The phrase “Guns don’t kill people; people do” has become one of the most recognisable slogans in American political and cultural debate over firearms. What began as a seemingly logical assertion about human agency has evolved into a central rhetorical device of the modern American gun-rights movement and related movements abroad, serving as a rallying cry for the National Rifle Association (NRA). It is frequently invoked by politicians and gun-rights advocates in other countries in response to shooting crises or policy changes at home, and its use in some cases reflects documented NRA influence through lobbying, media activity and links with overseas gun-rights organisations. This report examines the dissemination and socio political impact of this politically charged phrase, exploring how it moved from a colloquial expression to a mobilising symbol of resistance to gun-control measures. This report was written primarily by students from Georgetown University in Washington DC.

Origins and ideology
“Guns don’t kill people; people kill people.” Few political slogans have done so much work (and some might say harm) with so few words. In its simplicity, the phrase is seductive and superficially undeniable. Guns do not act alone; people pull the triggers. That apparent common sense is what gives the slogan its power. It quietly turns a complicated argument about access, lethality, regulation and risk into a much narrower question of individual morality and action. For opponents of gun regulation, the slogan offers an extraordinarily effective answer: the problem is not the weapon per sé, but the person who used it. Over time, its strength has laid not merely in what it said, but in how it reframed the national debate around the possibility that the availability and characteristics of firearms might themselves play a role in determining who lives and who dies. If its influence endures still today, it is mainly due to the National Rifle Association (NRA), which was instrumental in promoting this framing.
Founded in 1871 as a marksmanship and sporting organisation, the NRA shifted toward political lobbying in the 1970s, amid growing political debate over firearm regulation after high-profile assassinations and urban violence.1 Within this changing environment, the phrase provided a succinct articulation of the NRA’s new ideological stance. It encapsulated a worldview in which the individual, not the weapon, bore moral responsibility for violence. As Henigan notes, slogans such as “Guns don’t kill people” became a form of “bumper-sticker-logic” designed to compress complex policy questions into emotionally resonant, easily repeated assertions.2 The phrase’s simplicity, rhythm, and moral clarity allowed it to circulate effectively within both political discourse and everyday conversation.
By the late twentieth century, “Guns don’t kill people” had become a slogan for the gun-rights movement. Its rhetorical success stemmed from how it aligned with broader American cultural narratives, particularly those celebrating personal responsibility, individual liberty, and scepticism about government intervention. The slogan’s repetition in NRA publications, campaign materials, and televised interviews amplified its visibility. Among listeners, the phrase’s power rests in its ability to transform a policy debate into a moral one: the issue becomes a question of personal virtue rather than public safety. Media coverage of mass shootings reinforced the phrase’s dissemination. After each major incident, NRA officials and pro-gun commentators invoked the slogan to reframe the discussion around mental illness, morality, or law-enforcement failures rather than firearm access. The phrase became increasingly prominent. Every time it was repeated, its status as a familiar shorthand for opposition to gun-control measures ended up being reinforced.
The durability of the slogan also stems partially from its flexibility. Variations such as “cars don’t kill people, drivers do” or “knives don’t kill people, people kill people” appear in other policy contexts, from road safety to social media ethics. These analogues rely on the same rhetorical structure: attributing causation solely to human actors while treating technological or systemic factors as neutral. Philosophers argue that such reasoning misrepresents the relationship between humans and tools; technologies shape human behaviour by altering what actions are possible or likely. Firearms are supposed to increase the lethality of violent encounters. Ignoring this reality enables a form of moral abstraction that distances systemic causes from individual acts.
The slogan is deemed to be compatible with strands of conservative political thought that emphasize individual agency. Yet, its underlying logic is rooted as much in moral assumptions as in political ideology. The worldview that the slogan comes to embody places greater weight on personal responsibility than on collective and structural factors, treating individuals as morally accountable for actions presumed to lie within their own control. It follows that social structures are seen as backdrops to human behaviour rather than as forces that actively shape it. Back to the realm of politics, in some settings, including, but not only, in far-right environments, harmful outcomes are attributed to a lack of personal discipline or moral character rather than structural disadvantage. When this moral individualism is applied to gun violence, harmful firearm use is framed as a problem of individual wickedness or irresponsibility that cannot be solved through societal or policy changes.3
Such emphasis on personal responsibility does little more than nourishing arguments about the limits of government intervention in addressing social problems, like gun violence. 4 This line of argument can also lead to the claim that, because “evil” cannot be eradicated through social reform, violence must be met with equal force- namely armed self-defence5. NRA’s formulation: “The only thing that stops a “bad guy” with a gun is a “good guy” with a gun” 6 , comes to perfectly mirror this kind of reasoning. Under this perspective, armed self-defence turns into a sort of civic responsibility and individual action gains the upper hand over broader social or regulatory measures. Because government institutions cannot reliably influence and divert one’s attitude, each individual ends up being expected to take responsibility for their own protection and carrying a gun turns to be compatible with the behaviour of a good citizen7 . What immediately follow is that guns themselves are neutral and it is all a matter of using them in way that is reasonable.4 The problem arises when people assume that their use of firearms is inherently justified and ethical, while failing to recognise the extent to which their own actions contribute to produce violence. Those adopting this point of view are also those who reject the justification for broad government restrictions on gun-ownership on the basis that these limits would unfairly constrain the moral agency of law-abiding citizens.
In an attempt to understand the broader implications of this ideology, it is interesting to consider where the emphasis on individual agency and personal protection stems from. One point of reference often cited in this context is the Hobbesian state of nature. Starting from the assumption that in the absence of a common authority capable of enforcing peace, individuals are driven by self-interest and face a persistent struggle to protect their lives and resources against the selfish whims of others, Hobbes placed self-preservation at the centre of his account of human behaviour8. From this, many have derived the broader argument that since institutions are unable to provide adequate protection, individuals must retain the possibility to take responsibility for their own security and survival. However, the step from recognizing the importance of individual action to claiming that firearms are necessary for personal protection- and that violence is primarily a matter of who uses them- is a considerable one. Although Hobbes placed significant emphasis on the individual’s concern with self-preservation, any invoked connection between his account of human nature and the modern slogan “guns do not kill people but people do”, appears on closer inspection tenuous. While some of his concepts may to some extent have influenced the argument, straightforwardly treating his analysis as a direct philosophical foundation for the slogan itself remains questionable.
Beyond philosophical considerations, this deeply entrenched need for protection has very much to do with the cultural values that have historically been developed and promoted in the United States. For example, the archetype of the hardened frontiersman popularised the image of a fiercely self-reliant individual ready to risk everything to ensure survival. Romanticised as a figure able to defend his land and family without government interference, the frontiersman became a symbol of moral strength9. The gun came to represent not merely a weapon but something necessary for survival and self-sufficiency. Over time, mythology became an influential trait of American identity that equated personal autonomy with armed capability. The frontier myth persists in strands of modern conservative thought through the idea that people can better ensure their survival while being able to cause significant harm to others.10
Coming instead to our days, political instability and polarisation have continued to rise in recent years in the US, and public distrust in government institutions seems to be growing too. Such declining faith in authority has contributed to a fervent defence of gun-ownership. It is more and more framed as both a constitutional right and a moral necessity. In an era in which violent crime is over represented in US local news (very often in a biased way), people are getting suspicious of the government’s ability to ensure safety. According to a 2025 study in PNAS Nexus, this, together with other factors, seems to have influenced short-term firearm purchases.11 However, this heightened cynicism toward governmental authority is not uniquely American. Similar patterns of distrust and moral individualism are emerging globally and elements of the pro-gun rhetoric with its underlying philosophy of “guns don’t kill people; people do” have circulated beyond the US, including in the UK, Australia and Jamaica12. As societies around the world grapple with instability, some of the traits that have long defined American conservatism have gained wider global resonance. Yet, their spread should not be read simply as the export of an American model; understanding how they take shape always requires paying attention to the specific contexts in which they emerge. Another important caveat concerning the extensive use of moral and philosophical justification for gun ownership is the idea that the use of NRA phraseology does not necessarily stem from, nor imply, a genuine ideological commitment to the broader ideas associated with it. Often, it may instead function as a simplified, low-cost tool designed to grab attention and generate easy support. This is evident when looking at the way in which the phrase is displayed on T-shirts and bumper stickers, which come to serve as simple vehicles for disseminating broader and more complex political messages.

What the evidence shows
Taken literally, the claim that “people kill people” contains an obvious truth: firearms do not act independently of human beings. The rhetorical sleight of hand lies in presenting human agency and weapon characteristics as competing explanations and forces an “either/or” choice. By placing the blame entirely on human malice, the slogan implies that regulating the weapon is pointless and that the law should focus exclusively on punishing the individual. Yet, human intent and weapon technology should not be seen as mutually exclusive variables, but as interacting ones. Extensive public health and criminological research indicates that the availability, accessibility and lethality of firearms does not necessarily determine whether violent encounters occur in the first place but rather whether such violent encounters become lethal and turn fatal. The relevant empirical question is therefore not whether a person or a gun is ultimately “responsible”, but whether the presence and characteristics of a firearm alter the probability and consequences of lethal violence. On that point, because the evidence shows that it does, the policy logic embedded in the slogan, namely the pointlessness of regulating firearms, turns out to be seriously weakened.
This distinction is actually supported by a substantial body of empirical research. In the United States, states with higher levels of household gun ownership have been found to experience higher firearm-homicide rates even after controlling for poverty, crime and demographic factors13. While international comparisons must first account for divergent social, economic and institutional contexts, the broader cross-national evidence nonetheless continues to show a strong association between lower firearm availability and substantially lower rates of firearm homicide14. Moreover, the lethality of firearm violence has also revealed to be shaped by the characteristics of the weapon itself. Research indicates that shootings involving higher-calibre firearms are substantially more likely to result in fatalities15. Even though these studies evaluate case-fatality rates among shooting casualties once an encounter has already escalated to gunfire, and do not test the initial likelihood of an assault or the overall levels of firearm accessibility, their findings still underscore that weapon characteristics can materially affect lethality. The slogan’s logic, that a gun is merely an inanimate object, collapses under evidence showing that weapon design directly influences the fatal consequences of violent encounters.
“Guns don’t kill people, people do” functions thus less as a factual claim than as an ideological marker. The phrase can signal a commitment to individualism and self-reliance, as well as resistance to the perceived encroachment of the state. Rather than a neutral proposition, it stands as what in political science is a condensation symbol 16 and an in-group shibboleth- an expression whose literal truth meaning is secondary to its role in asserting cultural allegiance and group identity. This rhetorical function explains the phrase’s persistence despite evidence complicating its policy implications. Even amid mounting evidence of the relationship between guns and public safety, gun-legislation continues to be contested. Examining how this language has circulated is thus essential to understand the extent to which political rhetoric still contribute to resistance to gun-regulation.

How the rhetoric travelled
While the phrase continues to be most closely associated with American gun politics, the logic behind has increasingly appeared in international contexts, particularly following mass shootings or amid debates over proposed regulatory reforms. The examples that follow should not, however, be read as evidence of a uniform of direct diffusion of NRA rhetoric. They instead just illustrate different ways in which this frame has appeared outside the US, ranging from cases where similar arguments have appeared independently of the NRA to others where links to the association are documented.
Much of the gun-control rhetoric in the UK stems from the Dunblane massacre, during which 43-year-old Thomas Hamilton entered Dunblane Primary School in Dunblane, Scotland, on 13 March 1996, and used four legally held handguns to kill 16 pupils, one teacher, and injure 15 others before killing himself17. The shooting sparked immediate reform. Parliament passed the Firearms Amendment Act 1997, which prohibited the private possession of handgun above .22 calibre while granting an initial exemption for small-calibre (.22) pistols18, and later that year passed the Firearms (Amendment) (No.2) Act 1997, which removed the exemption and instituted a total ban on civilian handguns 19 .These measures were deeply disputed. On 16 June 1997, the House of Commons debated the prohibition of “small-calibre pistols” and an amendment providing for the retention of .22-calibre pistols. Edward Garnier, a Conservative MP argued that “not one member of the club is the type of person who is likely to commit mayhem by running amok with a pistol-let alone a single-shot pistol, which the amendment is designed to retain in the sport of shooting”.20
Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, another Conservative MP argued along similar lines that “it will not matter how well firearms are supervised, people will still want to use weapons illegally”20. Garnier and Clifton-Brown’s arguments illustrated an underlying view that firearms do not pose a danger when placed in the hands of responsible individuals, and that greater regulatory efforts should therefore target those who misuse firearms rather than firearms themselves. Prince Philip was criticised for espousing a similar sentiment in a BBC interview on 18 December 1996, asking “if a cricketer, for instance, suddenly decided to go into a school and batter a lot of people to death with a cricket bat which he could do very easily, I mean are you going to ban cricket bats?” While this quote generated widespread criticism and accusations of insensitivity and crassness, it could not but being welcomed by the pro-shooting lobby. Michael Yardley, a spokesman for the Sportsman’s Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland responded by saying “I’m delighted that the Duke of Edinburgh has had the courage to make this statement”21. Despite the widespread support for Prince Phillip’s statement and the sentiments he expressed, decisive legislative action, as mentioned above, followed.
Fourteen years after the Dunblane massacre, a lone gunman killed 12 people and wounded 11 others in the Cumbria shootings of 2 June 2010. During a House of Commons debate on 20 December 2010 22, the Conservative MP Dr Thérèse Coffey quoted the Roman philosopher Seneca and his sentence “‘a sword never kills anybody, it is merely a tool in the killer’s hand” and Goldie Lookin Chain song lyric “Guns don’t kill people, rappers do”, to support her objections to the recommendations laid out in the publication of the Home Affairs Committee’s report on firearms control. The report recommended indeed tighter restrictions on both the supply of illegal guns and on legal gun ownership. Dr Coffey used the above statements to advocate against the disproportionate burden that additional legislation would place on law-abiding gun owners, emphasizing her scepticism that further statutory restrictions could realistically prevent firearm fatalities. She also spoke in support of the economic benefits of shooting sports and gun- ownership. Through its dual emphasis on owner rights and economic utility, this reasoning strongly echoed conventional National Rifle Association (NRA) framing. On 29 September 2011, the government released its formal response to the Home Affairs Committee’s report23. Citing the UK’s comparatively low levels of firearm-related offences, it rejected calls for fundamental legislative overhaul, such as merging firearm and shotgun licensing into a single system or creating a unique codification of firearms law. Instead, it accepted targeted operational and procedural reforms, including updating Home Office guidance to police forces, reviewing licensing fees to move toward cost recovery, and exploring better information-sharing protocols with general practitioners regarding applicants’ medical fitness. In 2010, the UK firearm-homicide rate stood approximately 0.1 per 100,000 people.24 Though the UK government did not operate an open, centralised gun register, firearms licensing records—including detailed data on certificate holders and registered weapons—were systematically maintained across England and Wales via the National Firearms Licensing Management System (NFLMS). Under this system, there were 141,775 firearm certificates and 580,653 shotgun certificates on issue at the end of March 201025.
With an estimated 46 civilian firearms per 100 people (in 2007)26, Switzerland has one of the highest levels of civilian firearm holdings per capita in Europe. The firearm-homicide rate in the same year was approximately 0.3 per 100,000 people24. While high ownership levels are often attributed to the Swiss defence model, it is also to underline that members of the militia system have traditionally been permitted—rather than universally required—to store their service weapons at home during their military service and this notably contributes to inflating the estimate. In November 2007, a Swiss army recruit shot and killed a 16-year-old girl at a bus stop in Zurich-Höngg, resorting to his service weapon and the ammunition taken from his training base27. The incident prompted swift calls from Switzerland’s Social Democratic Party to withdraw service weapons from private homes. In response to what he deemed a rushed reaction by the political left, Werner Gartenmann, Deputy Managing Director of the Swiss conservative political organisation AUNS, commented “Waffenverbote entwaffnen Kriminelle nicht” or “Gun bans do not disarm criminals.”. The statement appeared in the pamphlet published by the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), a national-conservative, right-wing populist political party in December 200728. Gartenmann’s argument was that the perpetrator could reasonably have carried out the attack with a different weapon, thereby shifting attention away from firearms regulation and towards individual culpability. He also questioned why greater attention had not been given to measures addressing the perpetrator’s mental instability. He makes his argument drawing on a philosophical reference. Gartenmann specifically invokes Locke’s theory of the right of resistance as a basis for asserting that individuals possess a right to defend themselves and, where necessary, to take up arms in doing so. Echoing the classic American gun-rights framework that decouples the weapon from the violence and redirects debate toward individual agency, psychiatric instability and the inherent right to self-defence, this framing closely resemble the rhetoric deployed by the NRA in the American discourse.
Despite maintaining a lower rate of firearm holdings than Switzerland, the Czech Republic possesses a relatively high rate of firearms ownership in comparison with much of Europe. According to the most recently available statistics, there were approximately 1,073,534 registered firearms in 2024 (9.84 registered firearms per 100 people), a figure that excludes unrecorded and illicit firearms (and is therefore not directly comparable with the estimated civilian-firearms figures cited for other countries29. The country’s firearm-homicide rate, by contrast, was approximately 0.3 per 100,000 people in 202324. The Czech commitment to individual firearm possession has historically clashed with supranational regulation. On 9 August 2017, the Czech Republic filed a lawsuit at the European Court of Justice challenging the revised EU directive tightening firearms controls (Directive (EU) 2017/853)30. In the context of heightened concern about firearms trafficking and terrorist attacks in Europe, including the November 2015 Paris attacks, the new directive further restricted access to certain semi-automatic firearms and high-capacity magazines. Strongly rejecting the reasoning behind these new measures, the then-Interior Minister Milan Chovanec described the “massive punishment of decent arms holders “unacceptable”31, insofar as, in his view, legally held weapons had no connection with terrorism. Civil society appeared to agree with him and domestic opposition to EU directive was widespread. By 2017, the Czech government had received a petition signed by over 50,000 firearms holders and hunters’ organisations protesting EU-wide restrictions. Chovanec further advocated an amendment permitting citizens with a firearm licence to use their weapons in self-defence against terrorist perpetrators. While criticised by several parliamentarians who questioned the viability of armed civilian response, his intervention attracted attention even outside Europe. The same National Rifle Association (NRA) welcomed this position and America’s 1st Freedom devoted a post to it, entitled “Czech Republic Sues EU over gun law”32.
The domestic debate on gun-control was re-ignited in December 2023, following a mass shooting at Charles University in Prague, which left 14 victims dead (excluding the perpetrator) and 25 injured33. Just days after the shooting, economist and political commentator Markéta Šichtařová—who later served as a member of the Czech Chamber of Deputies for the Svobodní party from October 2025 until her resignation on 11 March 2026—published an article on iDNES.cz entitled “Zbraně nezabíjejí” (“Guns don’t kill”)34. Drawing an analogy with motor vehicle ownership, Šichtařová argued that “a gun does not kill—it is the person who decides to kill and chooses a firearm or any other tool as the tool to do so.” Pointing to overseas examples, including mass casualty events in jurisdictions with tighter controls, she contended that firearm bans fail to eliminate violence, arguing that societal aggression stems from factors such as “upbringing, mentality, and social frustration” rather than the availability of weapons. Her intervention reflected the broader pro-gun philosophy shared by Czech right-leaning and libertarian-conservative groups. The tragedy, however, prompted the Czech Parliament to initiate work on comprehensive gun-control legislation to tighten domestic firearms regulations. Key provisions of the reform established a centralised online firearms registry, introduced mandatory requirements for dealers to report suspicious purchases, and halved the interval for periodic medical reviews of licence holders from ten years to five, while expanding the statutory powers of authorities to mandate extraordinary psychological evaluations. Given the country’s permissive tradition, opposition was strong. During the lead-up to the law’s implementation in August 2025, Pavel Černý, president of the gun-rights organisation Liga Libe, pushed back against the tightening of restrictions, asserting: “A gun – like a car – is neither good nor bad … It depends on the owner – whether they are good or bad, with good or bad intentions”35. Černý’s defence of legal gun owners and individual culpability aligned closely with core arguments deployed by the NRA, illustrating the enduring influence of American gun-rights framing in Czech public discourse. But this time, he was not able to have the upper hand and orient policy, and the project went ahead, culminating in a new legal framework that came into force on 1 January 202636.
While the Czech Republic represents a country with a deeply entrenched statutory culture of individual firearm ownership, similar discursive patterns have also surfaced in jurisdictions with far more restrictive traditions, such as Ireland. In particular, around 2008, due to organised gangland activity, the country experienced historically elevated levels of firearm violence, with a 158 per cent increase in firearms-related offences from 2001 to 200837. On 18 November 2008, thus the Dáil Éireann (lower house and principal chamber of the Oireachtas) met to discuss a private members’ motion addressing the state’s response to gangland crime. The debate was specifically triggered by the murder of Shane Geoghegan- an innocent Irish rugby player who was killed in a case of mistaken identity on 9 November 2008, becoming the seventeenth gangland murder victim of that year. Resisting proposals to curtail firearm access, Fine Gael Deputy Andrew Doyle asserted that restrictions on legal handguns were not an answer to the crisis:
“If an Olympian sharpshooter with a handgun came back from the Olympics with a gold medal the Taoiseach and every Minister would be on a platform to welcome him, saying it was a great sport and gave people an outlet that is safe and secure. We are muddying the waters by trying to blame legally held handguns for the current problems”.38
Through this analogy, Doyle decoupled the firearm from the act of violence, drawing a sharp distinction between legitimate, law-abiding gun users and criminal perpetrators. He therefore disputed any policy rationale advocating further restrictions on legally held handguns, a position endorsed during the debate by Deputy Bernard J. Durkan. Although the Fine Gael motion- which criticised the government’s anti-crime strategy as ineffective, rejected handgun restrictions, and called for fast-tracking criminal trials—was ultimately defeated38, Doyle intervention demonstrated once again the extent to which NRA rhetoric was able to permeate also European legislative debates.
NRA rhetoric has spread outside of Europe as well, resonating in both developed and developing countries, with still quite divergent levels of civilian firearm holdings and violent crime. On 8 April 2021, Senator Marcos do Val of the centre-right Podemos stated in an address to the Federal Senate that “Armas não matam pessoas; pessoas matam pessoas” (“Guns don’t kill people; people kill people”) 39. Mr Do Val’s comment was made as he argued for postponing deliberation on a legislative decree project intended to overturn President Jair Bolsonaro’s four firearms decrees issued in February 2021. Set to take effect on 13 April, these presidential decrees introduced sweeping expansions of civilian access to firearms and ammunition, particularly for hunters, marksmen and collectors (CACs). The President of the Senate complied with Mr Do Val’s request, and removed deliberation from the day’s voting agenda39.However, these regulatory rollbacks did not take effect unimpeded: on 12 April 2021, on the eve of their scheduled commencement, Justice Rosa Weber of the Supremo Tribunal Federal issued an injunction suspending several of the decrees’ core provisions, including clauses which raised individual firearms acquisition limits and eased registration requirements40. Around this time, the firearm-homicide rate in Brazil was approximately 21 per 100,000 people41 with civilian weapons acquisition expanding rapidly under the Bolsonaro administration’s deregulatory drive42. Despite these setbacks, Mr Do Val’s comments, which replicate the quintessential NRA slogan verbatim, were subsequently circulated across allied social media networks and started to be widely championed as an advancement of Brazilian individual liberty.
While maintaining a relatively low firearm-homicide rate-approximately 0.7 per 100,000 people in 2018, compared with countries in the Americas such as Brazil- and an estimated 34.7 civilian firearms per 100 people24,43, Canada has nonetheless witnessed the diffusion of the same American firearms discourse. On 9 April 2018, Ontario Progressive Conservative Leader Doug Ford stated at a campaign event that “guns don’t kill people, people kill people. Crazy people”, adding that responsible gun owners are never the ones “going around killing people”44. Mr Ford’s remarks came in the wake of two separate Ontario shootings in January and February of 2018, which left five people dead and several others wounded45,46. In June 2018, shortly before the Ontario general election, the Ontario Liberal Party released an audio recording of Ford’s comments. Liberal leaders criticized the “NRA-style rhetoric” of the statement. In response, Mr Ford issued a statement clarifying his support for strong gun-control legislation 47. Just days after the audio recording surfaced, Mr Ford led the Progressive Conservatives to a majority government, winning his first term as Premier of Ontario, while the governing Liberals suffered a historic defeat, losing 48 seats in the Legislative Assembly.48
Quite similarly, Australia and New Zealand, both non-European countries with historically low firearm- homicide rates, have experienced the emergence of instances of NRA rhetoric surfacing in their politics. In New Zealand, variations of classic American gun-rights maxims surfaced during the intense legislative debates that followed the 15 March 2019 Christchurch mosque shootings, in which a White supremacist murdered 51 worshippers and injured 40 others49. Prior to the massacre, New Zealand maintained a low and stable firearm-homicide rate, set against an estimated civilian ownership level of 26.3 firearms per 100 people50. The inclusion of the 51 victims into the statistics create an acute distortion, producing an unprecedented, one-year surge in the national rate in 2019. Compelled by the gravity of the event, the Parliament acted decisively to overhaul the country’s weapons regime, passing the Arms (Prohibited Firearms, Magazines, and Parts) Amendment Act 2019, which banned most semi-automatic fire-arms, high-capacity magazines and associated firearms parts51. On 28 November 2019, Louise Hutchinson, spokesperson for the Waikato Mongrel Mob Kingdom, expressed herself in opposition to the proposed measures, contending: “Guns aren’t the problem, people are the problem. Guns don’t kill, it’s people that kill people”.52 Hutchinson argued that the legislative reforms effectively displaced scrutiny from the white supremacist perpetrator onto non-white communities—specifically Māori—describing the measures as “racist in its intent”52. While her testimony clearly evoked the standard NRA argument that decouples the weapon from the violence by locating culpability within the individual, she fundamentally inverted the slogan’s traditional purpose. Rather than championing conservative gun culture or sport-shooting lobbies, she repurposed American anti-regulation rhetoric to shield an indigenous, marginalised community from expanded state surveillance and policing.
In December 2014, when Australia’s national firearm-homicide rate was approximately 0.14 per 100,000 people53, gunman Man Haron Monis took 18 people hostage inside the Lindt Café in Sydney until police tactical officers stormed the premises after a 17-hour siege54. The incident resulted in the deaths of the café manager Tori Johnson, who was executed by Monis, and the barrister Katrina Dawson, who instead was killed by ricocheting fragments of police bullets during the raid. Australian Senator David Leyonhjelm responded to the tragedy by describing Australia a “nation of victims”, asserting that such a tragedy would not have happened in US states such as Florida, Texas, Vermont, or Alaska. “Statistically speaking,” he claimed, “one or two of the victims” would have been carrying a concealed handgun that could have averted the tragic outcome55. From the Liberal Democratic Party, Leyonhjelm himself cultivated explicit institutional and philosophical ties to the NRA, appearing also in a video broadcast on NRATV during Hillary Clinton’s 2016 US presidential campaign, during which she advocated stronger gun-control measures and cited Australia’s regulatory framework as a model56. Central to the Australian model of gun-control Hillary Clinton was praising, there was the 1996 National Firearms Agreement, which established the principal 1996-97 National Firearms Buyback that collected and destroyed roughly 640,000 newly prohibited semi-automatic and pump-action firearms, alongside the subsequent 2003 National Handgun Buyback, which retired an additional 68,727 handguns57. In the NRATV video56, Leyonhjelm said he was “a bit horrified” by Clinton’s remarks, insisting that Australia should not be held up as an international template and dismissing buyback and confiscation schemes as ultimately ineffective in the country. Reiterating his depiction of Australia as a “nation of victims”, Leyonhjelm expressed admiration for the organisation, stating that he was “in awe of the success of the NRA in holding back the tide” and declaring that Australian gun-rights advocates relied on the group to help them “hold the line in Australia”56.
Taken together, these cases reveal the different pathways through which this rhetoric has appeared outside the US. However, as anticipated above, they should not be treated as evidence of a single process of NRA-led transmission. The use of language resembling “guns don’t kill people; people do” outside the US does not, in itself, demonstrate that the NRA exported that language or caused the adoption of these arguments elsewhere. Claims emphasising individual culpability, lawful ownership and the neutrality of weapons can also arise independently wherever governments propose restrictions on firearms. In Australia, Leyonhjelm participation in NRA media activity and his explicit reliance on the organization’s support constitutes clear evidence of direct contact between pro-gun actors and the NRA. Elements of the Brazilian debate likewise show documented NRA involvement. In other cases, however, the resemblance is mainly ideological and rhetorical rather than demonstrably organisational. The significance of all these examples therefore lies less in establishing that every instance originated with the NRA than in showing the adaptability of a political frame that the American gun-rights movement helped develop and institutionalise. What should be retained is that across different national settings, the same basic logic can be repurposed to defend lawful gun- ownership, challenge restrictions, or again shift attention from firearm availability towards the conduct and responsibility of individual perpetrators. The international circulation of the rhetoric is thus best understood as a combination of direct organisational influence and independent convergence around a common political frame.

Power, lobbying, and political inertia
The NRA’s use of lobbying, political relationships and media campaigning, as illustrated by David Leyonhjelm’s involvement in its promotional broadcasting, is well documented. First, it is especially within domestic US politics that the NRA has exerted substantial influence on gun politics and policy, primarily through sustained legislative advocacy in the Congress. One of the organization’s arms, the Institute for Legislative Action (NRA-ILA), directs much of this work. According to federal lobbying disclosure records compiled by OpenSecrets, the NRA spent a cumulative total of $64,857,564 on registered federal lobbying between 1998 and the close of the 2022 legislative cycle58. In addition to direct lobbying expenditures, other pro-gun groups led by the NRA deployed over $150 million between 2000 and 2018 in outside spending and independent advocacy efforts that do not directly fund candidate campaigns59. Such levels of political capital helped shape landmark federal statutes. For example, NRA advocacy was instrumental in the enactment of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) in 2005, which provided firearms manufacturers and sellers with substantial protection from civil liability for crimes or unlawful acts committed with their products, while retaining enumerated statutory exceptions such as defective design or negligent entrustment. The organisation also championed the adoption of the 1996 Dickey Amendment. Rather than imposing an explicit statutory prohibition on all gun-violence research, the Amendment stipulated that none of the funds made available to the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) could be used to “advocate or promote gun control”60. Together with subsequent congressional budget reductions, that reallocated injury-prevention funds, this rider produced a substantial and long-lasting chilling effect on federally funded firearms research. Such legislative intervention was however directly precipitated by earlier public health studies. In 1993, a prominent study funded by the CDC and led by Arthur Kellermann reported an epidemiological association indicating that keeping a firearm in the home was linked to an increased risk of homicide by a family member or intimate acquaintance61.Following its publication in the New England Journal of Medicine, the NRA launched a targeted campaign to defund the agency’s research programmes and eliminate what it termed “anti-gun propaganda”62. During this campaign, the study’s lead author was informed that the organisation had assembled a personal dossier on him at its headquarters. Among many others, these episodes illustrate the NRA’s concerted strategy to constrain empirical inquiry, dismantle federal restrictions and resist the introduction of new statutory controls.
The NRA has demonstrated its political leverage also during federal election campaigns. During the 2016 US elections, the organisation disbursed over $30 million in reported independent expenditures to support Donald Trump’s presidential candidacy and oppose Hillary Clinton, outspending all other outside special-interest groups in that race63. In addition to its presidential outlays, the NRA allocated approximately $20 million across six key senate races to assist Republican candidates64. Beyond direct expenditures, the NRA-Political Victory Fund (NRA-PVF) operated a candidate grading system, assigning letter grades from A to F to evaluate politicians based on their voting records and public stances on Second Amendment issues65. These ratings exerted considerable discipline over lawmakers’ legislative positions; a downgraded evaluation could jeopardize endorsement, alienate pro-gun voters, or redirect outside campaign spending toward primarily or general-election opponents. The impact of such mechanism was particularly evident during the contentious 2014 confirmation of Vivek Murthy as US Surgeon General66. After Murthy described gun violence as a public-health issue, leading to a year-long confirmation delay, the NRA announced that it would score the Senate confirmation vote on Murthy’s appointment in its legislative scorecards. In this way, it ultimately and effectively threatened to downgrade the ratings of supporting senators.
The NRA’s determination to insulate firearms from statutory regulation has extended well beyond the American domestic sphere, penetrating multilateral governance. In particular, the organization has systematically pressured US officials to reject or withdraw from international agreements that set global standards for firearms. During negotiations over the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013, the NRA demonstrated its substantial capacity to shape US policy on international firearms governance. Characterising the proposed agreement as an existential threat to domestic sovereignty, the NRA Institute for Legislative Action warned: “The most pressing international threat to US gun owners is the UN Arms Trade Treaty…. [If passed,] US firearms policy could become the rest of the world’s business and subject to its approval, on pain of trade restrictions if it doesn’t meet ‘international norms.’”67 In response, the organization mounted an aggressive lobbying effort targeting US lawmakers to try to get all references to firearms outside the scope of the treaty68. Although the final text adopted by the UN General Assembly retained small arms and light weapons within its purview, the NRA’s domestic campaign successfully obstructed US ratification. The withdrawal of the US signature was announced by President Donald Trump in April 201969.
Beyond multilateral organisations, the NRA has replicated its core strategy also towards other countries, while always trying to adapt its lobbying techniques to fit foreign political and regulatory environments. Notably, the organisation often does not lobby foreign governments directly; instead, it bets on providing strategic advice, messaging guidance and political tactics through its representatives to domestic interest groups seeking to resist restrictive legislation. This repository of arguments, framing strategies and political tactics has been exploited by various foreign pro-gun organisations, including allied advocacy groups in Canada, South Africa and the UK70.The indirect leverage exerted through these cross-border interventions has yielded mixed yet notable results.
In Canada, during the 90s, the NRA attempted to exert economic pressure against proposed federal gun-control legislation by threatening a boycott by American hunters who were used to spend tourism dollars in the country71. However, this external pressure had limited effect: Canada enacted major federal firearms legislation in 1995 (The Firearms Act), establishing a universal licensing and registration regime despite fierce domestic and international gun-lobby opposition.
Perhaps NRA’s biggest success has been in Brazil. In 2003, amidst legislative efforts to restrict civilian access in a country experiencing some of the world’s highest rates of firearm violence, Charles Cunningham, an NRA lobbyist, addressed audiences in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Echoing American constitutional discourse, he framed resistance to firearm restrictions as a struggle that “was about more than guns and was about freedom”68..His narrative was subsequently adopted in campaign advertisements during the October 2005 national referendum on banning firearm and ammunition sales to civilians: one broadcast featured a news anchor warning that disarmament “won’t disarm criminals”, juxtaposed with images of Nelson Mandela’s release from prison and the “Tank Man” of Tiananmen Square68 . Despite initial public and institutional support from political and church leaders, the proposed nationwide prohibition was defeated by 64 per cent to 36 per cent.
Some interactions were documented also in Australia, where officials associated with the right-wing One Nation Party met with NRA representatives while seeking political advice and funding to weaken domestic gun laws.71 In footage recorded during an undercover investigation by Al Jazeera72, the Australian representatives asked how to manage media fallout following a mass-shooting. NRA officials advised them to “start with silence” and, should public pressure persist, to “go on the offensive”. These revelations triggered widespread bipartisan condemnation and public backlash and the delegation secured neither foreign funds nor policy concessions. Australia’s strict regulatory regime remained completely intact73.
Overall, while the transnational diffusion of these maxims may partially reflect ideological convergence among gun advocates, there are also many documented cases of NRA involvement with foreign organisations, demonstrating that it actually played an active role in disseminating familiar arguments and campaign strategies across borders.

Conclusion: implications for public health and regulation
The global circulation of the slogan “guns don’t kill people; people do” reveals it to be far more than a descriptive claim about causality and human agency. Across political systems and cultural contexts, the phrase consistently operates as a rhetorical device that narrows the scope of responsibility and directs attention away from institutional, commercial and regulatory factors affecting firearm availability, ultimately constraining the boundaries of policy debate. Its persistence, despite extensive evidence that firearm availability and weapon characteristics also affect lethal outcomes, underscores its primary function as an ideological anchor rather than an empirical reality. Understanding its power, dissemination, and consequences, is therefore essential not only for analysing firearms policies internationally, but also for recognising how moral language and “bumper sticker logic” can be mobilized globally to resist collective solutions to systemic harm. Treating gun-violence as a global health issue requires coordinated prevention strategies and interventions, whose implementation depends in part on agreement about the causes and the nature of the problem. So long as there is disagreement over the factors driving gun-violence, and the NRA and analogous gun-rights movements continue to frame the issue primarily around individual deviance rather than weapon availability, efforts to establish robust, evidence-based regulatory frameworks are likely to be frustrated.

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