-35I Joint Strike Fighter, provides one of the most detailed analyses of how F-35 components are sourced from multiple countries before being assembled in the United States and exported to Israel.
It reveals that 16.2% of all subawards in the F-35 programme have gone to UK-based manufacturers, second only to the United States. Among the primary beneficiaries is BAE Systems, which alone secured over $5.7 billion in contracts related to the fighter jet’s production. Other UK firms contributing components include Martin-Baker Aircraft Company, GE Aviation Systems, and Ultra PCS.
Israel’s fleet of F-35Is—an Israeli-specific variant of the aircraft—has been actively used in military operations in Gaza, including in the ongoing war that began in October 2023. According to the report, Israeli airstrikes carried out using these aircraft have been a key driver of civilian casualties. The use of explosive weapons in populated areas has caused widespread destruction, with UN agencies estimating that over 85% of Gaza’s population has been displaced and that nearly 60% of buildings have been damaged or destroyed.
Despite the extensive destruction and allegations of war crimes, the UK has continued to allow the export of F-35 components under Open General Export Licences (OGELs), which do not require case-by-case risk assessments. This has allowed British-made components to be incorporated into aircraft used by the Israeli Air Force without direct scrutiny.
Kelsey Gallagher, senior researcher on the project, told AOAV “this data only confirms what the UK government has already boasted, being that UK-based manufacturers play a major part in the F-35s global supply chain which, logically, would include producing some level of components destined for the IDF.”
“The UK, like other governments, have claimed it is simply not possible to determine the ultimate end-user of parts and components that flow into the F-35 program,” Gallagher said. “On the contrary, these datasets show that it is entirely possible to reasonably conclude who the end-user of those components could be—with the obvious conclusion that if civil society can determine this, governments can as well.”
Dr Iain Overton, Executive Director of Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), criticised the UK government’s approach, arguing that it allows Britain to claim plausible deniability while still playing a key role in supplying weapons used in conflict zones; “The UK government cannot continue to claim ignorance when its military exports are contributing to a war that has seen tens of thousands of civilians killed and displaced. The reality is that British-made components are helping keep Israeli F-35s operational, and the refusal to restrict their supply undermines international arms control efforts.”
The report also highlights that while other countries—including Germany, Canada, and the Netherlands—have imposed restrictions on direct arms sales to Israel, they continue to allow the transfer of F-35 components to the United States, which then supplies the aircraft to Israel under the US Foreign Military Financing programme. This, according to Project Ploughshares, creates a loophole in arms control regulations that allows weapons to reach conflict zones with minimal accountability.
The UK has partially suspended arms export licences to Israel, but the exemptions granted to the F-35 programme have been a point of contention. In December 2024, following pressure from human rights organisations, the UK government stated that it was “reviewing” its decision to allow continued exports of F-35 components, but no formal restrictions have been imposed.
Campaigners such as AOAV argue that Britain’s continued involvement in the programme could violate the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), to which it is a signatory.
Under Article 6.3 of the ATT, states are prohibited from authorising arms transfers if they have knowledge that the weapons could be used in the commission of war crimes or attacks on civilians. The UK’s use of OGELs for F-35 components has effectively shielded these transfers from detailed scrutiny, allowing British firms to continue profiting from arms sales while avoiding public accountability.
The lack of end-user assurances and transparency in the F-35 programme has made it difficult to determine the full extent of UK contributions to the Israeli fleet. However, Project Ploughshares’ research suggests that British firms have played a substantial role in keeping Israel’s F-35s operational. The report concludes that the UK’s approach to arms exports in the F-35 programme reflects a broader issue: how international joint production projects can allow states to sidestep their legal and ethical obligations by outsourcing risk assessments to intermediary countries.
As scrutiny over Israel’s military actions in Gaza grows, campaigners are expected to increase pressure on the UK government to end the export of F-35 components that could be used in future conflicts.
Whether Westminster will act is unlikely, but the UK’s complicity in supplying weapons used in war zones is becoming harder and harder to ignore.
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