Executive Summary
This report analyses Ministry of Defence (MOD) transparency data from 2009 to 2025 and finds that, despite official commitments to openness, significant gaps, inconsistencies and vague reporting continue to obscure how senior defence officials engage with arms companies, conduct overseas travel and spend public funds. The data reveals a substantial increase in interactions with defence contractors, particularly after 2022, alongside rising international travel and expenditure, reflecting shifting security priorities following Brexit, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and growing defence partnerships beyond Europe. However, missing datasets, ambiguous descriptions such as “industry engagement” and “business meetings”, and limited disclosure of hospitality and lobbying-related activities make meaningful public scrutiny difficult. The analysis also highlights continued engagement with Israeli defence institutions and companies despite growing international concern over Israel’s military conduct. Overall, the findings suggest that while the MOD publishes large quantities of information, the lack of context and detail undermines genuine accountability, leaving important questions unanswered about influence, procurement, public spending and the evolving relationship between government and the defence industry.
This transparency matters because the consequences of defence policy are ultimately measured not in contracts signed or meetings held, but in lives affected. Arms exports, weapons procurement and military partnerships can all shape how conflicts are fought and the degree of harm inflicted on civilians. Public scrutiny of the relationship between government and defence contractors is therefore an essential safeguard, helping to ensure that commercial interests are balanced against the need to protect civilians, uphold international law and reduce the human cost of armed violence.
Key Findings
- Interactions with arms companies have risen sharply
Recorded engagements between senior MOD officials and defence contractors increased significantly after 2022, reaching their highest levels in 2024 and 2025, reflecting a major hike in defence spending and government-industry ties becoming closer. - Transparency is undermined by vague reporting
Many meetings and overseas trips are described using generic terms such as “industry engagement”, “business meetings” or simply “meetings”, making it difficult to determine who was involved, what was discussed and whether lobbying or procurement issues were addressed. - Overseas travel and expenditure have grown substantially
Since 2021, both the number of countries visited and the amount spent on international travel by the MOD linked to defence have increased markedly, suggesting a more active global defence posture linked to post-Brexit diplomacy and evolving security challenges. - Significant gaps remain in the published data
Entire years, quarters and categories of expenditure are missing from the public record, often without explanation, preventing a comprehensive assessment of official activity and public spending. - Defence relationships are becoming more global and industry-focused
The data points to expanding engagement not only with traditional NATO partners but also with countries such as India and Israel, alongside increasing contact with emerging technology and AI firms.
Report
This report examines publicly available transparency data published by the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) between 2009 and 2025 relating to senior officials’ meetings with external organisations, hospitality received, business expenses and overseas travel. The analysis forms part of AOAV’s broader effort to understand how defence institutions interact with private industry, foreign governments and other external actors, and whether existing transparency mechanisms provide sufficient information to enable meaningful public scrutiny.
The MOD is required to publish details of meetings, hospitality and expenses incurred by senior officials as part of the UK Government’s wider transparency agenda. These disclosures are intended to promote accountability and public confidence by providing insight into how senior decision-makers conduct official business.
The report is particularly concerned with the relationship between the MOD and the defence industry at a time of increasing military expenditure, renewed emphasis on national security and the growth of defence technology and artificial intelligence firms. Public concern regarding lobbying, procurement decisions and the movement of personnel between government and industry has made transparency data an increasingly important source for understanding how influence operates within the defence sector.
The analysis draws upon all available MOD transparency returns covering senior officials’ meetings, hospitality declarations and business expenses from 2009 to 2025. Individual datasets were collected, cleaned and consolidated into a single database. Organisations listed in meeting records were manually reviewed and categorised, with particular attention paid to identifying defence contractors, arms manufacturers and military technology companies. Interactions with these entities were counted and aggregated annually to identify long-term trends. Overseas travel records were examined to identify destinations, travel frequency, expenditure patterns and stated purposes of visits. Additional analysis was undertaken on travel to Israel and on changes in activity before and after the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union.
Several limitations should be noted. The report relies exclusively on information disclosed by the MOD and therefore reflects the strengths and weaknesses of the underlying datasets. Significant gaps exist within the published records, including missing quarters and years of data. Reporting standards also changed over time, affecting comparability between periods. Furthermore, many meeting descriptions, hospitality declarations and travel justifications are highly generalised, limiting the ability to determine the precise purpose or outcomes of official interactions.
Consequently, this report does not seek to establish causation, impropriety or undue influence. Instead, it identifies patterns, trends and areas where limited disclosure constrains public understanding and accountability.
MOD meetings with arms companies: how many and by who?
Figure 1: Number of recorded interactions with known arms companies, including direct meetings and hospitality. Made with Excel.
A key part of the MOD’s remit includes regular meetings with arms companies to discuss ongoing defence procurement and development projects.
Figure 1, showing data stretching back to 2010, shows a consistent engagement with well-known British or overseas companies. Recurring organisations include BAE Systems, Babcock, Raytheon and other American and European-based companies. However, an interesting element of this data is that the MOD do not explicitly categorise organisations as arms companies. The reasons may be varied but could be due to the unclear criteria for what constitutes an arms company. Lockheed Martin and Thales are prolific weapons manufacturers; others, such as Rolls-Royce, mainly produce engines or other select components.
Several meetings have been held with data companies, particularly since 2020, including Palantir and Anduril. As artificial intelligence is becoming increasingly relevant regarding autonomous drone systems and is increasingly examined regarding the role of algorithmic warfare in perpetrating war crimes, the MOD may have to find methods of more transparently declaring these associations with data companies.
Figure 1 combines meetings held with permanent secretaries and recorded instances of hospitality. The latter is worth noting as such encounters often feature ‘working dinners’ or ‘receptions’ where it is likely that substantive discussions take place. These are not disclosed and neither is the cost, making it almost impossible to ascertain to whether these interactions are simply routine or private lobbying efforts.
One comprehensive 2024 report by the World Peace Foundation outlined that the stated purpose of these and other meetings are vague. One reason for this may be due to the potentially sensitive nature of such discussions, although this justification provides the MOD with a degree of plausible deniability that can obstruct transparency.
A noticeable pattern is a sharp uptick in interactions from 2024 onwards. Why this is the case is uncertain, but a sudden increase in listed meetings by officials is clear. It may reflect new, more extensive rules of data publishing set out in April 2024. Regardless, the issue of transparency surrounding reporting hospitality remains a significant one.
The movement of ex-MOD officials to the private sector, predominantly to arms companies is another key issue. In 2012, The Guardian revealed a list of senior figures that allegedly had lobbying links with such organisations. Linking back to the widening breadth in types of company that MOD officials interact with, publicly available data may reveal which companies are likely to try and influence those officials.
A notable example is that of the Israeli company Elbit, the Israeli Defence Force’s primary supplier. The company has been engaged with semi-regularly since before 2019 but was found to have organised a tour of Israeli sites in 2022, purportedly aiding its prospects in securing a lucrative training contract. The data also shows how integrated BAE Systems is in the MOD’s list of strategic partners given the volume of interactions. This is especially importantly as an OpenDemocracy investigation found that several MOD workers had their salaries paid by BAE.
MOD transparency is thus vital to uncovering the insidious linkages between private armaments companies and the country’s defence authorities. An ability to track the volume of interactions reveals the extent to which these companies are embedded in national security considerations and is the first step toward ensuring accountability where it truly matters.
Near and far: where have senior MOD officials travelled?
Figure 2: Number of unique countries that senior MOD officials visited between 2010-2025. Made with Excel.
Between 2009-2012, the number of international trips made by officials remained at a stable level, before a sharp downturn in 2012 due to missing data. Similarly, 2014 and 2018 lack travel data, with no reason given by the MOD for the former. The public reason listed on the MOD page for 2018 is due to a change in reporting requirements, although this is not elaborated on. These changes are minute, with trip costs disaggregated into categories of hospitality, accommodation and travel.
The numbers for those expenditures were recorded in 2017 and the years preceding but as far as transparency goes, putting all of those numbers into one place is not particularly significant. 2020 shows an obvious decline in trips accounting for Covid-19 travel restrictions but witnesses an upsurge from 2021 onwards. One possible and rather obvious factor would be changes in the international security climate following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, necessitating additional meetings with strategic partners.
Consistent countries visited include France, Germany, Belgium and the US, as well as Estonia, Kenya and Cyprus, owing to a British military presence. A substantial proportion of states visited are members of regional defence pacts like NATO or AUKUS.
Notably, however, over the years the list of countries that are regularly visited has increased, including Japan, the Nordic Countries and Middle Eastern states, reflecting an ever-widening process of integrated bilateral defence cooperation. The general increase in visits also somewhat coincide with the rise in interactions with arms companies. Whether there is a explicit correlation is worth further examination, but it appears that MOD officials are filling up their itineraries far more than they used to.
A consistent element worth noting are the vague purposes given for international visits. For example, a trip to Chicago in 2022 costing over £5,000 in taxpayer money is listed as ‘accompanied the MOD Chief Scientific Adviser to industry’. Of course, this may be deliberately unclear for security reasons but almost four years later, there are still no further details, which raises a few questions. What was discussed on the course of the trip? Which actors were met, and crucially, how did it relate to the national interest? ‘Industry’ is a loose term. This could pertain to any number of entities, including US weapon manufacturers. This is a recurring issue throughout much of the data provided.
Such ambiguity grants a significant scope by which the MOD can justify an overseas trip and thus what happens on those trips.
How much is spent on overseas trips?
Figure 3: Amount of Money in GBP spent on overseas trips from 2009-2025. Made with Excel.
Overseas trips accounts for much of the MOD’s expenditure. An oddity within the data provided are absent quarters throughout 2010-2025. Data for the entirety of 2012 is missing, whilst 2015 and 2016 are missing the January-March and October-December quarters. The decline in expenditure in 2020 and 2021 can be explained by Covid-19 travel restrictions, both in the UK and abroad. However, the upward trend from 2022 can be attributed to the simple fact that this is the first year with a complete dataset. Curiously, the MOD page provides no explanation as to why a significant amount of its travel expenditure data is unavailable.
Linking back to what actually happens on overseas trips, simply disclosing how much is spent on accommodation and hospitality does not reveal much.
Taking a random example, a conference hosted by Amazon Web Services on 3rd June 2024 saw £664.72 claimed in accommodation and meal expenses for a single day. There are few ways of knowing whether this sum was spent in a reasonable way, or instead on a luxury hotel or fine dining at the taxpayer’s expense. In 2024, The Telegraph found that officials had stayed at luxury accommodation, with one six-day trip to Dubai racking up over £5,000 on hotel bills alone.
Transport is another item of interest. The MOD reaffirms its policy that officials may not use first-class travel unless in certain circumstances. A significant amount of the data indeed lists standard or economy classes. A small change in detail in 2009 compared to 2025 is the reported use of an ‘official secure car’. In 2009, the usage would be reported per official but not disaggregated, meaning one is left to wonder whether this was used domestically or abroad. However, by 2025, the use of a secure car is explicitly tied to each trip, although the cost is calculated together with other forms of transport. Overall, the figures provided only record the activity of a handful of senior MOD figures, meaning a large proportion of MOD higher-ups remain unaccounted for.
A special relationship? Overseas trips to the State of Israel
Figure 4: Number of overseas trips to Israel based on publicly available MOD data. Made with Excel.
Despite a slow rhetorical distancing of the UK government since 2023 regarding Israel’s conduct in Gaza and the West Bank, marked by an official recognition of the State of Palestine, official contact remains, with at least 12 visits between October 2023 and 2025. Of the publicly disclosed international trips, Israel makes up a small fraction. Of the three meetings in 2015 there is no explicit reason given for the visits. Instead, the MOD uses reason codes such as ‘D2’ or ‘LA’ which are meaningless on their own. The only clues that are provided are the personnel that go.
One four-day trip in February 2017 involved Philip Osborn, then-Chief of Defence Intelligence, presumably to either exchange or observe intelligence with Israeli authorities. It is only until 2019 that more detail is provided as to the exact purpose of these trips. Even then, a 3-day trip in February 2019 costing over £3,000 is reasoned as ‘engagement with the Israeli MOD’. This falls into the same pattern as the other categories discussed above, namely a lack of transparency regarding what that actually entails.
Similarly, a four-day trip in May 2021 was done to hold ‘business meetings’ regarding ‘mutual force development benefit’. The use of deliberate sounding, but ultimately euphemistic language once again provides the MOD with enough scope with which to justify these trips. The most recent MOD data published early in May this year reveals another trip to Israel in mid-2025 for ‘meetings’. Aside from the superfluous usage of the term, this truly raises more questions than answers them. What were the contents of these meetings? With whom were they held? Jumping back to the Elbit-organised tour of Israel attended by MOD officials, The Times alleges that the tour was entirely funded by the company.
However, according to the July-September quarter of 2022, £1048 was claimed in the ‘other’ category which nominally includes hospitality given. There is no detail given as to what exactly this money was spent on. This seems odd if the trip was reportedly funded by an external party. In a climate where scrutiny of the IDF is only increasing, continued links between the MOD and Israeli forces and industry deserve the greatest level of transparency and clarity.
Pre- and post-Brexit
Shortly after the Brexit referendum in 2016, the Royal United Services Institute ascertained that British international engagement with allies, both European and trans-Atlantic, must remain unchanged. The EU provided extensive structural advantages by which the UK could exert influence, not least through a coherent defence policy. Yet are there any noticeable trends before and after Brexit? Reviewing the four categories above reveals some that are worth touching upon.
Firstly, the amount spent on overseas trips annually has sharply increased since 2021. Even in years of complete data prior to 2020, the amount pales in comparison to the post-Brexit period. This spending matches the general increase in the number of unique countries visited each year but does not line up with prior years. For example, 2016-17 saw a similar number of countries visited as in 2024-25, but where approximately £750,000 was spent in 2017, almost £1.4 million was spent in 2024. Differences between 2016 and 2025 demonstrate an almost three-fold increase. One possible explanation could be a rise in expensive events and defence-related conferences in the US and East Asia where return flights are pricier, relative to more but ultimately cheaper trips. What makes this increase unusual is the consistency of the destinations. There is no marked trend or pattern change in where MOD officials go pre- and post-2020.
Secondly, the number of countries visited from 2022-2025 was overall greater than the years between 2015-2019. The destinations remain consistent, with a strong engagement toward Europe. North America and Middle Eastern states. Initially, it appears that Brexit has actually boosted Britain’s engagement abroad, but it is important to note that these visits may coincide with other security concerns. Since 2020, the EU shot ahead with security and defence projects, leaving the UK to play catch up. Yet, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a watershed, creating an imperative for British officials to maintain strong bilateral links with European partners. With a growing recognition of the mutual benefits of UK-EU defence co-operation as evidenced by a number of defence treaties, officials have maintained a constant track-record of diplomatic contact. However, Brexit has indeed de-centred Europe from the horizon of British defence concerns. Between 2020-2025, there were at least 13 recorded instances of visits to India, with the same number occurring in the whole decade of 2009-19. Deeper defence ties with India demonstrate a decisive pivot toward other regions, partly driven by the UK’s increased distance from existing EU defence ties.
Thirdly, interactions with arms companies have risen drastically from 2022 onwards. A certain equilibrium was reached between 2015-2019. An obvious explanation for the sudden rise is, again, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but the US withdrawal from the equation of European security has also had a tangible impact. The British Government’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review repeatedly emphasised a need to increase Britain’s conflict readiness in the face of American policy re-orientation. Unsurprisingly, last year’s accompanying plan to invest £250 million in domestic armaments manufacturing includes the expansion of known arms companies including BAE Systems. As discussed, increasing interactions with arms companies may also coincide with heightened lobbying efforts by such entities to secure whatever lucrative contracts are bound to arise.
Fourth, travel to Israel offers a more ambiguous reading. Whilst there is a conspicuous increase in visits post-2020, this can be partly attributed to the more comprehensive data available for this period. Visits soared between 2023-2025, with a previous AOAV report noting that since 7 October, total MOD visits to Israel numbered almost 50. Military co-operation is the obvious answer, but it is a separate question of whether grassroot pressure has had any tangible impact on the MOD’s decision to maintain sustained contact.
All of this points to a partial shift in Britain’s international engagement. On one hand, Brexit has created distance with the country’s traditional security partners, necessitating a diplomatic outreach to other regions where Britain has, often, held extant defence links. On the other hand, Brexit cannot be attributed as the sole factor for this shift. An erratic security landscape has impelled the MOD to increase contact with arms companies as national priorities pivot toward greater armament procurement. Visits to Israel coincide with this national re-orientation, as do continued visits to European states.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Data disclosed by the MOD has seen a few minor changes between 2009-2025 and allows for a somewhat general estimate as to how much has been spent in different capacities. However, a few aspects stand out.
Firstly, the largely unexplained amount of missing data does not allow for a full overview of total expenditure, with data absent from certain quarters and even certain years.
Secondly, the given reasons for meetings and trips are ambiguous, bordering on superfluity. There is little that can be ascertained as to the actual activities during interactions.
Finally, expenditure on overseas trips does not provide much in the way of insight about what was the money spent on, why it was spent and whether it was value for money.
As far as the MOD’s drive for transparency goes, these are seemingly minor, but ultimately significant oversights.
The data also reveals a number of subtle but significant changes in both Britain’s international engagement and the MOD’s priorities.
Relationships have become increasingly defined by defence cooperation and a greater emphasis has been placed on expanding contact with arms companies. However, vague language provides the MOD with both scope for its activities and plausible deniability in cases where accountability can be questioned.
It is vital to be aware that ‘transparency’ does not always equate to an understanding of what is really at play.
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