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The politics of immunity: UK–Israel legal coordination and the erosion of universal jurisdiction

By Louis Hayes on
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Executive Summary

This report, drawing on over 800,000 leaked Israeli Ministry of Justice emails hacked in April 2024 and cross-verified against UK official records, reveals UK-Israeli legal collaboration since the mid-2000s to shield Israeli officials and dual-national IDF soldiers from war crimes prosecutions in Britain. Key incidents like the 2005 Heathrow standoff (General Doron Almog) and 2009 Tzipi Livni arrest warrant prompted legislative changes, including Section 1(4A) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, requiring Director of Public Prosecutions consent for private warrants on grave international crimes. Post-2011, the UK issued special mission immunity certificates to 16 Israeli delegations since 2013, including for Benny Gantz and Herzl Halevi, coinciding with peak Gaza scrutiny. Leaks show Israeli lobbying for these protections, alongside concerns over UK-IDF dual citizens, exacerbated by the UK’s September 2025 recognition of Palestine, potentially breaching the Foreign Enlistment Act 1870. Despite suspending 30 arms licences to Israel in 2024 over IHL risks, F-35 components were exempted for NATO security, enabling continued high-level visits. It appears the system prioritises military ties (e.g., F-35, intelligence) over universal jurisdiction duties, silencing arms trade scrutiny.

Introduction

This AOAV report argues that legal actors in the UK and Israel have collaborated with an ambition to circumvent international law in Britain since the mid-2000s. Israeli government lawyers and their UK counterparts have worked together to manage a series of interconnected risks. The primary of which is the potential for high-level Israeli officials to be arrested for war crimes on British soil. This is coupled with the legal exposure faced by British-Israeli IDF soldiers upon their arrival in the UK. It is a risk that has intensified with the formal recognition of the State of Palestine in September 2025[1].

The report also highlights how military and intelligence ties, such as the F-35 programme, meant that travel routes have been kept open for Israeli officials. This legal advocacy has also, to a large extent, silenced public scrutiny of the arms trade. 

Our analysis is based on a dataset[2] containing over 800,000 emails, 700,000 image files, 200,000 documents, thousands of spreadsheets and presentations originating from the Israeli Ministry of Justice, leaked by a hacktivist collective ‘Anonymous for Justice’ in April 2024.

Leaked information tends to be cluttered and or incomplete. Reuters reported that it could not independently verify the authenticity of the hacktivist-leaked files. For this reason, we have sought to cross-examine them against official UK records.

To this end, the leaked documents have been compared to four primary sources. Statutory text and explanatory notes regarding the 2011 reform of private arrest warrants[3], as well as official prosecutorial guidance issued by the Crown Prosecution Service[4], have been used in this comparison. The report also utilises ministerial statements to Parliament concerning ‘special mission immunity’, and specific parliamentary answers disclosing dates and volume of immunity certificates issued to Israeli delegations.

The Heathrow Standoff

The 2005 standoff at Heathrow[5], involving retired Israeli General Doron Almog, exemplified the UK’s willingness to put diplomacy before international law.

Almog was no marginal figure but a senior Israeli military commander, having served as head of the Israel Defense Forces’ Southern Command between 2000 and 2003, during the height of the Second Intifada. In that role, he oversaw operations in Gaza, including controversial policies such as large-scale house demolitions aimed at countering militancy. It was these actions that later formed the basis of legal complaints brought by human rights lawyers, who alleged he was guilty of grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

A day before Almog’s arrival to the UK, a British judge ordered his arrest over these alleged war crimes in Gaza. The warrant relied on the concept of universal jurisdiction (ICRC, 2021)[6]. This legal doctrine enables any country to prosecute grave international crimes, regardless of where they occurred. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (2014), this obligation is mandatory and must be applied ‘regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator.’ The situation also created diplomatic tension as it provided independent judges the means to hold high-level officials accountable without the government’s purview.

By 2005, Almog had retired from active service but remained a prominent public figure, making the attempted arrest a significant test case for the application of universal jurisdiction against high-ranking officials of allied states.

After landing on British soil, General Doron Almog refused to disembark from the plane, having possibly been informed that he might be arrested (Dodd, 2005). Meanwhile, the Metropolitan Police refused to board the aircraft, stating fear of an ‘armed confrontation’ with his security detail (PCHR, 2008)[7]. Following a two-hour showdown the retired general set off back to Israel without facing prosecution.

It was a remarkable moment of inaction that, to some, showed just how much close political allies are above the Geneva Conventions on British soil. It was heavily criticised by human rights organisations, such as Amnesty international[8] who described it as ‘a clear violation both of the UK’s unconditional obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention and under national law’ (Amnesty International, 2005). Today, the Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review (2025) warns that selective enforcement is a ‘major threat to the legitimacy of international justice’[9]. They highlight the double standard between the swift investigations into Ukraine and Syria compared to the continued inaction over Gaza.

The 2009 Livni Warrant

In December 2009, a British judge issued an arrest warrant for Tzipi Livni, Israel’s former Foreign Minister, over her alleged role in the 2008–2009 Gaza conflict (Operation Cast Lead), where lawyers for Palestinian victims invoked universal jurisdiction for suspected war crimes. Livni, who had served as Foreign Minister from 2006–2009 and was a key figure in Ehud Olmert’s cabinet during the offensive, canceled a planned UK visit upon learning of the warrant, which was swiftly revoked after she did not enter British territory. The incident drew sharp condemnation from Israeli officials as an “abuse of the British legal system,” prompting apologies from Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Foreign Secretary David Miliband, who pledged legislative changes to prevent future risks to visiting Israeli leaders.

That led to a shift in legislation. By May 2010, Foreign Secretary William Hague argued publicly that the situation was ‘unsatisfactory’ and that the UK could not accept a position where Israeli politicians felt unable to visit (Hirsch, 2010)[10]. This culminated in 2011 with the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (2011, p. 106)[11], which introduced Section 1(4A), explicitly stating that for a defined group of offences committed abroad, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, torture, and hostage-taking, ‘no warrant shall be issued’ without the express consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. This ensures that every private application undergoes a state-controlled filter before a warrant can be granted.

Evidence from leaked Israeli Justice Ministry documents, reported by Declassified UK, suggests that these legislative adjustments emerged following a sustained lobbying campaign by Israel (McEvoy, 2024)[12] beginning after the Heathrow standoff.

Israeli legal officials sent memos and sought amendments to the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act. They advocated for an executive greenlight in order to filter out judicial warrant applications.

In this framework, the UK gained a mechanism to prevent diplomatic ‘emergencies’. Israel now receives prior assurances enabling their officials to travel freely.

  • AOAV recommends the repeal of Section 1(4A) of the 2011 Act.

Immunity becomes routine

After the legislative reforms in 2011, the UK went further still to facilitate the use of immunity for official visitors. In March 2013, a ministerial statement introduced a pilot process providing immunity for extra-nationals on temporary official business (Hansard, 2013)[13]. This statement confirmed that the UK recognises these immunities under customary international law.

Crucially, it established that His Majesty’s Government, not a court, decides which visits qualify.

In January 2025, the Foreign Office revealed that of 68 requests for special missions since 2013 of these, immunity certificates were issued for Israeli delegations on some 16 occasions. In answer to parliamentary questions, specific recipients were disclosed. These included Benny Gantz and Herzl Halevi (UK Parliament, 2025)[14]. The data shows Israeli delegations received this protection precisely when legal scrutiny of conduct in Gaza was at its most intense.

The immunity practice provides a safe corridor for travel managed by the executive. It allows senior officials and military leaders to visit even when private arrest applications are likely. Declassified UK’s leaked documents provide another part of the picture. They allege that after 2011, Israeli officials pushed for even more insulation against prosecution. They reportedly wanted bilateral meetings to be excluded from public scrutiny thereby overriding freedom of information (McEvoy, 2024).

Declassified also found that the CPS under Starmer, the then DPP, has since refused to disclose internal information on the prosecutions regarding the 2011 Livni episode (McEvoy, 2024)[15].

A central theme emerges: Britain’s frontier of accountability is now shaped as much by information control as it is by formal law.

  • AOAV urges the government to transfer the power to grant ‘Special Mission’ immunity from the executive branch to an independent judicial body.

The prosecution of dual citizens serving in the IDF

According to leaked Israeli Justice Ministry material, their focus is also on assessing whether UK nationals serving in the Israel Defence Forces could face criminal liability upon their return. Declassified reports that Israeli officials commissioned legal advice on this issue (Declassified UK, 2024)[16]. They investigated whether British subjects can lawfully serve in foreign militaries.

The trigger for this, according to Declassified UK, was public pressure to treat returning UK-IDF personnel as foreign fighters (McEvoy and Morris, 2026)[17]. This concern was addressed in an April 2024 parliamentary answer, which stated: ‘The UK recognises the right of British nationals with more than one nationality to serve in the legitimately recognised armed forces of their additional nationalities. This includes the Israel Defence Force.’ However, the answer included an important caveat: ‘Anyone who travels to conflict zones to engage in unlawful activity should expect to be investigated upon their return to the UK.’[18]

The answer referred to Section 4 of the Foreign Enlistment Act 1870[19]. The act makes it a criminal offence for a British subject to enter the military of a foreign state at war with a state at peace with the UK. At that time, the UK did not recognise the Occupied Palestinian Territories as a state[20]. However, following the UK’s recognition of the palestinian state on the 21st of September 2025, the legal landscape is now uncertain. By October 2025, the International Centre of Justice for Palestinians had already requested private prosecution on a simple premise: Palestine is now ‘a foreign state’, at peace with the UK. Therefore, under the Act, service in the IDF amounts to a breach of the law of England.

The pressure is mounting on other fronts, too. In April 2025, a 240-page dossier (see the summary here), built on witness testimony and open-source intelligence, was handed to the Metropolitan Police’s War Crimes Unit[21]. This filing serves as a direct test of whether UK institutions have the appetite to investigate their own citizens for international crimes. For Israel, this represents an increase in legal vulnerability for its personnel. If UK courts begin to entertain these cases, Israeli state lawyers must work to pre-empt British legal interpretations, aiming to secure what Declassified describes as ‘adequate safeguards’ [22] for their service members travelling abroad.

  • AOAV calls on the Crown Prosecution Service to provide clear, public guidance on the legality of British subjects serving in the IDF following the UK’s recognition of Palestine.

Arms trade, military cooperation and intelligence channels

For AOAV, the legal story is inseparable from the material one. Defence cooperation, arms exports, and intelligence sharing drive senior officials to travel. The strategic interests of the UK give the political incentive to allow these visits.

In September 2024, the UK government suspended 30 arms export licences to Israel for use in Gaza (Department for Business and Trade, 2024)[23]. A ‘clear risk’ that they might facilitate serious violations of international law was cited by officials. This decision is well-documented in government news releases and parliamentary briefings.

Yet, subsequent litigation reveals how national security arguments allow for exceptions, even when the government’s own IHL assessment has shifted. A High Court judgment on the ‘F-35 carve-out’ shows that while some licenses were halted, the government intentionally excluded F-35 components[24]. The Defence Secretary, John Healey, argued that the global F-35 programme depends heavily on the UK. Suspending these licenses, the government claimed, would have profound implications for NATO partners and international security. He added that it would ‘undermine US confidence in the UK and Nato at a critical juncture in our collective history and set back relations’ (Al-Haq v Secretary of State for Business and Trade, 2025, p. 63, para. 167)[25].

International defence cooperation, such as the global F-35 programme, cannot happen remotely. It demands secure, in-person discussions between senior leaders. By issuing ‘special mission’ certificates, the UK ensures Israeli officials can land in London safely. This removes the threat of a court-ordered arrest.

Remarkably, the UK continued to grant this immunity even while it was simultaneously investigating those same officials for war crimes and suspending other arms export licences.

  • AOAV recommends ending all exemptions for F-35 components to ensure that arms export licences are applied consistently to all military programmes.

Conclusion and recommendations

Evidence supports the existence of a British system that is designed to limit legal action against Israeli personnel, including alleged international criminals. The strategy combines changes to formal legal architecture, as well as procedural and diplomatic tools such as special mission immunity.

These tactics operate alongside defence, intelligence, and arms-trade relationships.

This setup ensures that strategic defence ties are prioritised over the duty to investigate international crimes.

Recommendations

  1. AOAV recommends the repeal of Section 1(4A) of the 2011 Act;
  2. AOAV urges the government to transfer the power to grant ‘Special Mission’ immunity from the executive branch to an independent judicial body;
  3. AOAV calls on the Crown Prosecution Service to provide clear, public guidance on the legality of British subjects serving in the IDF following the UK’s recognition of Palestine;
  4. AOAV recommends ending all exemptions for F-35 components to ensure that arms export licences are applied consistently to all military programmes.

 Bibliography

Footnotes

[1] Prime Minister’s Office (2025) PM statement on the recognition of Palestine: 21 September 2025. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-the-recognition-of-palestine-21-september-2025 (Accessed: 7 March 2026).
[2] DDOSecrets (2024) Israel Ministry of Justice. Available at: https://ddosecrets.org/article/israel-ministry-of-justice (Accessed: 7 March 2026).
[3] Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, c. 13. Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/13/pdfs/ukpga_20110013_en.pdf (Accessed: 7 March 2026).
[4] Crown Prosecution Service (2011) War Crimes/Crimes Against Humanity – Guidance on making an application for DPP consent to an application for an arrest warrant. Available at: https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/war-crimescrimes-against-humanity-guidance-making-application-dpp-consent-application (Accessed: 7 March 2026).
[5] Dodd, V. (2005) ‘Israeli general escapes arrest at Heathrow’, The Guardian, 12 September. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/sep/12/israelandthepalestinians.warcrimes (Accessed: 8 March 2026).
[6] International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (2021) Universal jurisdiction over war crimes – Factsheet. Available at:https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/universal-jurisdiction-icrc-eng.pdf (Accessed: 8 March 2026).
[7] Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) (2008) ‘British police feared a real threat of an armed confrontation with armed Israelis at Heathrow airport’, 19 February. Available at: https://pchrgaza.org/pchr-and-hickman-rose-british-police-feared-a-real-threat-of-an-armed-confrontation-with-armed-israelis-at-heathrow-airport/ (Accessed: 8 March 2026).
[8] Amnesty International (2005) United Kingdom: Arrest warrant issued against Israeli general: The Doron Almog case. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/eur450362005en.pdf (Accessed: 7 March 2026).
[9] TRIAL International (2025) Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review 2025: Make Way for Justice. Geneva: TRIAL International. Available at: https://redress.org/storage/2025/04/03_TRIAL_UJAR_2025_FINAL_DIGITAL.pdf
[10] Hirsch, A. (2010) ‘Ministers move to change universal jurisdiction law’, The Guardian, 30 May. Available at:https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/may/30/change-universal-jurisdiction-law (Accessed: 8 March 2026).
[11] Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, c. 13. Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/13/pdfs/ukpga_20110013_en.pdf (Accessed: 7 March 2026).
[12] McEvoy, J. (2024) ‘Israel lobbied Britain to change law on war crimes arrests’, Declassified UK, 17 May. Available at: https://www.declassifieduk.org/israel-lobbied-britain-to-change-law-on-war-crimes-arrests/ (Accessed: 8 March 2026).
[13] Hansard (2013) Written Ministerial Statements: Special Mission Immunity (4 March 2013), HC Deb, vol. 559, col. 55WS. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm130304/wmstext/130304m0001.htm (Accessed: 7 March 2026).
[14] UK Parliament (2025) Israel: Diplomatic Immunity: Written question – 18276. Answered by Catherine West on 20 January 2025. Available at: https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2024-12-05/18276/ (Accessed: 7 March 2026).
[15] McEvoy, J. (2024) ‘Censored: Keir Starmer’s emails about Israeli war crimes case’, Declassified UK, 4 June. Available at: https://www.declassifieduk.org/censored-keir-starmers-emails-about-israeli-war-crimes-case/ (Accessed: 8 March 2026).
[16] McEvoy, J. (2024) ‘Israel secretly sought legal advice about Britons serving in the IDF’, Declassified UK, 16 May. Available at: https://www.declassifieduk.org/israel-secretly-sought-legal-advice-about-britons-serving-in-the-idf/ (Accessed: 7 March 2026).
[17] McEvoy, J. and Morris, A. (2026) ‘Over 2,000 Britons served for Israel amid Gaza genocide’, Declassified UK, 11 February. Available at: https://www.declassifieduk.org/over-2000-britons-served-for-israel-amid-gaza-genocide/ (Accessed: 8 March 2026).
[18] Ahmad of Wimbledon, T. (2024) ‘Israel Defense Forces: British Nationals Abroad: Written question – HL3707’, UK Parliament: Written questions, answers and statements, 12 April. Available at: https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2024-03-27/HL3707/ (Accessed: 16 March 2026).
[19] Foreign Enlistment Act 1870, c. 90, s. 4. Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/33-34/90/section/4 (Accessed: 8 March 2026).
[20] UK Parliament (2024) ‘Israel and Ukraine: British Nationals Abroad – Written Question 8748’, 9 January. Available at: https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2024-01-09/8748 (Accessed: 8 March 2026).
[21] International Centre of Justice for Palestinians (2025) Legal Summary: Criminal Complaint to the Metropolitan Police War Crimes Unit regarding British citizens and the IDF. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IU6MHDBpQj-H48_2jy9YYllJOAwR16nY/view (Accessed: 7 March 2026).
[22] ¹ McEvoy, J. (2026) ‘Israel secretly sought legal advice about Britons serving in the IDF’, Declassified UK, 18 February. Available at: https://www.declassifieduk.org/israel-secretly-sought-legal-advice-about-britons-serving-in-the-idf/ (Accessed: 8 March 2026).
[23] Department for Business and Trade (2024) UK suspends around 30 arms export licences to Israel for use in Gaza over International Humanitarian Law concerns. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-suspends-around-30-arms-export-licences-to-israel-for-use-in-gaza-over-international-humanitarian-law-concerns (Accessed: 7 March 2026).
[24] R (Al-Haq) v Secretary of State for Business and Trade [2025] EWHC 1615 (Admin). Available at: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Al-Haq-v-Secretary-of-State-for-Business-and-Trade.pdf (Accessed: 8 March 2026).
[25]Al-Haq v Secretary of State for Business and Trade[2025] EWHC 1615 (Admin). Available at:https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Al-Haq-v-Secretary-of-State-for-Business-and-Trade.pdf(Accessed: 16 March 2026).