The possibility that members of Britain’s Special Forces could face prosecution over alleged unlawful killings in Afghanistan is, in one sense, a tragedy.
The deaths behind the potential prosecutions remain, still, a tragedy for the Afghan families who have waited years for answers. It is a tragedy for an institution whose reputation rests on discipline, professionalism and service under extraordinary pressure. And it is a tragedy for Britain that allegations of this gravity have persisted for so long without final resolution.
But if credible evidence points to serious crimes, prosecution is also a necessity.
According to the BBC, evidence uncovered through the Independent Inquiry relating to Afghanistan suggested that serious offences may have been committed by British personnel during detention operations between 2010 and 2013.
The Inquiry itself is examining whether there is credible information that UK Special Forces carried out extrajudicial killings, whether any such killings were subsequently covered up and whether earlier Royal Military Police investigations were properly conducted.
None of this means anyone is guilty.
A referral is not a prosecution. And a prosecution is not a conviction.
AOAV had already written to the military police in November 2023 asking for an investigation into Sir Gwyn Jenkins over allegations that he failed to report evidence of possible SAS executions. The Royal Military Police said the Defence Serious Crime Command was aware of AOAV’s request, although AOAV received no substantive response from the Command.
As the inquiry was ongoing, we were told, there would be no prosecutions.
It later emerged that, after separate evidence was referred to the Command in early 2026, service police carried out a scoping exercise into prosecuting as yet unknown service personnel but paused any criminal investigation pending the conclusion of the Afghanistan Inquiry.
Justice, in this form, has been delayed.
If evidence exists suggesting murder, manslaughter or other grave offences, it must be investigated properly. If prosecutors conclude that there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction, and that prosecution is in the public interest, charges should follow. That is the standard applied under the Full Code Test.
That principle cannot change because the allegations concern the SAS.
Yes, Special Forces operate in extreme conditions. Soldiers are required to make rapid decisions in circumstances that are dangerous, confused and often lethal. Any fair assessment of their conduct must recognise the realities of combat and guard against comfortable hindsight.
Yet operational difficulty cannot become a de facto justification for legal exceptionalism.
The state entrusts soldiers with extraordinary powers, including the lawful authority to kill. In that sense, legal accountability is more important, not less.
The distinction between lawful killing in war and unlawful killing in war must remain real and enforceable. If not, there are no rules in war.
To date, no member of UK Special Forces has been prosecuted for an alleged war crime arising from operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. Earlier investigations into alleged wrongdoing in Afghanistan produced no prosecutions. Operation Northmoor investigated hundreds of allegations concerning Afghanistan between 2005 and 2013 but brought no charges, while a separate investigation, Operation Cestro, resulted in three soldiers being referred to the Service Prosecuting Authority but none being prosecuted.
And yet, for years, the allegations concerning some British operations in Afghanistan have been extraordinarily serious. They include claims that Afghans, including children, were unlawfully killed during raids and that accounts subsequently given for some deaths did not reflect what had actually happened.
The inquiry exists because allegations of this kind cannot be settled through institutional reassurance or reputation alone. Evidence must be examined, witnesses heard and decisions tested.
But an inquiry is not a substitute for criminal justice.
If evidence provides reasonable grounds to suspect criminal conduct, investigators must investigate. If prosecutors conclude that the evidential and public-interest tests are met, prosecution should follow. If those tests are not met, individuals should not remain indefinitely under the shadow of suspicion.
This should not be regarded as hostility towards the armed forces. Nor can these allegations simply be dismissed as the product of “ambulance-chasing lawyers”.
The overwhelming majority of British service personnel are expected to obey the law in circumstances most people will never experience. They are entitled to know that those standards are meaningful and that alleged criminal conduct will not be ignored to protect the prestige of a unit.
Failure to investigate credible allegations does not protect institutional reputation. It corrodes it, allowing suspicion to spread from individuals to whole units and commanders. A credible criminal process can test evidence, protect defendants’ rights, clear the innocent and hold the guilty to account.
Afghan families also deserve answers after more than a decade of uncertainty. The Defence Serious Crime Command’s reported decision to pause criminal investigations while the inquiry continues may have justification, but delay carries risks as memories fade and evidence becomes harder to test.
Britain also has a wider interest in applying at home the standards it demands abroad. No soldier should be prosecuted because of headlines or political pressure. But nor should anyone be shielded because they served in an elite or secretive unit.
That is why this moment is both tragic and necessary.
If the evidence supports prosecution, the rule of law requires it.
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