In this report, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) examines the principal explosive weapons used by the Israeli military in Gaza between October 2023 and September 2025, tracing specific munitions to their manufacturers and documented incidents of civilian harm. Our research identifies how weapons described as “precision” systems repeatedly produced mass casualties, while also examining the US, Israeli and European supply chains that sustained their use. We argue that understanding civilian harm in Gaza requires scrutiny not only of how weapons were deployed, but of the procurement decisions, arms transfers and defence industries that enabled their continued supply, as well as the enduring legacy of unexploded ordnance, contamination and long-term harm.
Introduction
In this paper AOAV set out to examine the principal explosive weapons used by Israel’s military in Gaza during the “Swords of Iron” war from October 2023 to September 2025, a period during which South Africa filed allegations of genocide against Israel at the International Court of Justice. We sought to identify not only the weapons used, but also the operational logic and industrial systems that sustained their use.
The weapon-specific incidents detailed below occurred within the much larger scale of Gaza’s destruction: a peer-reviewed population survey estimated that by early 2025, 75,200 people had died violently in Gaza (Spagat et al., 2026; Mansour, 2026).
Media reporting commonly refers to “airstrikes” or “shelling”, often without identifying the specific munitions involved, their manufacturers or the military doctrines governing their deployment. The weapons behind the destruction is therefore obscured, and the technological, logistical and procurement systems sustaining it often left unidentified. Recognising this, AOAV set out to focus on the material characteristics of the weapons used: manufacturer, blast radius, fragmentation patterns, fuse settings, guidance systems, dud rates and the supply chains that enabled continued bombardment.
While we do not present an exhaustive catalogue, we feel that the breadth of our research in this report that took over a year in the making allows us to identify recurring trends in the design, provision and deployment of Israel’s arsenal in Gaza.
A central finding of our research is the incongruence between so-called “precision” warfare and large-scale destructive effects in dense urban environments. Our researchers document extensive reliance on US-made Mk 80 series general-purpose bombs, including 1,000lb and 2,000lb munitions, deployed both unguided and fitted with JDAM or Israel’s SPICE guidance kits. Despite the use of these guidance systems, large air-dropped bombs can result in extensive areas of destruction when used in a densely populated urban territory such as the Gaza Strip.
We record repeated mass-casualty incidents traced by journalists and investigators to identifiable bomb fragments, tail kits and strike patterns. Alongside these, we examine smaller “precision” weapons such as the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb, marketed as a low-collateral munition, yet repeatedly associated with lethal strikes on shelters, schools and hospitals housing displaced civilians.
Our analysis also details the industrial logistics underpinning Israel’s military operations in Gaza.
We track the IDF’s extensive use of 155mm artillery, supplied through both domestic Israeli production and US-origin stockpiles, and examine how NATO-standard interoperability enabled rapid substitution and resupply. In this context, the use of artillery in the territory has predictable civilian consequences. We also examine the Merkava tank’s 120mm ammunition ecosystem, focusing on multi-purpose rounds and programmable fuses, and trace how these technologies translated into fragmentation injuries and lethal airburst effects.
We give particular attention to the re-emergence of “multi-purpose” lethality as a design philosophy. Our researchers identify how weapons are repeatedly described by manufacturers and military sources as flexible systems suited to complex terrain. In practice, this often denotes fragmentation sleeves, programmable airburst functions, delayed-detonation fuse settings and dense pre-formed tungsten or steel micro-shrapnel intended to maximise anti-personnel effects. Medical testimony and recovered fragments suggest the deployment of munitions producing distinctive injury patterns, including micro-fragment wounds, traumatic amputations and catastrophic internal injuries.
We also detail indications of cluster munitions within Israel’s inventory and evidence suggestive of probable use in Gaza, alongside allegations concerning other non-conventional weapons.
AOAV also examines the political economy underlying Israel’s war effort. Israel’s major arms manufacturers, particularly Elbit Systems and its subsidiaries, recur throughout our research as producers of shells, bombs, loitering munitions and guidance systems frequently marketed internationally as “combat proven”.
At the same time, US military stockpiles, export approvals and transnational supply chains involving European components repeatedly enabled the tempo and scale of fire observed in Gaza and, to a lesser degree, the West Bank. We seek to highlight the infrastructure and international supply networks that sustained the provision of bombs, shells and replacement components.
Finally, we consider the continuing impact of Israel’s arsenal. Weapons do not cease to kill once a strike ends or media attention fades. Our research highlights the vast quantity of unexploded ordnance left in Gaza’s rubble, the long-term risks to civilians during reconstruction, and the environmental persistence of explosive residues and heavy metals.
Civilian harm therefore extends beyond immediate casualties to encompass the slower violence of contamination, fear, amputation and morbidity in a landscape transformed into a minefield by both design and volume.
Iain Overton
Executive Director
AOAV
September 2026
Key Findings
- Boeing JDAM-equipped Mk-84 bombs were used in Gaza, including at Jabalia refugee camp, where strikes on 31 October 2023 killed more than 120 people.
- Boeing GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs were repeatedly used on shelters and schools, including Al-Tabi’in school and Kuwait Peace Camp 1.
- Elbit Systems supplied Israeli artillery and tank munitions, including the M339 120mm multi-purpose shell and M454 155mm fragmentation shell.
- Northrop Grumman M830A1 tank ammunition was linked to the scene where five-year-old Hind Rajab and rescuers were killed.
- Rafael SPICE-1000 and SPICE-2000 guidance kits converted 1,000lb and 2,000lb bombs into precision-guided weapons while retaining their large explosive effects.
- Lockheed Martin Hellfire missiles were extensively supplied to Israel; an AGM-114K2 fragmentation variant was identified after a strike on a Gaza school shelter.
- Elbit SkyStriker loitering munitions were identified in repeated 2025 strikes on displacement sites, including Mawasi, where children were among those killed.
- The campaign relied on an integrated supply chain involving Elbit, Rafael, Israel Aerospace Industries, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics.
Methodology
This report employs an open-source and forensic methodology. Weapon profiles are constructed from cross-referenced information, including US State Department notifications, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) releases, Israeli reporting, human-rights investigations, specialist defence-sector analysis and reputable international media coverage. Many findings are further supported by forensic examination of primary-source imagery by weapons experts, including photographs of fragments, blast signatures, tail fins, fuse components, driving-band markings, paint schemes, serial or vendor codes and other distinctive design features. Wherever possible, the report avoids generic references to “airstrikes” or “shelling,” instead identifying the specific munitions and delivery systems involved.
To link weapons to civilian harm, the paper prioritises incidents with corroborated dates, locations and a clear evidentiary chain. Israeli military rationale is considered alongside open-source and forensic evidence. Particular weight is given to cases involving documented remnants, expert imagery analysis, consistent witness and medical testimony. Specific examples have been selected to illuminate broader operational patterns and recurring forms of harm associated with particular classes of weapon.
The report does not claim exhaustive certainty in every instance. Rather, it distinguishes carefully between confirmed use, likely use and plausible inference. The intention is not to overstate conclusions, but to establish credible analytical resources for attributing specific forms of destruction, injury and civilian harm to identifiable weapon systems, procurement networks and design choices.
Part I — Ground-Delivered Munitions
Following October 7, Israel’s ground operations in Gaza relied heavily on tanks, artillery and even naval guns. This part follows the calibre size: first the 155mm artillery and rocket systems, then the 120mm ammunition of the Merkava. Known documented civilian harm from each is included alongside the weapon that produced it.
1.1 155mm artillery shells and rocket systems

Israeli media confirmed that the Artillery Corps fired multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) along with over 100,000 artillery shells within six weeks (Boguslavsky, 2023b; Fabian, 2023), in what one of its senior officers described as “the largest operation of the Artillery Corps since 1973” (Zitun, 2023). Israel relies on tanks and howitzers, including self-propelled guns, compliant with NATO standardisation agreements (STANAGs). Much of this equipment is produced by, or includes components from, US manufacturers. As a result, Israeli artillery fires NATO- and US-standard shells: primarily 155mm rounds.
The majority of these shells came from two streams — expedited US transfers and Israel’s own production. From the US, in December 2023 the US approved the sale of some 57,000 artillery shells to Israel (DSCA, 2023), formalising transfers — expedited two months earlier — from US military stockpiles based in Israel (Davies and Ganguly, 2023; DefenseMirror, 2024).
That package, undeclared to Congress at the time, included: 52,229 M795 HE 155mm rounds and 4,792 M107 HE 155mm rounds (DSCA, 2023). The M107 is a heavy (43.2kg) unguided high-explosive shell approved for US service in 1958. The M795, from General Dynamics, replaced it and features a high-fragmentation perforated steel casing. According to General Dynamics, it offers greater range and accuracy with roughly double the lethality against personnel, and is the “conventional ammunition of choice” for the US Army and Marine Corps. Israel and the US coordinate withdrawals from the War Reserve Stockpile Allies-Israel (WRSA-I). The US reportedly consulted with Israel before shipping 155mm shells to Ukraine (Schmitt et al., 2023), and gave permission for the IDF to draw on the stockpile after October 7.
On the domestic side, Israel’s leading supplier of tank and artillery munitions is Elbit Systems-Land, which absorbed the formerly state-owned Israel Military Industries (IMI) in 2018. IMI developed many of the IDF’s modern shells and possesses a factory dedicated to producing ordnance for export, including NATO-standard calibres, with demand rising during the war in Ukraine. Its 155mm line includes the M107-A3, a variant of the US M107 HE shell with enhanced firepower; the M454 S-HE, a multi-purpose airburst “Super High Explosive” shell containing 7,000 pre-formed fragmentation elements (Elbit Systems, 2026b; Cat-UXO, n.d.), whose use in Gaza has neither been documented nor reported; and the M999 ‘Barak Eitan’ cluster artillery shell, which disperses nine ‘M99’ submunitions that each expel 1,200 tungsten fragments on detonation.
The US adopted the M99 submunitions for its own XM1208 cluster shell programme (Peck, 2025). After objections from international investors, Elbit cancelled the M99’s production, but the Israeli state-owned arms company Tomer producing M99/XM1208 shells in a $210m deal with the US Department of Defense; a programme criticised by human rights organisations (Glaun, 2025; Echols, 2025).
Tomer, previously part of IMI, was kept under state control for its strategic and classified production lines. It also produces rocket engines for Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Elbit (Azulay, 2025; Calcalist, 2025).
Israel denies using cluster munitions in Gaza but the evidentiary picture is mixed: remnants of the M999 shell were documented in Lebanon in 2024 (Christou, 2025). However, deployment in Gaza remains unverified.
Platforms and rocket systems
Israel’s Artillery Corps has used US-developed M109A2 and M109A5 self-propelled howitzers. Their manufacture was taken over by BAE Systems’ US subsidiary, which has since produced the M-109A7 for the US military (Arms Sales Accountability Project, 2024a); Elbit America’s SIGMA-155 self-propelled howitzer, is slated to replace the M-109A5 for the IDF (Bisht, 2025). M109A5 howitzers were reported firing at Gaza and Lebanon in October 2023 (Army Recognition, 2023).
Alongside the legacy US-made M270s, Israel’s rocket artillery now operates its own variant of Elbit’s Precise Universal Launch System (PULS), compatible with a range of missiles and even loitering munitions (Egozi, 2024; Army Technology, 2023). PULS have the capacity to fire the guided AccuLAR 122mm (Romach), AccuLAR 160mm (Bar) rockets — 40km-range precision-guided munitions first developed by IMI — and the 227mm unguided Ra’am Eitan cluster rocket, unveiled in 2020 by the 282nd Brigade, which contains 64 bomblets with four separate detonating mechanisms and a claimed sub-1% failure rate in line with US standards.
Ra’am Eitan use in Lebanon in 2024 has been confirmed by on-the-ground evidence (Christou, 2025), however, no such evidence exists for their deployment in Gaza.
After October 7, the 282nd Brigade deployed from northern Israel to Gaza and used the guided 122mm Romach (AccuLAR) rocket for precision strikes. According to Israeli reports cleared by military censorship, around 150 Romach strikes were conducted within a month, alongside tens of thousands of artillery shells. The reports indicate that the larger cluster Ra’am Eitan rocket was not employed (Zitun, 2023). In April 2025, new ‘Bar’ AccuLAR rockets were fired for the first time against targets in Gaza (Jerusalem Post, 2025). Artillery Corps Unit 5252 operates Hermes 450 ‘Zik’ UAVs for spotting, fire correction and strikes (Israel Defense, 2023).
Civilian harm and unexploded ordnance
Protracted fire has lethal consequences. Palestinian militant groups are known to collect unexploded munitions, including artillery shells, and repurpose them into IEDs or cannibalise components for rockets; an IDF source estimated the overall dud rate to be up to 15% (Berman, 2024). Several human rights organisations have raised concerns about possible 155mm white phosphorus use, including Amnesty International (Citizen Evidence Lab, 2023; Gillard, 2024), Human Rights Watch, Euro-Med Monitor and IMEU.
AOAV has previously documented the use of artillery on Gaza (Perkins, 2015).
1.2 120mm tank ammunition
Israeli sources announced that tanks and armoured vehicles have taken heavy losses in Gaza. In July 2025, the Hebrew-language newspaper Maariv reported that the IDF had lost nearly half its stock of Merkava 4 tanks in the campaign (Türkiye Today, 2025), though this has not been conformed by this report. What it does reflect is what Israeli sources described as an “extremely high” maintenance and repair load. The IDF’s primary battle tanks, the Merkava Mk3 and Mk4, carry a 120mm smoothbore cannon compatible with NATO ammunition under STANAG 4385.
Similarly to artillery, two supply streams converge: Israeli-produced multi-purpose rounds and US-origin cartridges. Among the domestically produced rounds, the 120mm M329 APAM-MP-T (Anti-Personnel Anti-Materiel Multi-Purpose Tracer) combines structural penetration with anti-personnel effects and was used in earlier operations such as Operation Protective Edge (2014). Its prototype, the XM329, was among the first tank rounds to incorporate an airburst fuse setting, and a fragmentation sleeve filled with tiny tungsten cubes lets it disperse lethal fragments across a roughly 20-metre radius. Because the M329 uses six submunitions, each below the 20kg threshold set by Article 2 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, it meets the technical definition of a cluster munition (Schirding, 2007; OSMP, 2024; Convention on Cluster Munitions, 2008, art. 2) – a classification we note as technical and descriptive rather than a finding that Israel, which is not a party to the Convention, has committed a treaty violation.
The M329 is no longer listed in Elbit’s ammunition portfolios, possibly due to international scrutiny of cluster munitions, but indications are that the IDF may have drawn on existing stockpiles during the Gaza campaign (OSMP, 2024).
Its successor, the M339 HE-MP-T (High-Explosive Multi-Purpose Tracer), more closely reflects the original XM329 concept: a high-explosive round with a fragmentation sleeve whose programmable fuse can be set for point detonation on impact, delayed detonation (to penetrate structures) or airburst over the target (Katz, 2012; Azulay, 2012). The shell adheres to NATO and US charge standards, and evidence from Gaza indicates it became a principal tank munition in urban combat (Salman et al., 2025; McGreal, 2024). Israeli media reported its introduction after Operation Protective Edge (Lappin, 2015), highlighting its flexibility across different platforms and its multi-purpose penetrating/fragmentation features.

On the US-origin side, Israel received transfers of the M830A1 multi-purpose anti-tank with tracer (MPAT) shell (now supplied by Northrop Grumman): the US Secretary of State approved a sale of almost 14,000 rounds on December 8, 2023 (Allison, 2023), following an earlier expedited transfer from the WRSA-I stockpile under emergency authorisation (Bertrand, 2023; DefenseMirror, 2024; Sharp, 2025).
In August 2024, the DSCA reported a further Israeli request to purchase 32,739 additional 120mm cartridges, including M1147 High Explosive Multi-Purpose with Tracer and M830A1 MPAT rounds (DSCA, 2024). The M1147 includes programmable fuse settings, enabling point detonation, airburst, and delayed detonation modes (Dawoud, 2025). The scale of these purchases suggests Israel’s consumption outpaced both its stockpiles and its domestic production capacity.
Civilian harm
Whether M339 or M830A1, tank shells used in populated areas often proved lethal to civilians. Given their wide-area effects, the use of fragmentation rounds in densely populated areas raises humanitarian and legal concerns. A fragment of a US-made M830A1 was recovered near the ambulance in which five-year-old Hind Rajab was killed in January 2024; forensic weapons experts consulted by CNN believed damage to the ambulance was consistent with such a tank shell (Kelly et al., 2024). Medical experts who reviewed photographs of fragmentation injuries and recovered shrapnel from Al-Aqsa Hospital concluded the damage was likely caused by M329 cluster shells or M339 fragmentation shells (McGreal, 2024).
On March 19, 2025, tank shells struck the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) guesthouse in Deir al-Balah, which housed aid workers, at a site UNOPS said had been “deconflicted” with the IDF; UNOPS chief Jorge Moreira da Silva called the strike “not an accident.
The IDF initially denied targeting the building, then said that “the building was struck due to assessed enemy presence and was not identified by the forces as a UN facility” (IDF, 2025). A Washington Post forensic investigation concluded that two Israeli 120mm shells struck the compound — one airbursting above a patio, another penetrating a wall before detonating inside (Loveluck et al., 2025) — killing a Bulgarian UN aid worker and injuring five others.
AOAV’s earlier analysis has separately noted IDF use of the Iron Sting guided mortar system (Gillard, 2024).
Part II — Air-Delivered Munitions
Israel’s aerial campaign has moved across a range of munitions, from unguided “dumb” bombs through GPS- and laser-guided kits to the small-diameter glide bomb marketed as “low-collateral.” This part follows that movement and sets each weapon beside the strikes most clearly attributed to it by open-source and forensic investigation.
2.1 Unguided general-purpose bombs

Israel used “dumb bombs” extensively in its aerial campaign during late 2023. NATO had reportedly shifted away from unguided munitions following the 1999 Yugoslavia intervention, in which 90% of bombs dropped were precision guided (Broch, n.d.); a former US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) official stated that 100% of the bombs in the 2011 Libya campaign were guided (Bennet and Sagalyn, 2023; Grissom et al., 2016). Yet, over Gaza the IDF used unguided Mk-80 series bombs first developed by the US in the 1950s. Mk-82 (500lb), Mk-83 (1,000lb) bombs are usually fitted with modern guidance kits to improve accuracy and reduce ‘collateral damage’ — here meaning damage to buildings or structures surrounding the target. The slightly older M117 (750lb) was also used unguided; though phased out by the US military, photos of an IAF F-16 jet loaded with M117s were posted on military social media accounts (Panella, 2023).
A December 2023 US assessment compiled by the Director of National Intelligence found that, at that stage of the conflict, “about 40-45% of the 29,000 air-to-ground munitions Israel has used have been unguided” (Bertrand and Bo Lillis, 2023). This disparity likely reflects the greater availability of dumb bombs relative to smart munitions — especially given Israeli access to the WRSA-I which reportedly contains large amounts of legacy dumb bombs. Israeli officials previously noted a predominance of ‘outdated’ — obsolete — munitions within the stockpile. High-profile incidents of mass civilian casualties sparked dismay among US officials, with President Biden warning that “they’re starting to lose that support by the indiscriminate bombing that takes place” (Shear, 2023).
According to IDF intelligence officers speaking to an Israeli journalist, dumb bombs were preferred for targeting “junior militants” deemed too low-value to waste expensive guided munitions on (Abraham, 2024), and nighttime strikes on homes of suspected Hamas affiliates were favoured despite the greater risk to civilians. The 2,000lb Mk-84 illustrates the gap between ‘precision’ rhetoric and the physical effect of these strikes, raising international humanitarian law issues of proportionality and distinction. In these early stages, Mk-84 bombs were dropped extensively on urban areas (Stein et al., 2023).
They can create craters up to 11 metres deep and 15 metres wide; AOAV analysis notes their “lethal radius” can reach 360 metres, with severe injury and damage expected up to 800 metres from the point of impact (AOAV, 2016). On October 17, 2023, a Mk-84 reportedly killed between 15 and 40 people in Khan Younis, including many members of the Lamdani family, who had recently fled the Gaza City beach refugee camp following IDF instructions to evacuate north-to-south. No guidance kit remnants were documented alongside the bomb-casing fragments, suggesting use of an unguided Mk-84 (Airwars, 2023).
2.2 JDAM guidance kits
JDAM-equipped bombs were widely used over Gaza with devastating effects. Developed by Boeing (formerly McDonnell Douglas), Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) tail kits upgrade rather than replace conventional bombs, attaching to bombs and providing GPS/INS guidance for more accurate strikes. A California-based company, AeroAntenna, produces GPS antenna components for JDAMs (OSMP, 2025b). When fitted, bombs receive “GBU” designations: GBU-38 for the 500lb Mk-82, GBU-32 for the 1,000lb Mk-83s, and GBU-31 for the 2,000lb Mk-84s (Parsch, n.d.). Hardened bunker-buster bombs, such as the BLU-109 can also be JDAM-equipped.
After October 7, 100 BLU-109s were transferred to Israel alongside roughly 3,000 JDAM kits expedited as emergency aid (Halpern, 2023). In February 2025, an Israeli request for 13,000 JDAM kits for Mk-84 bombs was approved (DSCA, 2025), following the Trump administration’s lifting of the previous administration’s May 2024 pause on one shipment of 2,000lb bombs (Magid and Spiro, 2025).

With GPS guidance, JDAM-equipped bombs are currently thought to have a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of 5 metres or less — meaning 50% will land within five metres of the target point — but where GPS data is denied and only inertial guidance is available, the CEP can rise to 30 metres (US Air Force, n.d.). That distinction is critical in Gaza, because there was extensive GPS disruption around the area during Operation Iron Swords, much of it attributed to Israeli jamming and spoofing (Gebrekidan, 2024; Middle East Monitor, 2024).
Given JDAM’s reliance on GPS-aided INS guidance, Israel’s own electronic warfare (EW) methods could, in principle, have degraded the GPS capabilities of JDAMs. However, the extent of any such effect is unknown, as is whether Israeli systems and mission planning compensated for it or whether specific strikes were affected.
Civilian harm
On October 31, 2023, multiple 2,000lb JDAM-equipped bombs struck Jabalia Refugee Camp, killing over 120 people — mostly women and children — and wounding hundreds (Airwars, 2026). Gaza Civil Defence director Ahmad al-Kahlout told reporters that six US-made bombs were dropped, and visuals captured by the Guardian identified at least five craters (Dawn, 2023; Graham-Harrison et al., 2023). The IDF said it had targeted a Hamas commander and tunnels while the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated the strike “could amount to a war crime” (Al Jazeera, 2023).
JDAM-guided bombs were also used in Deir al-Balah on October 10 and 22, 2023, destroying the homes of the al-Najjar and Abu Mu’eileq families and killing 24 and 19 civilians respectively, with Amnesty International condemning both airstrikes as unlawful (Amnesty International, 2023).
On June 30, 2025, a 500lb GBU-38 struck the Al-Baqa café in Gaza, a known recreational spot, killing over 40 people (Khadder and Kent, 2025). Weapons researcher Trevor Ball identified the JDAM tail section involved (Burke, 2025), while the IDF stated that prior aerial surveillance had been used “to mitigate the risk of harming civilians,” a common refrain used to justify such strikes.
2.3 Multi-Purpose Rigid (MPR) bombs

Israel fields the MPR-500 “enhanced blast” bomb, developed by IMI and first showcased in 2012. Designed for urban warfare, it integrates aspects of bunker-busters with anti-personnel area-effect weapons: a hardened nose can penetrate up to four concrete floors before the blast expels 26,000 pre-formed tungsten fragments, with a single 2mm fragment capable of severe internal injury (Elbit Systems Land, n.d. a). In promotional material, Elbit claims it achieves a lethal area equivalent to the significantly larger Mk-84 while reducing structural collateral damage, with timed detonation at a chosen floor (Elbit Systems Land, n.d. a). Built to similar dimensions as the Mk-82 for interoperability, it can be used unguided or with guidance kits, and Boeing approved its JDAM compatibility in 2012 (Eshel, 2012).
Its performance in Operation Protective Edge was considered highly effective, and IMI went on to apply the MPR concept to other bomb sizes (Lappin, 2016). In 2023, its use was reported in Gaza operations (Boguslavsky, 2023a), and Amnesty International experts identified it at the site of an April 19, 2024 strike on Rafah, alongside remnants of a JDAM kit.
2.4 SPICE guidance kits

Israel also uses SPICE (Smart Precise Impact Cost-Effective) kits, made by state-owned Rafael Advanced Defense Systems (Rafael hereafter), to convert dumb bombs into precision-guided munitions. The kits attach X-configuration wing/fins and guidance modules for stand-off range delivery, combining GPS guidance with electro-optical scene-matching sensors in the weapon’s nose; Rafael claims a CEP of about 3 metres (lower than JDAMs) but at a higher cost (Times of India, 2025). SPICE 1000 and SPICE 2000 kits fit Mk-83 and Mk-84 bombs respectively, and BLU-110 and BLU-109 bunker-busters are similarly compatible. Rafael claims a 95% target acquisition probability for both kits (Rafael, n.d.).
In December 2023, former Pentagon targeting official Mark Garlasco identified SPICE-2000 bombs from social media videos: an October 11 video appeared to show a similar munition, suggesting use from early days of the conflict. Garlasco considered SPICE-use unusual where GPS jamming was not thought to be an issue (Epstein, 2023).
Speculatively, factors driving the use of more costly SPICE kits may have been a shortage of JDAMs, avoidance of accuracy loss from GPS disruption, or an interest in live testing. Citing “increased precision and reduced collateral damage,” the US approved a $320m transfer of SPICE kits to Israel in November 2023, noting that Israeli stockpiles were insufficient (Times of India, 2025). Human rights groups criticised the transfer, observing that 1,000lb or 2,000lb bombs can and do cause large levels of destruction regardless of guidance.
Despite appeals to halt deliveries of kits for large bombs in favour of lighter options, Israel has continued to receive and deploy them. Rafael guidance kits have been sold internationally — India used SPICE-2000 bombs against militant camps in Balakot, Pakistan, in 2019, reflecting longstanding India-Israel defence collaboration (Times of Israel, 2019).
2.5 Laser guidance
The IAF also employs ‘Lizard’ laser-homing kits, produced by Elbit, for Mk-80 bombs (Elbit Systems, 2022); these are analogues of US Paveway laser-guidance kits, and both Israeli jets and UAVs may carry laser target designators. Laser guidance is generally preferred for strikes against moving targets. OSINT analysts identified Lizard/Paveway tail fins from remnants found in Gaza, one bearing the marking “FOR USE ON MK82,” confirming use with the 500lb bomb (OSMP, n.d. a).
While open-source documentation is sparse, these kits are confirmed in IDF inventories deployed in Gaza. In 2025, evidence of a previously unknown but apparently related guidance technology was found on a laser-guided bomb in Khan Younis: an Israeli defence-linked source confirmed that photos of a ‘Zikit 3’ data plate (‘Zikit’ translates as Chameleon) were recovered amid rubble (Dumba, 2025). Its absence from public records suggests it may relate to undisclosed IDF technologies or live-tested new systems.
2.6 The GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb (SDB)

In 2023 and 2024, the IAF used the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), a precision air-dropped munition, on multi-storey residential buildings, schools, mosques, hospital grounds, and UN shelters. After October 7, 2023, a transfer of 1,000 GBU-39 SDBs was expedited from the WRSA-I under emergency provisions (Bisht, 2023), with further shipments in 2024 (Malsin et al., 2025). The GBU-39 is a 113kg (250lb) precision glide-bomb manufactured by Boeing, developed by the US Air Force (USAF) and introduced in 2006.
It carries approximately 22.7kg of explosives, producing a smaller blast radius than heavier bombs, and its light weight allows an aircraft to deliver more strikes in a given sortie when compared with alternative bombs. Israel’s first publicly declared use was in December 2008 (Kaaz, 2009); initially carried by F-15I “Ra’am” fighters, before being integrated with F-16s and then F-35s. The B variant, potentially the most widely used type in Gaza, features cockpit-programmable fuse settings for point impact, airburst, or delayed detonation.
Accuracy figures vary by source, variant, and mode of delivery: for the air-dropped GBU-39/SDB I, older sources commonly cite a CEP of 5—8 metres, Saab markets the ground-launched version as accurate to within one metre (Saab, n.d.), and some in the defence industry report less than a 1 metre CEP for the GBU-39/B (Army Recognition, 2025).
Other variants include the (A/B) Focused Lethality Munition (FLM) with a Dense Inert Metal Explosive (DIME) warhead — designated ‘ultra-low collateral damage’ — a (B/B) laser-guided model, and the more recent GBU-53 ‘SDB Increment II’ with enhanced electro-optical, infra-red (EO/IR) and radar guidance. We have not found public confirmation of these other variants in Israel’s inventory, although circumstantial evidence suggests the FLM has been used in Gaza (see Part V and Annex I).
Civilian harm
By mid-2024 US reports described the SDB as Israel’s “weapon of choice” for Gaza operations. Israeli military officials stated they preferred lighter munitions to mitigate civilian harm when operational circumstances allowed (Jakes, 2024). US officials have additionally pressed for the use of smaller bombs (Murphy, 2024). Despite this, the GBU-39s frequently resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties. Open-source investigations verified dozens of strikes on shelters, schools, tent camps and residential buildings; children were killed in all 24 cases investigated by the data-driven organisation Disclose, the Guardian and its partners (Disclose, 2025).
On August 10, 2024, IDF stated that three of their GBU-39s struck the Al-Tabi’in school, which was being used as a shelter for displaced families at the time. After gathering for early morning prayer in the school’s mosque, over 100 people were killed. Video footage of the scene circulated on social media revealed one hole near the central column of the building, suggesting that three bombs had penetrated through the roof and first floor of the building before detonating near the mosque entrance and a central column of the men’s prayer hall (Al-Haq, 2024).
This evidence indicates that the bombs’ fuses were set for delayed detonation, and the double blast in a crowded, confined space had catastrophic effects. One victim of the attack, Yasmin Mahani, reported “I went to the mosque and found myself stepping on flesh and blood,” Searching for the body of her son, she found no trace of his remains. He was among the 2,842 Palestinians Gaza Civil Defence has classified as “evaporated” since 2023, a category for those with no recoverable remains beyond biological traces (e.g. blood spray or small pieces of skin) (Mansour, 2026). IDF statements acknowledged the presence of civilians while their claims of neutralised militants were disputed by NGOs (Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, 2024). Trevor Ball verified GBU-39 use from shrapnel, linking Boeing to the attack (Nasser et al., 2024).
Earlier, on May 26, 2024, two GBU-39s hit Kuwait Peace Camp 1 in Rafah, killing at least 45 people and injuring around 249 others; Amnesty International documented severe injuries, including a toddler and a woman “decapitated by fragments” from the explosion (Disclose, 2024; Goodwin et al., 2024; Amnesty International, 2024). Video of bomb fragments showed serial numbers connected to Boeing’s supply chain.
The Washington Post reported that the “81873” cage code identified Woodward HRT of Valencia California, which produces the GBU-39’s fin actuation systems (Brown et al., 2024a). Other US-made components were also recovered, including a Honeywell Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) from a June 2024 school strike that killed 40 people (Al Jazeera, 2024b).
Despite its ‘low-collateral’ designation, the SDB’s repeated use on crowded civilian locations produced mass fatalities — a pattern consistent with what an OHCHR committee considered was “Israel’s disregard of its obligation to distinguish between civilians and combatants and take adequate safeguards to prevent civilian deaths” (OHCHR, 2024c). The SDB can also be deployed from US MQ-9 Reaper drones using L3Harris’s BRU-78 dual carriage systems, and circumstantial evidence suggests Israel may have adapted similar capabilities for its larger drones. (See Annex I).
Part III — Missiles and Loitering Munitions
Guided missiles and drone-carried munitions are responsible for much of the civilian death in Gaza. This section first examines the unmanned platforms that increasingly dominate the air scene, then the munitions they and Israel’s helicopters carry — Mikholit guided bombs, Hellfire and Spike missiles, and the SkyStriker loitering munition — connecting each system with attributable strikes.
3.1 Tactical UAV platforms and operations

Israel has extensively deployed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in Gaza; this section focuses on its larger fixed-wing remotely piloted aerial systems (RPAS), whose munition-delivery capability was officially disclosed in 2022 (Fabian, 2022a; Williams, 2023). Israel’s defence sector considers itself a world leader in the development of these platforms. The Heron-TP, produced by IAI, is a large, medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) tactical UAV used mainly for long surveillance missions, equippable with various technical payloads, including EO/IR, radar and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) sensors for target acquisition and designation, working in tandem with other platforms to deliver strikes. Its own potential strike role has been mooted, given its approximate 1,000kg payload (Ahronheim, 2019). IAI president Boaz Levy has said the Heron-TP played a pivotal role in the Iron Swords campaign (Jerusalem Post, 2023a). The Hermes-450 “Zik” (in Hebrew), produced by Elbit with versions in service since 1998, is described as the military’s aerial workhorse and is used extensively for reconnaissance, surveillance and strikes. Operators may relay targeting intel or conduct strikes themselves. The more recent Hermes-900, a MALE drone first deployed in 2009 with advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) features, accommodates the same munitions and has been exported to Brazil, Mexico and Singapore.
As key parts of a “sensor-to-shooter” kill web, Hermes-450s may operate in “hunter-killer” mode — loitering, detecting and acquiring targets via sensor networks to deliver munitions rapidly, often with minimal human input (Egozi, 2023; Frantzman, 2023).
With this technology, piloting skills are not necessary. Loitering manoeuvres are automatic while operators manipulate the payload. Drones often work in pairs, one designating the target and another firing munitions (Elbit Systems, 2014). IAF Squadron 161 (“Black Snake”) and Artillery Corps Unit 5252 operate ‘Zik’ Hermes 450s from Palmachim Air Base (Fabian, 2022a). An officer of Squadron 161 described the squadron’s work to Breaking Defense: one of its main mission types is “keeping up a persistent overwatch of an area… keeping an eye out for targets that pop up and striking in such a situation.”(Egozi, 2023). According to the article, since targets — such as Hamas operatives “riding on motorcycles on their way to perform an attack” are mostly mobile and Gaza is so dense, “almost real time sensor to shooter sequences” are required (Egozi, 2023). “We are capable of the real-time sensor-to-shooter operations, and this is enabled by the accurate intelligence gathered by the UAVs payload combined with additional details that we receive from other sources”.
She stressed that “there is a man in the loop at all times so that the mission can be aborted if there is a danger of hitting innocents,” with each mission controlled by a two-man station of commander and drone operator “side by side watching the data transmitted by the UAV.” Elbit supplies the Hermes fleet’s electro-optics and jamming systems, and the private Israeli firm InfiniDome said it had worked “day and night” since October 7 to supply anti-GPS-jamming systems (AFSC Investigate, 2024). It is believed GPS jamming was largely carried out by the IDF itself, to interfere with rocket attacks on Israel (Gebrekidan, 2024; Middle East Monitor, 2024).
At the urging of industry players, the IDF finally acknowledged armed drone use over Gaza in 2022, despite accounts of use dating back two decades (Egozi, 2022; Fabian, 2022a; Williams, 2023).
3.2 Mikholit guided bombs

Hermes-450s carry precision munitions such as the IAI-developed Mikholit (“little hammer”). Sometimes misdescribed as missiles, Mikholits are small laser-guided bombs with fold-out X-configuration rear fins, providing a lighter and stealthier option than missiles with “propulsion systems that generate the tell-tale noise and smoke of fuel afterburners” (Williams, 2023). Both Hermes 450s and 900s can carry laser target designators; 450s are reportedly capable of carrying four Mikholits or four Spike missiles. However, recent open-source evidence indicates Hermes 450s and 900s may carry a quad-cannister of four Mikholits on each wing, eight in total (Ball, 2024; Secret Projects Forum, 2025a). Though associated with “roof knocking” warning strikes, they are also used for deadly ‘surgical’ strikes against human targets, using 2kg high-explosive or fragmentation-sleeve warheads: according to Al-Sawalhi, a Mikholit was used in a strike in Al-Maghazi that reportedly killed 7 children (Al-Sawalhi et al., 2024).
‘Serious failure’ — the World Central Kitchen (WCK) convoy.
A notable armed drone strike occurred on April 1, 2024 (Reuters, 2024), when a Hermes 450 targeted World Central Kitchen vehicles near Deir al-Balah, killing seven humanitarian aid workers (Mezzofiore and Goodwin, 2024a; Waters, 2024). Early analyses suggested Spike missiles were deployed (Grylls and Weiniger, 2024; Cleave, 2024), however an armaments expert told CNN the damage was, “consistent with precision guided munitions with a small explosive warhead” (Mezzofiore and Goodwin, 2024a).
A Bellingcat investigation likewise indicated a low-yield precision-guided munition with no sign of fragmentation elements, noting that the most common method to guide munitions onto moving targets is by laser; the target is illuminated by a laser, with munitions “riding” the reflection to impact. Target designation requires high-magnification optics and sensor pods. (Waters, 2024).
These characteristics are potentially consistent with a Mikholit bomb, although the munition has not been conclusively identified: Spikes use electro-optical guidance and are higher-yield ‘anti-tank’ weapons that would likely have caused far greater damage to the WCK vehicles. Furthermore, an entry hole on one of the vehicle’s roof panel indicates a near-vertical strike more consistent with a guided-bomb than with a powered missile, which typically strikes from a flatter trajectory. Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi called the strikes a mistake following a misidentification that should not have happened, dismissing two officers and reprimanding senior commanders (Reuters, 2024).
An IDF report cited a ‘misclassification’ of a bag as a rifle and a failure to transmit WCK coordination plans down to operational level (Floto, 2024). Despite public calls for transparency, the IDF declined to publish unedited drone footage. Beyond its human cost, the strike showed the Zik’s lethal capability to rapidly engage targets in Gaza at any time. The IDF’s tactical use of these semi-autonomous platforms in Gaza provides a stark insight into military drone use over urban environments.
3.3 Hellfire missiles (AGM-114)
Over Gaza, the IDF frequently fired guided missiles from attack helicopters, drones, and ground and maritime platforms. The Hellfire II (AGM-114) is a short-range, laser-guided air-to-ground system with an 8-9kg warhead, able to destroy tanks, bunkers and structures from out of sight, e.g. behind a hill (Powerbase, 2025). The ‘Helicopter-launched Fire and Forget Missile’ was developed by Rockwell in the 1970s and later produced by Boeing, Martin Marietta, and Lockheed Martin. Though often associated with the AH-64 Apache helicopter gunships, it can also be fired from fixed-wing aircraft, ground and maritime platforms. The Hellfire II family in use reportedly comprises the AGM-114K HEAT (high-explosive anti-tank) (with the K-2A variant adding an external fragmentation/APAM sleeve), the AGM-114M blast-fragmentation for soft and light-armoured targets (an alternative for heavy anti-tank variants), the AGM-114N metal-augmented-charge (MAC) (commonly classed as thermobaric) for enclosed structures, the multi-purpose AGM-114R‘Romeo’ that integrates characteristics of the previous K, M, and N variants, and the radar-guided, longer-range, fire-and-forget AGM-114L ‘Longbow’ that performs in adverse weather (Army Technology, 2020).

The 2000s introduction of the N ‘thermobaric’ variant is controversial, with concerns voiced about its compliance with international law. Its metal augmented charge uses a reactive aluminium powder creating a sustained blastwave of high heat and pressure, effective against personnel in bunkers and tunnels where the blast effect can “go around corners” (Powerbase, 2025). Despite legal concerns, thermobaric Hellfires are classified as “low collateral-damage” due to their limited blast radius compared with conventional explosives. Nevertheless, the heat and overpressure of thermobaric weapons on humans have been acknowledged as horrific (JMVH, 2023). Consistent with this, surgeons in Gaza have reported injuries they believed consistent with thermobaric weapons (El-Taji et al., 2025), and an IDF social media post showing a loaded Apache sparked speculation that a red band visible on an AGM-114 denoted the N variant (Newdick, 2023).
Civilian harm
Israel has used Hellfires extensively for targeted killings and strikes on vehicles and fortified positions, Apaches deployed them substantially during and after October 7 against vehicles, individual fighters and building entrances (Asif, 2024). Between October 7 and November 14, 2023, US transfers included around 2,000 Lockheed Martin Hellfires for Apaches (Capaccio, 2023), and in 2025 Congress approved an Israeli request for 3,000 Hellfires and ancillaries valued at $680m (DSCA, 2025). The multi-purpose Romeo variant is likely preferred to simplify logistics (Lockheed Martin, n.d. a). Trevor Ball confirmed Hellfire use in the June 8, 2024 hostage rescue operation in Nuseirat, central Gaza, where ground footage appeared to show Apache-launched missiles striking buildings from different firing positions (Brown et al., 2024b; Goodwin, 2024a).
Authorities in Gaza later put the operation’s death toll at 274 (Majed, 2024), a figure disputed by the IDF, which estimated that fewer than 100 people were killed (Mackintosh, 2024). Ball also confirmed a Hellfire strike on the Cairo Elementary School for Girls in Gaza City, which sheltered thousands of displaced civilians. The building was struck as people gathered for Friday afternoon prayers and the AGM 114-K2 fragmentation sleeve variant was identified from remnants (Sabbah and Kouddous, 2025).
3.4 Spike missiles

Israel also utilises its domestically developed Spike family missiles made by Rafael. These are versatile electro-optically guided missiles with high explosive, penetrating or fragmentation warheads. The original Tamuz (Spike NLOS) (non-line of sight), which was developed from the late 1970s for the Artillery Corps, uses fold-out X-wings for a long-range (15-30km) ‘anti-tank’ capability effective against artillery positions (Gao, 2020).
Some versions of Spoke additionally features a nose camera linked to the launch unit by fibre-optic cable which negates GPS interference, giving operators a ‘missile’s eye view.’ This allows for in-flight retargeting and a “fire and observe” / “lock-on after launch” mode. Later models boosted its EO/IR capacities, added advanced image processing, laser-homing, and handover of control to other battlefield platforms (Gao, 2020; Valpolini, 2022). A Rafael source said in 2022 that an AI capability for entirely autonomous target recognition and strikes was available for the sixth generation NLOS. However, thus far militaries have preferred to retain human control (Etzion, 2022). The L-Spike 4X, unveiled in October 2025, has AI-enabled target recognition and allows a single human controller to manage up to four loitering-capable munitions simultaneously (Felstead, 2025).
Lighter members followed. The 1990s Spike-MR (‘Gill) is a shorter-range fire-and-forget anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) with short fins rather than folding wings, giving Hermes 450 UAVs (which can carry four Spikes) an anti-tank option where Hellfires were found too heavy. It’s a competitor with the US Javelin for ground use and is presumably fully compatible with the Hermes drones automatic target recognition (ATR) system. The Spike-LR brought the NLOS fibre-optic datalink into a lighter, globally popular vehicle-mounted ATGM; the LR2 is claimed to be jamming-proof with upgraded warheads and detonator fuse options, and an Aerospike variant for fixed-wing aircraft was unveiled in 2022 (Frantzman, 2022). The Spike-SR, which is said to be for infantry use, integrates light use and target designation through the missile’s own seeker, and Spike-ER is a longer range version of the LR with upgraded features.
These ‘premier’ systems have been exported to NATO and US allies including India, South Korea, Germany and Poland; Lockheed Martin now partners with Rafael, on Spike NLOS for the US military (Lockheed Martin, n.d. a; DefenseMirror, 2025). Meanwhile, Eurospike — a joint venture with Rheinmetall and Diehl Defence — is supplying missiles to Germany through NATO’s Procurement Agency in one of the agency’s largest contracts (Manuel, 2025), approved despite the Bundesrepublik’s decision to ban exports of military equipment that could be used in Gaza.
Evidence of use in Gaza
Direct remnant evidence of Spike use in Gaza is small, and no civilian-harm incident has been attributed to it. We have not found ground-remnant documentation of Spike use, but Israeli defence correspondents reported it in Gaza (Fabian, 2023). The lighter, shorter range versions seem the more obvious choice for Gaza’s urban terrain, with little need for stand-off use. Nevertheless, maritime NLOS versions were reportedly fired at targets on Gaza’s coastline in October 2023, according to Israeli defence sector publications (Boguslavsky, 2023c).
3.5 The SkyStriker loitering munition
Loitering munitions occupy a conceptual space between drone and missile. ‘Kamikaze’ or ‘suicide drones’ gained international attention when the Yemeni Houthi movement used delta-winged drones — likely based on the Iranian Shahed-136 — against Saudi oil facilities, showing how inexpensive systems could deliver accurate long-range attacks. Similar drones have since been widely used by Russian forces in Ukraine, and Israel has long been a leading developer and exporter of such systems. Loitering munitions are kamikaze-capable drones able to search for and ‘lock-on’ to targets after launch. Shorter-range, EO/IR-equipped examples include the US Switchblade-600 (requested by Israel in 2023) and Russia’s ‘Lancet.’

Developed by Elbit Systems, the SkyStriker is designed for low-altitude, quiet flight, launched from land, sea, or air. It integrates ISR with the ability to pinpoint strike by high-speed dive, can loiter up to two hours with a 5kg payload or one hour with 10kg, and carries high-explosive, penetrating or fragmentation warheads (or non-explosive, technical ISR/EW payloads). Loitering manoeuvres can be performed autonomously while operators monitor video feeds from the drone’s EO/IR sensors.
Available information suggests SkyStrikers can autonomously identify and engage targets according to pre-programmed criteria (Army Technology, 2024; Elbit Systems, 2025), implying machine-learning visual recognition and potential use without a ‘human in the loop’ (Hartnett et al., 2020). In October 2025, Elbit America unveiled a ‘Block 4’ version with an upgraded EO/IR guidance suite ”incorporating AI-driven automatic target recognition algorithms” (SSB Crack, 2025; Elbit America, 2025). Most publicly available information nonetheless emphasises human control — reflecting the preferences of prospective international purchasers, and no evidence confirms that a strike in Gaza was done without a human in the loop. Promotional materials emphasise that operators can abort a strike at a late stage and recover the drone. As munitions expert Trevor Ball put it, “one-way attack drones are effectively missiles,” and “pretty similar to the bombs and missiles [Israel] were using to strike tents and schools before”; unlike fire-and-forget missiles, however, loitering munitions let operators launch first and determine the target afterwards.
Civilian harm
Ground evidence in 2025 indicates the IDF ramped-up its use of the SkyStriker (OSMP, n.d. b). With international outcry over GBU-39 mass-casualty incidents, Israel may have turned to the smaller, lighter SkyStriker for precision strikes. Cost was probably also a factor, as loitering munitions offer a cheaper alternative to guided missiles or jet-launched bombs. There has also been speculation that Gaza served as a real-world testing environment for the SkyStriker (Kouddous and Salha, 2025). During April 2025, SkyStrikers were used in multiple strikes on displacement sites, including tent camps in Mawasi, Khan Younis — an area the IDF had previously designated a “humanitarian zone” — with at least five strikes in one week hitting tents in Mawasi and elsewhere, killing at least 30 people, including 14 children (Kouddous and Salha, 2025).
On April 17, 2025, one struck a shelter in Mawasi, killing ten members of the Abu al-Rous family, five of whom were children. Similar strikes occurred in northern Gaza the same night. In Beit Lahia, a tent sheltering the Al-Atal family was hit, killing two adults and four children. Seven members of the Asaliyah family were additionally killed in their sleep at the Jabaliya refugee camp. Survivors described the impacts as “like an earthquake” and found body parts among the debris. Two days later, a strike near a field hospital in Mawasi killed members of the Abu al-Nida family, and on April 21, a married couple sheltering in a nearby tent were killed. Distinctive SkyStriker components were documented and verified (Kouddous et al., 2025).
These incidents raise questions about the targeting logic behind such operations. Israeli military directives reportedly allow up to 20 non-combatants to be killed as acceptable collateral damage in eliminating a single low-level militant (Kingsley et al., 2024); assigning a target and an acceptable level of casualties to ‘neutralise’ them may serve to absolve operators of any sense of personal responsibility (+972 Magazine, 2025). Such frameworks likely shape operational decisions.
No open source evidence confirms whether SkyStrikers over Gaza were piloted or programmed to turn back if no valid target was identified, and as AOAV has argued, the parameters of AI target-recognition systems inevitably reflect the biases of their programmers and training data (Creyghton, 2025). The system has been used in strike missions by Azerbaijan and India. For India, a variant manufactured in Bengaluru is produced through a joint venture between Elbit Systems and Alpha Design Systems and was reportedly used in strikes against militants in Pakistan in May 2025 (Kumar, 2025).
SkyStriker can be launched from Elbit’s versatile PULS rocket launcher, indicating its capability for integrated use with modern artillery units. PULS, a platform marketed internationally, has been adopted by both NATO and non-NATO states (Dangwal, 2025). In 2024-25, Serbia signed deals worth $1.635 billion with Elbit for joint production of Hermes 900s, PULS, SkyStrikers and other advanced systems (Cattringer, 2025), and Denmark is among the European NATO members that have also purchased the system (Fiorenza, 2025).
Part IV — Supply Chains and the Political Economy
The weapons described above did not appear on the battlefield in a vacuum. They were moved through stockpiles, export approvals and transnational supply chains. This section of the report draws out some of those enabling factors, including the US stockpile in Israel, Israel’s domestic producers, the European and international components within the arsenal and the wartime commercial effects of the Gaza campaign on Israel’s defence industry.
4.1 War Reserve Stockpile Allies-Israel (WRSA-I)
The United States has one other WRSA, in South Korea. Israel benefits from hosting the WRSA-I because it reduces procurement and delivery times during emergencies (Chappel and Harrison, 2024). With respect to transfers from the stockpile to Israel after October 7, the US Congressional Research Service found:
“For the first six months of the war, most U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) to Israel were previously approved for delivery and accelerated, taken from the U.S. stockpile in Israel…and/or were not notified to Congress because their dollar value fell below the prior notice threshold for transfers to Israel” (Sharp, 2025).
As the preceding sections show, this mechanism recurs across the arsenal: the 155mm artillery shells and M830A1 tank shells both eluded the threshold for notice during that period (Pamuk and Stone, 2023). Later ancillary requests triggered a DSCA notification, but Secretary of State Antony Blinken waived congressional review of the approval, citing legal provisions for “an existing emergency” (DefenseMirror, 2024).
The scale of US backing is massive: at least $21.7bn in military aid was provided between October 2023 and September 2025 and the State Department reported 751 active Foreign Military Sales cases worth $39.2bn as of April 2025 (Hartung, 2025). The US reported approximately $4.2bn worth of weapons physically delivered to Israel between October 2023 and May 2025, including $2.3bn of bombs, ammunition, and mines (Hansen, 2025); Israel’s Defense Ministry reported receiving over 90,000 tonnes of military equipment (Sharp, 2025).
4.2 Israeli domestic production
Alongside US supply, Israeli manufactures figure throughout this report. Elbit Systems and its land subsidiary (incorporating the former IMI) produce the M107-A3, M454, and M999 artillery shells, the Lizard laser kit, the MPR-500 bomb and the SkyStriker loitering munition. Rafael, state-owned, makes the SPICE guidance kits and the Spike missile family. IAI produces the Heron-TP and the Mikholit; and state-owned Tomer produces the M999/XM1208 cluster shell and rocket engines for both IAI and Elbit. The same names therefore recur as designers, manufacturers and exporters of the systems identified in Parts I-III.
4.3 European components and international supply chains
The US and Israel are not the only links in the arsenal chain. The GBU-39’s ‘Diamond–back’ wing is produced in a US-based factory owned by the European consortium MBDA. The wing is a critical component of the GBU-39, which has been connected to child fatalities in Gaza and MBDA is the sole known supplier (Disclose, 2025). Investigators traced revenues from the US MBDA Inc to MBDA UK, which then passed profits to the MBDA group headquarters in France. Its three shareholders — UK’s BAE Systems, France’s Airbus, and Italy’s Leonardo — received over $460m in dividends in 2024. The US subsidiary MBDA Inc is unfettered by the UK’s exports ban given the corporate loophole preventing the government from restricting arms sales by foreign subsidiaries of UK parent companies (Disclose, 2025). Thus, MBDA continues to profit from arms sales to Israel. The UK’s suspension of arms export licenses also included a caveat for critical components of Israel’s 45 F-35 combat aircraft, provided they are supplied through other countries (Perlo-Freeman, 2025).
Tungsten fragmentation elements are manufactured to specification by firms such as the US-based Elmet Technologies (Elmet Technologies, 2022), which imports raw materials such as “wolfram ore” (tungsten concentrate) from sources such as the Barruecopardo mine in Spain (EQ Resources, 2024) and the Mt Carbine mine in North Queensland, in the face of national activists’ criticism (Isherwood, 2024). The US Defense Production Act classifies the Queensland ore as a ‘US domestic source’ (Isherwood, 2024) and Elmet produces tungsten sphere and cube fragmentation pieces that are documented in wounds in Gaza (as detailed in Part V). Spike missiles are produced for Germany through Eurospike, a joint venture with Rheinmetall and Diehl Defence, via NATO’s Procurement Agency — a contract approved despite Germany’s ban on exporting equipment that could be used in Gaza (Manuel, 2025).
4.4 Israel’s defence industry and the Gaza campaign
In 2024 Israel’s defence exports hit a record $14.8bn, with European buyers comprising 54% of their sales (Frantzman, 2026). In 2025 European deals fell to 36%, but exports increased to $19.2bn for a fifth consecutive year, and the Israel Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated nearly half of the deals were government-to-government (Israel Ministry of Defense, 2026; Frantzman, 2026). Defence Minister Israel Katz directly attributed the success to battlefield performance in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran and the ministry described its industries as working “round-the-clock” to fulfil orders for the IDF and foreign buyers (Frantzman, 2026). By November 2025, Israel’s big three arms manufacturers — Rafael, Elbit and IAI — were reportedly facing a substantial backlog of munitions orders after the IDF had consumed “massive amounts of ammunition” (Azulay, 2025a; Azulay, 2025b).
Continuing demand to replenish stockpiles led suppliers, including Tomer, to expand their production facilities (Azulay, 2025b). Internationally, perceptions of the war may have theoretically hindered Israel’s arms sales with negotiations slowed, embargoes and bans imposed and some European contracts cancelled. For instance, Spain suspended new arms exports in October 2023 and later cancelled a $300m Rafael anti-tank deal and a $6.6m Elbit ammunition contract. However, Israel’s export ledger indicates otherwise, and when the October 2025 “ceasefire” commenced, a marketing executive expressed hope that the negative publicity over Gaza would soon pass: “We have the best technologies in the world, proven over the last two years. Europe knows this, and once Gaza is off the front pages, negotiations will resume. I’m optimistic” (Azulay, 2025a). Any impact on Elbit’s sales appears minor; financial results for 2025 were “excellent,” according to its CEO — revenues up 16% to $7.9bn and an order backlog of $28.1bn (Elbit Systems, 2026a).
Part V — Unconventional and Contested Weapons
A separate strand of evidence comes not from recovered remnants but from the bodies of the wounded in Gaza. A review of healthcare workers’ reports on injuries in Gaza, published in the British Medical Journal, stated that “the pattern of injuries in Gaza reflects an extreme form of high energy trauma rarely observed in civilian populations […] The distribution of injuries aligns with the use of thermobaric, incendiary, and area effect munitions designed for maximum tissue destruction.” (El-Taji et al., 2025). This part examines two recurring injury patterns noted in media reports and the munitions they implicate.
5.1 Tungsten microshrapnel
Multiple reports from Gaza, including surgeons’ testimonies, describe an unusual injury pattern in victims of strikes (McGreal, 2024; Effting and Feenstra, 2025). Doctors often reported very small entry wounds combined with catastrophic internal damage including “irreparable damage” and “shattered bones.” Speaking to Middle East Eye, Dr Mohammed Tahir described removing a single 2mm tungsten cube from a patient injured in a strike, which “penetrated his skin, cut through both the upper and lower trunks of the brachial plexus, and lodged itself in the skin of his back [. . .] the paralysis is likely permanent due to the nature of the injury.” (Powell, 2024).
Back in 2009, Amnesty International recorded purpose-made 2—4mm cubic shrapnel elements embedded in walls and visible in post-mortem X-rays (Amnesty International, 2009) — now known to be tungsten ‘fragmentation elements.’ Many warheads incorporate a fragmentation sleeve packed with pre-formed cubes, cylinders or spheres placed over the high-explosive charge to increase lethality.
The elements are manufactured to specification — the US-based company, Elmet Technologies, advertises such products for the international defence market (Elmet Technologies, 2022). Tungsten is favoured for its dense mass and hardness, nearly double the weight of steel (Effting and Feenstra, 2025). Expelled at extreme velocity in the explosion, fragments retain high kinetic energy: the micro-shrapnel can penetrate armour and cause severe internal injuries.
5.2 Dense Inert Metal Explosives (DIME)
No investigation has conclusively confirmed DIME use in Gaza, but a second unusual injury pattern has drawn repeated allegations by surgeons that such weapons are in use. Surgeons report traumatic amputations, often with legs “sliced off” without detectable traces of shrapnel, though with residues of toxic heavy metals (Skwawkbox, 2025). These descriptions echo those of earlier Gaza conflicts. In 2009, doctors Erik Fosse and Mads Gilbert reported treating patients with severe amputations where the shrapnel apparently dissolved into surrounding tissue (Democracy Now, 2009), and Mark Garlasco investigated claims of unconventional weapon use for Human Rights Watch (Hass, 2009). A field report by surgeons Dr Swee Ang and Dr Ghassan abu Sittah described amputations where the stumps were “characteristically cut off in guillotine fashion [and] also fail[ed] to bleed,” linking the injuries to DIME (Sittah and Ang, 2009).
During Operation Protective Edge in 2014, Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor documented cases of severed limbs showing signs of intense heat but no detectable shrapnel (Euro-Med, 2014), and an Al-Haq briefing described “gruesome amputations caused by a metal vapor or residue” (Al-Haq, 2014). The residues were reportedly undetectable by X-ray, complicating surgery and doctors sought to understand the implications for treatment (Al-Haq, 2014; Baud, 2016). Again, these injuries were attributed to DIME. In the mid-2000s, Italian journalists who had previously exposed US use of white phosphorus suggested there was live-testing of experimental DIME weapons in Gaza, based on similar accounts from doctors and Italian lab tests that found tungsten and other metals (Rapoport, 2006). The documentary’s producer identified evidence of DIME use as: the presence of a hot metal powder – invisible to X-ray – causing amputations where the blood vessels were sealed (Al Jazeera, 2006). According to the World Health Organisation, exposure to white phosphorus can cause severe deep burns on the skin, corneal burns and perforation of the eyes as well as respiratory issues.
DIME munitions, developed in US Air Force research laboratories, combine explosives with dense tungsten powder (mixed with cobalt, nickel or other metals). Drag from the heavy particles restrains the blast’s energy, limiting its radius but producing extremely destructive effects within a small area. Researchers involved in early experiments reportedly noted the mixture’s exceptional power: the micro-fragments’ effects were stronger than the shockwave itself (Military.com, 2006).
The concept was employed in an ‘ultra-low collateral damage’ variant of the GBU-39, called the Focused Lethality Munition (FLM), introduced in 2006, which combines DIME with a carbon-fibre bomb casing to minimise conventional shrapnel. The long-term risks are far from trivial: concerns about carcinogenic risk from tungsten alloys were raised over the FLM programme. In US military studies simulating shrapnel injuries, tungsten alloy pellets implanted in rats caused a rare cancer in all test animals within five months (Kalinich et al., 2005). Although the study conditions may not fully replicate or cover transient fragment wounds, it nevertheless suggests serious long-term health risks for survivors of both tungsten fragmentation and DIME munitions.
Testimony continued into the current war. Recalling his experience of the explosion at Al-Ahli Hospital on October 17, 2023, British-Palestinian surgeon Ghassan abu Sittah said: “The wounds were clean. They didn’t have dust and dirt and gravel, and they were just sharp cuts amputations” (Forensic Architecture, 2024a). At a related event Singaporean surgeon Dr Swee Ang stated the injuries matched those associated with DIME (Forensic Architecture, 2024a). Even so, the case remains inferential: despite repeated allegations across multiple contexts in Gaza, we have not found official investigations, forensic analysis or munition remnants that confirm DIME use. The evidence consists primarily of injury patterns, surgeon testimony, and comparison with previous DIME cases (see also Annex I.)
Part VI — The Aftermath for Gaza
According to its initial field data, Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor estimates that at least 10 million tonnes of rubble have been removed, crushed, or moved from their original sites within the areas under Israel’s unlawful military control, which encompass about 66 per cent of the Gaza Strip.
Among millions of tonnes of rubble, there may be tens of thousands of unexploded munitions, with detonation failure rates estimated at between 1 in 10 and 1 in 20 (Reuters, 2025). A November 2025 investigation found that Gaza may now contain the world’s highest concentration of unexploded ordnance (UXO) (The Economist, 2025). Clearing this ordnance will likely take many years and presents an “unprecedented” challenge: UXO poses constant risks to civilians returning to daily life, accidental detonations are likely to cause severe injury or death, and children are particularly vulnerable because they may unknowingly handle unexploded objects.
Unmarked explosives complicate travel, humanitarian deliveries, reconstruction, and agricultural work, while the constant threat of a detonation creates fear and ongoing psychological stress for residents and municipal workers (Eid, 2025). The danger compounds: given the scale and lethality of the munitions used, combined with overcrowded shelters and camps, a single detonation could cause significant casualties and strain already overwhelmed services, while further IDF strikes or fighting could easily trigger secondary detonations of UXO (Eid, 2025).
Detonated munitions have their own separate impact. A preliminary assessment by UNEP found that many munitions contain toxic heavy metals and explosive chemicals (UNEP, 2024). For example, Mk-80 series bombs use tritonal (TNT and aluminium powder), with TNT a potential carcinogen and aluminium exposure linked to encephalopathy (brain damage). Drinking water contaminated by explosives such as RDX can affect the central nervous system. Following earlier Israeli operations, Palestinian researchers reported increased birth defects and miscarriages (Naim et al., 2012; UNEP, 2009), and 2009 environmental samples found carcinogens including caesium, asbestos dust, tungsten and aluminium oxides, and volatile organic compounds (Lightbrown, 2011).
UNEP has documented widespread soil, water and air pollution, extensive rubble, and damaged sanitation and energy systems (UNEP, 2025). Contamination of agricultural land and waterways will have long-term regional impacts on ecosystems and food chains in Gaza and neighbouring countries, including Israel. For some observers, the IDF’s campaign has caused such harm to the environment that it amounts to an “ecocide” — the intentional destruction of the environment necessary to sustain human life — a concept not yet codified as a crime under the Rome Statute (Steinbock, 2025; Monbiot, 2025).
Conclusion
This paper has sought to demonstrate that civilian harm in Gaza was not an unintended by-product of war, but the foreseeable result of specific weapon choices used at scale in one of the world’s most densely populated territories. Given the scale, pace and duration of Israeli fire operations, and the known properties of the ordnance deployed, the resulting devastation was not merely predictable; in many documented cases it appears to have been accepted as the operational cost of the campaign.
The IDF’s reliance on heavy artillery, large air-dropped bombs, multi-purpose tank rounds, precision guided munitions and loitering drones produced consistent and well-documented patterns of death and injury. These were not isolated incidents, but the cumulative effects of an arsenal optimised for lethality in environments where civilians could not meaningfully be separated from the battlefield. The use of massive Mk-84 bombs in densely populated areas, and of guided munitions against crowded halls, shelters and courtyards, raises serious concerns about compliance with the principles of distinction and proportionality.
The evidence offers little reassurance in claims about “precision” warfare. Guidance kits, programmable fuses and “low-collateral” designs did not alter the destructive physics of explosive weapons in urban environments, nor did they alter the policy decisions governing how, where and how often such weapons were used. In practice, smaller bombs did not necessarily mean fewer civilian deaths; multi-purpose shells were not used with restraint; and autonomous or semi-autonomous systems did not guarantee greater protection for civilians. In many cases, “precision” functioned less as a constraint than as a justification for sustained intensity.
This violence also depended on supply chains extending far beyond Israel. US stockpiles and expedited transfers recur throughout the evidence, alongside European-linked components and Israeli manufacturers marketing “combat-proven” systems. Some of the advanced Israeli-developed weapons used in Gaza are sold internationally, while US-developed weapons featured heavily in the campaign; understanding their patterns, effects and consequences therefore has broader and continuing relevance.
While legal responsibility may be contested, the sustained tempo of fire was a political choice enabled by allies that continued to approve transfers, license components and replenish weapons even as civilian casualties mounted. This architecture of supply exposes the double standards of governments that invoke humanitarian concern while allowing arms manufacturers to profit from, and advertise, systems whose effects in Gaza have been documented in the bodies of civilians.
The consequences will persist long after the fighting. Gaza is now a rubble-strewn wasteland saturated with unexploded ordnance, toxic residues and unstable debris. Anti-personnel fragmentation munitions and other non-conventional explosives leave an agonising and intractable legacy: amputations, disability, severe blast and fragmentation injuries, long-term contamination, psychological trauma and heightened risks to health and recovery. Children comprised a high proportion of those maimed, buried, or obliterated without recoverable remains.
Together, these findings raise serious questions under international humanitarian law and challenge narratives that civilian harm was meaningfully mitigated. They point instead to a broader obligation — for governments, arms manufacturers and militaries alike — to consider how campaigns in populated areas are conducted and whether to provide certain weapons likely to be used in such campaigns.
AOAV has not approached companies named in this report for comment because the users of these weapons hold the greatest responsibility. In February 2026, responding to Al Jazeera’s reporting on the deaths of Gazans, the IDF said it “uses only lawful munitions” and strikes targets in accordance with international law, and that as a rule it does not comment on specific munition types (IDF, 2026). In January 2024, responding to South Africa’s ICJ case, Prime Minister Netanyahu called the IDF “the most moral army in the world” and said it does everything to avoid harming non-combatants (Prime Minister’s Office, 2024).
Annex I — Assessing Alleged Use of DIME Weapons
The weapon-types most likely to account for this strand of unusual injuries — slicing amputations where vessels are sealed with no trace of shrapnel — seem to be:
- The GBU-39 Focused Lethality Munition (FLM) from IDF jets and/or UAVs.
- Other (unknown) DIME weapons.
- Injuries from other non-conventional munitions, such as the ‘thermobaric’ AGM-114N, have sometimes been confused with DIME-caused injuries.
- Some combination of the above.
Information on whether Israel has stocks of the FLM does not appear to be available (in English language sources), but the persistent reporting of such injuries may constitute circumstantial evidence of use. In 2009, Dr Erik Fosse said, “All the patients I saw had been hit by bombs fired from unmanned drones.” Israel’s use of armed UAVs has only recently been allowed past its military censors, despite eyewitness accounts from Gaza. The GBU-39 can be fitted to US MQ-9 Reaper drones with a BRU-78 rack and release mechanism produced by L3Harris. Israel’s Hermes 900 is of similar size to the MQ-9 and could plausibly carry an equivalent payload, and IDF use of the GBU-39 (B) variant is well documented. On this analysis, any incident where GBU-39 wing assembly remnants were found without any metal bomb casing fragments, and which was associated with the distinctive clean, slicing amputation injuries noted above (without shrapnel or fragmentation elements), would tend to indicate use of the FLM.
Annex II — ‘Double tap’ at Al-Nasser Hospital, August 25, 2025
In total, at least, four munitions struck the hospital in two waves of near simultaneous strikes (Thomas et al., 2025). The day following the attack, Israeli media claimed a drone strike on the position had first been intended: Golani Brigade troops spotted a Hamas surveillance camera and requested a drone strike on the position, which was approved by Southern command. Shortly after, they identified an ‘apparent rifle scope’ at the position, classed it as an ‘immediate threat,’ and made an urgent request for tank fire, which was also approved (Levaton, 2025). Remnants of 120mm tank shells were later identified at the scene (Lubell et al., 2025), one shell hitting the fourth-floor corner of the external stairway and killing Palestinian cameraman Hussam al-Masri.
The Israeli reporting did not state that the drone strike was aborted after the tank fire, suggesting an armed drone may still have fired.
Nine minutes after the first explosion, as rescue workers and journalists gathered around the casualties, two additional munitions hit the balcony in rapid — almost simultaneous — succession, captured on mobile-phone video that showed two apparently powered munitions, visibly alight at the rear, striking from relatively shallow but downward trajectories (Salman et al., 2025).
Trevor Ball told CNN that the projectiles were consistent with tank shells and the fragmentation damage matched a round like the M339 (Salman et al., 2025). BBC’s Verify experts also attributed the strike to at least two tanks, and N.R. Jenzen-Jones, director of Armament Research Services, said the bright emission was most likely a tracer rather than a missile motor and that two tanks had fired almost simultaneously (Hunter, 2025).
The collective analysis of weapons experts on the M339 and other 120mm tank rounds ties the attack directly to the munitions documented in Part I. The second strike may conceivably have been due to a failure of communication rather than an intentional double tap.
However, the documented presence of a surveillance quadcopter drone over the scene four minutes after the tank shells hit indicates close real-time observation and thus weighs against this possibility (Lubell et al., 2025).
This attribution is not without difficulty, however. Tank shells travel at velocities of roughly 1,600–1,800 metres per second – fast enough that a projectile in flight would likely appear, at most, as a blur or a brief streak rather than the sustained, visibly-burning object tracked across multiple video frames. This raises the question of whether the footage is in fact consistent with a slower-moving, powered munition – such as one fired from a drone – rather than a tank round.
The presence of a surveillance quadcopter drone over the scene four minutes after the initial tank shells hit (Lubell et al., 2025) makes this an open, rather than settled, question: Israeli reporting on the strike has itself left open whether a drone fired the second volley, a possibility that sits awkwardly alongside the experts’ consensus on tank shells.
The collective analysis of weapons experts on the M339 and other 120mm tank rounds ties the first strike directly to the munitions documented in Part I. Whether the second strike, nine minutes later, was fired by tank or drone remains contested.
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