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A briefing note for journalists on the ways in which the UK is involved in the US war on Iran

By Sacha Bergsma on
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Introduction

The UK has a history of leasing military bases to the US Air Force. Although the US needs to ask the UK Government permission to use the bases for combat operations, the legislative framework appears to reserve a primary “jurisdiction of US personnel to the US.”  Whilst the UK retains formal sovereignty over its military bases and must grant permission for their use in combat operations, in practice long-standing basing arrangements and Status of Forces Agreements mean that day-to-day operational control rests largely with US forces. This creates a distinction between legal authority and practical oversight: while the UK can authorise or withhold use at a formal level, its ability to monitor, shape, or constrain specific missions launched from these bases is limited.

In the current war against Iran, the British military bases in Fairford, Akrotiri, Diego Garcia and Flyingdales are known to be actively used. On 1 March, Prime Minister Keir Starmer allowed the US to use RAF bases. Initially the UK withheld permission – which was critically received by Trump – but after Iran struck British allies in the Gulf region, Starmer allowed the use of UK bases for “defensive operations”. 

Up until 7 April, Starmer has maintained this position, saying that the UK will not directly support the US in the war. Defence Secretary John Healey states that the UK is only involved in defensive operations in response to Iranian threats, and that these operations are necessary to defend the British citizens and allies in the region.

At the same time, the UK military does not provide the media or parliament with information concerning foreign nations’ military operations. Additionally, the Ministry of Defence refuses to comment on whether the UK approves the target lists of US strikes departing from the British bases, and on the number of killed civilians by US bombing missions from British bases. 

This silence leads to questioning whether the UK can clearly determine the line between operations with merely defensive purposes, and operations that (simultaneously) assist the US in their war against Iran.  

RAF bases: what do we know?

Since the start of the war on Iran on 28 February, the UK has been involved by permitting the US to use their RAF bases. The following part shows an overview of the bases and their reported activity since the start of the war until 7 April. 

RAF Akrotiri
RAF Akrotiri is based in Cyprus, owned by the UK Ministry of Defence, but has US military embedded there it appears on a permanent basis. It is hosting intelligence facilities, and is known to be “extremely busy”. We know that:

RAF Fairford
RAF Fairford is based in England, owned by the UK Ministry of Defence and has been serving as “key European forward operating location for U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command.” We know that 

RAF Flyingdales
RAF Flyingdales is based in England, owned by the UK Ministry of Defence and provides the US and UK government with a “continuous ballistic missile early warning service” to prevent surprise attacks. We know that

Diego Garcia
Diego Garcia is based in the Indian Ocean on one of the Chagos Islands. It is a US-UK jointly owned military base, and is reported to be critical for the countries’ national security.The base is subject to a contested deal of giving Mauritius sovereignty over the Chagos Islands. We know that

Other UK involvement
The UK involvement reaches further than just the use of their military bases. UK owned weapons and aircrafts were used, since the start of the war. We know that

  • Typhoon Squadron jets, jointly owned by UK and Qatar, were sent to Qatar;
  • Sky-Sabre, a UK owned ground-based air defence system, were sent to Saudi-Arabia, Bahrein and Kuwait; 
  • Lightweight Multirole Launcher, a UK-owned versatile precision missile, arrived in Bahrein, together with UK experts to integrate it into Bahraini defence and
  • Rapid Sentry, a UK owned ground-based air defence system, is operating in Kuwait combined with the RAF’s ORCUS system, a drone-detecting system. 
  • Defence Secretary John Healey announced in the last week of March that more UK troops and defence systems will be deployed in the Gulf region. 

Questionable involvement

The government’s position hinges on a carefully drawn distinction between defence and participation that is becoming harder to sustain under scrutiny. The UK Government officials state that they are not and will not be involved in offensive operations against Iran. Keir Starmer is refusing Trump to use RAF bases to strike Iranian civilian bridges and power plants, and repeats that the UK involvement only concerns protection of their own civilians, troops and allies. 

But, while the UK may not be directly selecting targets or conducting strikes, it is facilitating operations that are integral to the US campaign.

In effect, the line between defensive support and operational involvement appears less a fixed legal boundary than a matter of interpretation.

This ambiguity is compounded by a lack of transparency. The UK retains formal sovereignty over its bases, yet provides little clarity on how it exercises oversight in practice. Ministers insist that involvement is limited and defensive, but decline to disclose whether they review US targeting decisions or assess civilian harm arising from missions launched from British territory. That leaves a gap between stated policy and verifiable reality.

For investors, allies and policymakers alike, such opacity carries risks. The UK’s credibility rests not only on its legal position but on the consistency between its rhetoric and its actions. Without clearer disclosure on the scope and limits of its involvement, the government’s claim to remain outside offensive operations risks appearing increasingly tenuous.