A little-known consultancy based in Kent recorded 194 uses of an export licence covering controlled goods and technology, with Israel listed as the destination, during 2023 and 2024, according to Department for Business and Trade records.
Listed as a management consultancy by Companies House, Touché Ltd has a relatively limited public profile. Registered in Ash, Kent, the company is co-directed by Omer Benayahu and Neta Peleg Benayahu, an Israeli couple.
Omer Benayahu’s employment history shows an extensive background in the defence industry, including links to Elbit Systems, Israel’s largest defence contractor. His LinkedIn profile states that, alongside co-founding Touché in 2019, he worked as a team leader at Instro Precision, a UK manufacturer owned by Elbit Systems.
The findings were first reported by Private Eye. Government export-control records show that Touché held an Open Individual Export Licence for arms exports, known as an OIEL, first granted in 2022.
Unlike a Standard Individual Export Licence, which generally authorises specified goods to a specified recipient, an OIEL can permit multiple shipments of specified controlled goods to named destinations or recipients during the period in which the licence is valid. The quantity of goods exported under an OIEL is generally not limited, although exporters remain subject to the conditions of the licence.
A Department for Business and Trade freedom-of-information disclosure shows that Touché reported 103 uses of the arms licence for Israel in 2023 and 91 in 2024, a total of 194. No use was reported for 2025.
Private Eye reported that this represented more shipments to Israel over the two-year period than were recorded by some substantially larger UK defence companies.
The use of an OIEL does not, however, reveal the same level of transaction-by-transaction information that would be available from individual licences. This can make it difficult to establish publicly the quantity, value and ultimate use of goods exported under such licences.
The licence granted to Touché covered a wide range of controlled goods and technology. These included components for civil unmanned air vehicles, equipment for converting manned aircraft into unmanned aircraft, UAV components, and technology relating to UAVs and turbofan, turbojet and turboprop UAV engine systems.
In its response to the FOI request, the Department for Business and Trade said the figures were based on usage returns submitted by the exporter.
It also cautioned that information held on its SPIRE export-licensing system had limitations because licence holders did not always provide the number of shipments or quantities shipped. Officials said they could therefore not “dependably determine” either the precise number of uses or the dates on which the licence had been used.
The disclosed information does not specify the value of Touché’s exports, the number of components contained in each shipment, their manufacturer or their ultimate recipient.
Nor does the available information establish whether equipment exported by Touché was used by the Israel Defense Forces in Gaza, incorporated into Israeli weapons systems or associated with particular military operations.
The wider use of open licences for arms exports to Israel has attracted scrutiny. According to UK government figures, there were 51 extant OIELs with Israel as a destination on 31 May 2024, alongside 290 Standard Individual Export Licences.
On 30 January 2024, the Arms Export Control Joint Unit conducted a remote compliance visit to Touché Ltd. Such checks form part of the ECJU’s oversight of companies using export licences. The government disclosure does not provide details of the findings of that visit.
In September 2024, the UK government suspended around 30 arms export licences for items intended for use in military operations in Gaza, from a total of approximately 350 licences to Israel. The government said its assessment had found a “clear risk” that certain military exports might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law. The suspended licences included components for military aircraft, helicopters and drones, as well as equipment used for ground targeting. The decision did not amount to an arms embargo, and the government stressed that it was not making a determination that Israel or British exporters had committed offences.
It is not clear from the publicly available information whether Touché’s OIEL was among the licences affected by the suspension.
Concerns over the transparency of open licences pre-date the Gaza war. Parliamentary committees have previously called for greater transparency around open licences, including information about companies, equipment and the quantities transferred. The government itself acknowledges limitations in export-control data. Its current guidance notes that OIELs generally do not limit the quantity of goods that can be exported, while official licensing statistics do not necessarily represent goods actually exported.
The significance of the Touché case lies in what it reveals about the limits of public scrutiny of Britain’s arms-export system. A small company with little public profile has reported extensive use of a licence covering military-controlled goods and technology destined for Israel, including UAV-related equipment, yet the available records do not disclose what was actually shipped, its value, the quantities involved or the ultimate recipients.
The UK government itself concluded in September 2024 that there was a “clear risk” that some UK military exports to Israel might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, leading it to suspend licences covering, among other items, UAV components. By December 2024, two OIELs were among the suspended licences.
The case raises a broader question about transparency and accountability in the movement of military and dual-use technology into armed conflicts. Open licences present a particular challenge to our scrutiny of arms exports linked to civilian harm in conflict, because they can authorise repeated exports without the quantity of goods generally being limited, while the government does not publish a financial value for OIELs in the way it does for standard individual licences. The result is a black hole gap between the degree of activity permitted by the export-control system and the information available to Parliament, human rights reseachers and the public about what actually leaves the country, and the impact this might have in war.
There is no evidence in the material examined by AOAV that Touché breached any of the terms of its export licence or UK export-control law.
But, as noted, its reported use of an open licence illustrates the difficulty of establishing from public records precisely what controlled goods have been exported, in what quantities, at what value and to which ultimate recipients.
AOAV was unable to contact Touché to request a right to reply. There is no publicly listed corporate email address for Touché Ltd published on Companies House. Any reply given in response to this article will be published.
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